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Through a feminist and interpretivist lens, this dissertation addresses the present dearth 
of research on marital rape in contemporary South Africa by exploring contradictory 
institutional responses to marital rape in legal, policy, and social contexts. Drawing from 
an array of academic traditions spanning law, the social sciences and the humanities, as 
well as empirical research with women’s rights organisations undertaken by the author, 
my research question asks: Since the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993, in what ways 
is marital rape in South Africa rendered (in)visible in and through the institutions where 
women seek protection from violence? The dissertation argues that despite the 
criminalisation of marital rape and an emergent women’s rights consciousness within the 
law, formal and informal institutions that survivors seek help from are complicit in 
fostering conditions that allow for marital rape to persist. These hindrances arise in both 
overt and subtle forms. Concurrently, the dissertation draws out the kinds of 
circumstances through which marital rape is revealed, acknowledged and addressed 
within institutional environments. Tracing women’s endeavours to seek protection, the 
research captures the manner in which Black women are compelled to carry disquieting 
levels of violence, while also discovering the forms of recourse that eventually do provide 
them relief. The research findings unearth an interplay of factors that preclude 
recognition of the scale of sexual violence in marriage, and stifle survivors’ ability to find 
recourse. Amidst this web of barriers, local women’s rights civil society organisations play 
a critical role in assisting survivors and bringing the sexual abuse to light. Through the 
range of local services offered by these organisations, survivors are progressively 
empowered to enact changes in their lives and find means of freeing themselves from 
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GLOSSARY OF RECURRING TERMS 
 
-thwelwe The isiXhosa term for the state of having been subjected to the 
ukuthwala process.   
 
Ukuthwala Ukuthwala is the isiXhosa and isiZulu word for the practice of 
abducting/carrying off a girl or woman for purposes of marriage. 
Variations of this practice are also found across South Africa 
amongst tshiVenda, siSwati, xiTsonga, sePedi and IsiNdebele 
speaking groups, and others. 
 
Makoti  The isiZulu and isiXhosa term for a new wife  
  
Lobola Loosely translated as “bridewealth” but the meaning and 
symbolism are more complex than a simple translation conveys. 
In past times lobola was given in form of cattle but in the present 
it can be given in the form of money and gifts. Lobola is a central 
component of customary marriage; given by a man to the family 
of his intended bride, for purposes of compensating/thanking  
her family for having raised her, and creating a bond between the 
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1 Chapter 1: Finding Feminism(s) and Revealing the 
Gaps 
1.1 INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
Interwoven in spaces seen and unseen, violence in South Africa embeds itself 
amongst its people. The legibility of this marking is uneven, for a historical amalgam of 
legal, cultural and social manipulations renders certain bodies more vulnerable to violence 
than others. Violence more easily inscribes itself on bodies that hold lesser status in South 
African society; bodies marked by youth, disability, queerness, Blackness and gender.1 
Though the written law now casts its net wide enough to protect all who inhabit this 
country, the violence enacted upon bodies marked by “otherness” flourishes, and its 
victims may rarely find solace in the law.  
Marital rape is perhaps the quintessence of these contradictions. Historically, 
iterations of legal, cultural and social ordering condoned marital rape, designating it as an 
act outside the bounds of criminality and immorality. Though the Prevention of Family 
Violence Act (PFVA)2 criminalised marital rape in 1993, the history of legal inequities 
against wives, and the continuing force of social and cultural accommodations of marital 
rape, remain underacknowledged and under-researched. Within the literature and policy 
discourse, there is minimal understanding and examination of how the legacy of 
sanctioned sexual violence in marriage, filters into institutions that women seek recourse 
from. Simultaneously, there is a paucity of research on the distinct intricacies that surface 
in the help-seeking journeys of survivors of marital rape. 
This dissertation addresses the present dearth of research on marital rape in 
contemporary South Africa by exploring the contradictory institutional responses to 
                                               
1 Pumla Gqola, “Brutal Inheritances: Echoes, Negrophobia and Masculinist Violence” in Go Home 
or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa, ed. Shireen Hassim, Tawana  
Kupe, and Eric Worby (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008). 
2 Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (PFVA). 
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marital rape in local legal, policy, and social contexts. The aim of the present research is 
to uncover a range of ways in which sexual violence in heterosexual marriages and 
marriage-like relationships is rendered invisible in the very places that women go to in 
order to seek protection from violence; and in juxtaposition, to draw out the sometimes 
unexpected and indirect modalities through which marital rape is revealed, acknowledged 
and addressed within these environments. Tracing women’s journeys in seeking 
protection, the research unearths how wives are compelled to carry disquieting levels of 
violence, while also elucidating the forms of recourse that eventually do provide them 
relief.  
The findings detail whether and how marital rape is confronted in certain recourse 
settings such as courts, police stations, community organisations, and family units. 
Drawing from an array of academic traditions spanning law, the social sciences and the 
humanities, as well as empirical research with women’s rights non-profit organisations 
(NPOs) undertaken by the author, this research serves as a critical contribution to the 
relatively sparse scholarship on marital rape in South Africa. My research question asks: 
Since the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993, in what ways is marital rape in South Africa rendered 
(in)visible in and through the institutions where women seek protection from violence?  
The overarching research question is informed by sub-questions that I engage with 
in the chapters of the dissertation, and which are summarised at the end of this chapter. 
My central argument that threads the questions together is that in contemporary South 
Africa, formal and informal institutions that survivors seek help from are complicit in 
fostering conditions that allow for marital rape to persist, and there is an interplay of 
locally determined factors that preclude recognition of the scale of sexual violence in 
marriage, and stifle survivors’ ability to find recourse.  
1.2 DEFINITIONS 
Given the cultural and racial make-up of South Africa, the definition of marriage 
that I apply in my research is broad. I define marriage as a formal familial union between 
two parties enacted via civil, religious and/or cultural routes, appreciating that each 
 7 
tradition has its own rituals and representations of marriage. For customary (i.e. Black 
indigenous) marriage forms, I also include the customs through which such marriages are 
initiated, for example the abduction or carrying away of the intended bride. Though there 
are many variations of abduction for purposes of marriage within the diverse groupings 
that comprise South Africa, I employ the label ukuthwala as a general designation for the 
practice given the salience of the term in present literature and public discourse.3 I do not 
discount the existence of abuse and rape within same-sex marriages, however due to the 
background of legal and cultural powers granted to men over wives, my dissertation 
exclusively addresses heterosexual marriages.4  
Legally prescribed definitions of rape are ever-shifting, socially and culturally 
contingent, and limited in reflecting women’s perspectives of violence.5 In South Africa 
the present statutory definition of rape is broadly framed, having greatly expanded the 
common law definition of rape.6 Though not taking the present statutory definition of 
                                               
3  “Ukuthwala” is the isiXhosa and isiZulu word for the practice of abducting/carrying off a girl 
or woman for purposes of marriage. Variations of this practice are also found across South Africa amongst 
tshiVenda, siSwati, xiTsonga, sePedi and IsiNdebele speaking groups, and others.  
4 See for example: Lori Girshick, “No Sugar, No Spice: Reflections on Research on Woman-to-
Woman Sexual Violence,” Violence Against Women 8, no. 12 (2002); Susan Turell et al., “Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender Communities’ Readiness for Intimate Partner Violence Prevention,” Journal of 
Gay & Lesbian Social Services 24, no. 3 (2012); Emily Simpson and Christine Helfrich, “Lesbian Survivors of 
Intimate Partner Violence: Provider Perspectives on Barriers to Accessing Services,” Journal of Gay & Lesbian 
Social Services 18, no. 2 (2005); Dena Hassouneh and Nancy Glass, “The Influence of Gender Role 
Stereotyping on Women's Experiences of Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence,” Violence Against 
Women 14, no. 3 (2008). 
5 See Estelle Freedman, Redefining Rape (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2013); Kersti Yllö 
and M. Gabriela Torres, Marital Rape: Consent, Marriage, and Social Change in Global Context (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 1; Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 171-83. 
6 Under common law, the crime of rape was limited to the penetration of a vagina by a penis, 
without the woman’s consent. In contrast, Chapter 2, section 3 the Sexual Offences Act of 2007 defines rape 
as follows: “Any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual penetration with a 
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rape for granted, I prefer to conceptualise marital rape through a feminist lens, seeing it 
as part of a continuum of sexual violence.7  
In the realm of male-female interactions, Kelly proposed the notion of a continuum 
to underscore two salient features of sexual violence, the first being that forms of sexual 
harm, “no matter how seemingly disparate,” are “part of the same social phenomenon, 
i.e. that of men’s social control of women.”8 Secondly the concept of a continuum imparts 
that “at the level of social experience, these disparate forms of behaviour are not easily 
distinguished” and they “blur” into one another.9 Seeing rape as an extreme manifestation 
of harm along the sexual violence continuum, I concur with MacKinnon’s position that 
rape “should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which physical force is one form. Lack 
of consent is redundant and should not be a separate element of the crime.”10 This 
definition takes into account the social inequalities that exist between men and women. It 
contemplates the difficulty of including consent in the definition of rape since the idea of 
consent tends to be premised on androcentric conceptions of sexual scripts and violence.11  
                                               
complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.” Chapter 1 of the Act defines 
sexual penetration as “any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by-  
(a)  the genital organs of one person into or beyond the genital organs, anus, or mouth of another 
person;  
(b)  any other part of the body of one person or, any object, including any part of the body of an 
animal, into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person; or  
(c)  the genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of another person…  
See Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (SORMA). 
7 Liz Kelly defines sexual violence as “any physical, visual, verbal or sexual act that is experienced 
by the woman or girl, at the time or later, as a threat, invasion or assault, that has the effect of hurting her 
or degrading her and/or takes away her ability to control intimate contact.” Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 41.  
8 Ibid., 76. 
9 Ibid. 
10 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 245. 
11 Ibid., 173-74, 77, 245. 
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In describing the women who have been raped by their husbands, I refer to them 
as survivors, and not victims. I support Kelly’s contention that the term victim “makes 
invisible the other side of women’s victimisation: the active and positive ways in which 
women resist, cope and survive.”12 That women literally survive rape is a triumph, for too 
often intimate partner abuse results in the murder of the abused by her abuser. 
The word “institution” carries unique connotations within different fields. For 
purposes of my research I conceive of institutions as forms of support for purposes of help-
seeking, that are either formal or informal in nature. Following the categories employed 
by Liang et al. in their research on help-seeking, formal institutions can include the police, 
courts, social services agencies, mental health providers, churches, and 
persons/organisations that assist survivors of violence.13 In providing emotional and 
material forms of assistance, a survivor’s immediate social network of family and friends 
represent informal institutions.14  
I utilise the expression “(in)visibility” in an abstract sense as well as a concrete one. 
The parenthesis within the word signifies that I am leaving room for contradictions and 
texture, creating an account that is not tied to any particular outcome but allows for 
seemingly contrasting themes to exist alongside one another. This comports with the 
interpretivist approach I adopt to understanding my empirical data. Within an 
interpretivist research paradigm, I seek to understand the phenomena from the standpoint 
of human experience.15 My analysis therefore eschews fixed and imposed understandings 
of women’s experiences and how institutions respond to marital rape. I discover multiple 
and co-existing meanings from the perspectives of the subjects implicated in the study. In 
the abstract sense, invisibility speaks to the question of whether marital rape is recognised 
                                               
12 Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence, 162. 
13 Belle Liang et al., “A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Help‐Seeking Processes among 
Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence,” American Journal of Community Psychology 36, no. 1-2 (2005): 72. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Rachel Ormston et al., “The Foundations of Qualitative Research,” in Qualitative Research Practice: 
A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, ed. Jane Ritchie, et al. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 12. 
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as an injustice worthy of redress and correction; essentially whether it is seen as a violation 
of a women’s dignity. The more concrete connotation of invisibility concerns whether and 
how marital rape as a subject comes to the surface as women engage with formal and 
informal institutions. 
1.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FEMINISM  
My research project is about the erasure, as well as the recovery, of women’s voices 
and experiences. It is a critique of the current state of South Africa’s institutions; a 
revelation of their failings in respect of violence that plagues women in their most intimate 
and hidden spaces. In parallel, my research also bares the points of progress within 
institutions and the manner in which women are agitating for and effecting change in 
respect of violence committed against them. The research says much about the condition 
of the Black woman’s body and personhood in contemporary South Africa, and it is for 
this reason that I anchor my work within African and Black-oriented feminist theories.16  
There are an infinite number of feminism(s) growing out of temporal shifts, regional 
positioning and identities.17 To enter into ongoing debates about the ineffectuality and 
limitations of certain feminist ideologies is futile, for rigidified conceptions of any 
philosophy would fail to fully characterise the multifaceted nature of women’s lives and 
outlooks. Reductive and unbending notions of what “true” feminism is alienate women 
who reject or do not see the relevance of such prescripts in their lives.  
To illustrate the alienating potential of feminist theorising in the African context, I 
consider the following examples. Acholonu coined the term “motherism,” which she 
posited as the antithesis of Western feminism and the answer to afro-oriented feminism.18 
                                               
16 For the South African context, I include all non-whites within the category of Black. 
17 For an overview of the variations of feminism relevant to the African context see Desiree Lewis, 
“African Feminisms,” Agenda 16, no. 50 (2001). 
18 Catherine O Acholonu, Motherism: The Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism (Owerri: Afa Publications, 
1995). 
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In parallel with Acholonu, Mikell propounds an emergent form of African feminism that 
is “distinctly heterosexual, pro-natal and concerned with many ‘bread, butter, culture, and 
power’ issues.”19 Perspectives such as those of Acholonu and Mikell that rest on 
conservative notions of African feminism cannot be dismissed outright, for they represent 
a certain ethos that responds to the perceived hegemony of Western feminism.20 
Nonetheless, constricted philosophies of what African feminism means preclude the range 
of peripheral voices that feminism is ostensibly designed to centre, for example gender 
non-conforming individuals.21 
The fixed categories of feminism run the risk of being too closely tied to identity 
politics, taking focus away from the practice of feminism. Labels detract from the larger 
issues of women’s disempowerment and move us no closer to undoing discrimination or 
learning more about women’s realities.22 Matebeni comments that conflating identity with 
practice creates “hegemonic generalizations and essentialisms that assume a unified 
interpretation” of feminism and other categories.23 These “generalizations efface the 
problems, perspectives and political concerns of women marginalized because of their 
class, gender, race, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation.”24  
Further, pressing and moulding African women into essentialised ideals of African 
womanhood in fact perpetuates the very forms of violence that feminism(s) seek to undo. 
As Muholi has argued, the rape of Black lesbians “reconsolidates and reinforces African 
                                               
19 Gwendolyn Mikell, African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Wendy Isaack, “In Conversation. Pumla Dineo Gqola Speaks with Wendy Isaack,” Agenda 6 
(2006). 
22 Elaine Salo, “Talking About Feminism in Africa,” Agenda 16, no. 50 (2001): 61. 
23 Zethu Matebeni, “Exploring Black Lesbian Sexualities and Identities in Johannesburg” (PhD 
diss., Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, 2011), 23. 
24 Ibid. 
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women’s identity as heterosexuals, as mothers, and as women.”25 To move away from 
imposing templates of African womanhood, it is incumbent upon African feminist 
theorists to employ paradigms that do not ignore the unique histories and social make-up 
of the continent’s people, but that also leave room for vibrant and evolving formulations 
of feminist thought and practice.   
For purposes of my research project, I have found it more constructive to ascertain 
how feminism can be a tool and a framework with which the experiences and challenges 
of African women can be rendered legible and visible. As opposed to conceiving of a 
dogmatic feminism that perpetually places woman in the position of the victim and the 
oppressed, Oyèwùmí posits that the feminist project is about “female agency and self-
determination.”26 To undertake the practice of feminism is to “stir” and “unsettle” male-
centricity in order to liberate women.27 The subversive acts of stirring and unsettling 
reaffirm the practice of feminism, avoiding identity-driven approaches. Taking heed of 
the lenses through which I present my findings, my research aims are bound up with my 
own identity as a Black feminist woman committed to advancing women’s and queer 
people’s rights. Consequently, my perspectives are shaped by my positioning in a 
racialised and gendered society, and it is from the meanings imbued in my identities that 
I “stir” and “unsettle.” 
As my dissertation primarily explicates the experiences of Black women, it is also 
important that I analyse their “the intersecting categories and multiple embodied 
experiences.”28 I accordingly strike a careful balance, heeding the cautions about 
essentialist forms of African feminism, but also exposing the threads of racial inequality 
                                               
25 Zanele Muholi, “Thinking through Lesbian Rape,” Agenda 18, no. 61 (2004): 122. 
26 Oyèrónkẹ́  Oyèwùmí, African Women and Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood (Asmara: 
Africa World Press, 2003), 1-2. 
27  Patricia van der Spuy and Lindsay Clowes, “Review: Accidental Feminists? Recent Histories of 
South African Women,” Kronos 33 (2007): 213; Amina A Mama, "Women's Studies and Studies of Women 
in Africa During the 1990s," (CODESRIA Working Paper Series, No. 5, 1996), 2. 
28 Muholi, “Thinking through Lesbian Rape,” 123. 
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that weave themselves throughout the lives of Black South African women. Gender 
violence exists across the breadth of South Africa, leaving no racial, religious or class group 
untouched.29 Nevertheless, women’s experiences of violence are not the same, and to 
ignore the filters of race and class would be to inauthentically present Black women’s 
realities.30 The tentacles of colonialism and apartheid indefatigably reach into the present, 
so that women in South Africa are not simply women but are women and “other.” Those 
who found themselves at the bottom of apartheid’s strict hierarchies are in many ways still 
submerged in conditions of poverty, violence and insecurity. 
Given South Africa’s racialised and classist history, I draw parallels from American 
Black feminist thought. In line with Mama and Matebeni, Collins argues that it is less 
important to argue what labels are suitable (for example, womanism, Afrocentric feminism 
or Black feminism), or to contest the content and definition of these labels.31 Instead, one 
should examine the reasons for the existence of Black feminist theoretical traditions. 
Analogous to the South African context, Black feminist thought appreciates the history of 
intersecting forms of oppression against Black women and works to resist these 
oppressions.32 Though it flows from a history of subjugation, Black feminism 
simultaneously emphasises the agency of Black women.33 Moreover, it takes stock of the 
diversity in their social and class positioning, while acknowledging common challenges.34 
                                               
29 Helen Moffett, “‘These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them’: Rape as Narrative of Social 
Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 32, no. 1 (2006): 137. 
30 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Identity Politics, Intersectionality, and Violence 
against Women,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1242. 
31 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2002), 22. 
32 Ibid., 4, 22-24. 
33 Harris-Perry writes: “Sisters are more than the sum of their relative disadvantages: they are 
active agents who craft meaning out of their circumstances and do so in complicated and diverse ways.” See 
Melissa  Harris-Perry, Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2011), 47. 
34 Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 27-28; Audre 
Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (Watertown: Persephone Press, 1982). 
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And, as a practice, Black feminism is about clarifying, discovering, reinterpreting the ideas 
and experiences of Black women in the face of silencing.35  
The subjects of silencing and erasure resound in feminist theory concerning Black 
women in South Africa. The writings of Gqola speak to the importance of interrogating 
contemporary violence against women and girls (VAWG) grounded in an awareness of 
the disturbing and unresolved legacies wrought by apartheid.36 The legacies of largely 
unacknowledged violence against Black women during apartheid render them “disposable 
citizens.”37 Motsemme’s critical work on the silences of Black women who testified before 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is of significant import in unveiling 
hidden forms of violence against Black women. Admittedly feminist practice seeks to 
unearth Black women’s voices for they have long been suppressed; but such a practice 
presupposes, as the TRC did, that the world is “only knowable through words.”38 Both 
Mostemme and Gqola encourage a feminist analysis that not only searches for and 
disinters women’s narratives, but also one that finds meaning in silences.39 Silence “within 
a violent everyday can also become a site for reconstituting ‘new’ meanings and can 
become a tool of enablement” for survivors.40  
The feminist framing of my research engenders the asking of demanding and 
imaginative questions. It provokes one to go beneath the surface of legislative frameworks, 
policy efforts, and scholarship on women, to identify what such developments denote 
about the state of marital rape and the condition of Black women in South Africa. It 
                                               
35 Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 27-28. 
36 See generally Pumla Dineo Gqola, “How the ‘Cult of Femininity’and Violent Masculinities 
Support Endemic Gender Based Violence in Contemporary South Africa,” African Identities 5, no. 1 (2007). 
37 Ibid., 120. 
38 Nthabiseng Motsemme, “The Mute Always Speak: On Women’s Silences at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” Current Sociology 52, no. 5 (2004): 914, 16-17. 
39 See generally ibid., 16; Pumla Gqola, Rape: A South African Nightmare (Johannesburg: MFBooks, 
2015). 
40Motsemme, “The Mute Always Speak,” 917. 
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inspires one to ask whether the developments are thwarting or enabling the liberation of 
women. The feminist paradigm also incites a certain restlessness, for undertaking feminist 
research requires the creation of multi-dimensional accounts of women’s lives, and the 
influence of the forces around them. Based upon the examples set by Gqola and 
Mostemme, my research pays attention to silences, both on the part of institutions and 
women themselves, in order to make meaning of these silences and to render a much more 
complex picture of marital rape and the violence that Black women bear.  
1.4 LOCATING MARITAL RAPE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND REVEALING THE 
GAPS 
Guided by practice of both African and Black feminism(s), in this section I lay out 
the bodies of literature that inform the study and also specify the gaps that my research 
seeks to fill. Though housed in the discipline of law, my research is by necessity and 
preference interdisciplinary, using methodologies that are better equipped to empirically 
probe embodiments of intimate partner sexual violence, and to interrogate institutional 
and social hegemonic norms. I have identified three broad theoretical groupings that feed 
into the sub-questions that I apply in this dissertation. Within these groupings I identify 
the gaps that my research addresses. 
Under the umbrella of feminist jurisprudential and criminology literature, I 
commence by surveying debates on the utility of the law in protecting women, and 
scholarship on the persistence of rape stereotypes and the attrition of rape cases in the 
criminal justice system. The second section considers both comparative and South African 
studies on rape in intimate, family and marital settings. Within this section, I narrow down 
to consider South African public health, psychology, ethnographic and historical literature 
on sexual violence to extract questions that are specifically relevant to marital rape. In the 
third and final section, I discuss literature that evokes the complexities of help-seeking for 
survivors of sexual violence, and provides more fluid frameworks for conceptualising the 
help-seeking processes of marital rape survivors in South Africa.  
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1.4.1 Feminist Debates About the Law’s Utility  
There are ongoing debates about the law’s potential to truly transform and 
improve the lives of women. Some contributions have focused upon the male-centric 
personality of the law, a standpoint most vividly captured by MacKinnon’s unwavering 
conclusion that the “law sees and treats women the way the men see and treat women.”41 
Historically, the form and interpretation of rape laws has unquestionably benefitted men, 
as rape has traditionally been “defined according to what men think violates women.”42  
In spite of law reforms, feminist thinkers have drawn attention to the limited 
impact of legislation in light of the discriminatory attitudes that adjudicators carry, the 
institutionalisation of androcentrism, as well as how the law falls short of meaningfully 
rectifying the forms of violence meted out to women.43 But, even where feminists initially 
exercise  influence in law reform processes, the reform focuses may ultimately shift. This 
was the case with the  creation of the South African Sexual Offenses Act (SORMA) in 
2007, where the course of law reform firstly prioritised expanding the scope of protection 
for victims; but over time veered away from the victim-centric ethos to concentrate on the 
creation of new crimes and their prosecution.44 
Moreover, feminist critiques of the rhetoric of rape judgments expose the familiar 
                                               
41 Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence,” Signs 8, no. 4 (1983): 644. 
42 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1975), 67-82; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1994), 86. 
43 Lynn  Schafran, “There's No Accounting for Judges,” Albany Law Review 58, no. 4 (1995): 1068; 
Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation” 
(presentation, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, April-May 1996. 
https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/Fraser98.pdf), 16; Robin  West, “The Difference in 
Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,” Wisconsin Women’s Law 
Journal 3 (1987): 116.; Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 2002), 5. 
44 See Introduction to Lillian Artz and Dee Smythe, Should We Consent?: Rape Law Reform in South 
Africa (Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd, 2008), 2. 
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tropes of justifiable male sexual entitlement and female blameworthiness in judicial 
language; rhetoric that paints rape as an inconsequential act.45 Scholars have noted the 
crude erasure of women and girls’ dignity in South African rape jurisprudence since the 
enactment of a law prescribing minimum sentences in 1997.46 
Despite the law’s resounding shortcomings, it cannot simply be an ineffectual tool. 
Kapur and Cossman maintain that “(i)t is not sufficient to simply assert that law is 
patriarchal, or that the law makers are sexist.”47 This view “tells us very little about the 
precise workings of the law, and even less about if and how women can use the law.”48  In 
this vein, feminist legal scholars have highlighted the symbolic power of the law and law 
reform. Legislation can be of “liberating value” and “reinforces emerging conceptions 
concerning the status of women and the right of self-determination in sexual conduct.”49 
Building upon this idea of the law as symbolic, Artz and Smythe assert that the role of 
feminist jurisprudence is to “use feminism as a corrective measure to address male bias in 
law and legal scholarship”; and while the “law is not the answer to patriarchy… it is a 
                                               
45 In South Africa, see for example Ndou v S 2014 (1) SACR 198 (SCA); S v Ntuli [2005] JOL 12442 
(ECLD); Ntholeng v S [2004] JOL 13024 (O).  
46 Joel  Modiri, “The Rhetoric of Rape: An Extended Note on Apologism, Depoliticisation and 
the Male Gaze in Ndou v S,” South African Journal on Human Rights 30, no. 1 (2014); Nicole Kubista, 
“Substantial and Compelling Circumstances: Sentencing of Rapists under the Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing Scheme,” South African Journal of Criminal Justice 18, no. 1 (2005); Yonina Hoffman-Wanderer, 
“Sentencing and Management of Sexual Offenders,” in Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa, 
ed. Lillian Artz and Dee Smythe (Claremont: Juta, 2008); Rebecca Chennells, "Sentencing: The Real Rape 
Myth," Agenda 23, no. 82 (2009); Kristina Scurry Baehr, “Mandatory Minimums Making Minimal 
Difference: Ten Years of Sentencing Sex Offenders in South Africa,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20 
(2008). 
47 Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996), 30. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992), 33; Miriam Benson, “Rape Law: A Feminist Legal Analysis,” Medicine 
and Law 8 (1989): 308. 
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powerful arena in which the experiences of ‘violence’ are articulated and visions of justice 
are promoted.”50 
Engaging with the law from a feminist position is therefore both a pragmatic and 
aspirational exercise; an exercise attuned to the intractable relationship between the law 
and patriarchy. The feminist project nonetheless encourages a harnessing of the law’s 
power in order to bring about gradual (albeit uneven) change, and to offer a vision of a 
more gender equal society.  
1.4.2 The Prevalence of Rape, Rape Attrition and Rape Myths 
While accepting that South African law sends powerful ideological messages about 
women’s rights, and can result in gradual change, rape remains inexorably prevalent in 
the present. Studies have broadcasted that one in four South African men have committed 
rape.51 And as recently as 2016, a community study conducted in the Gauteng province 
township of Diepsloot, found that 28% of men interviewed had raped during their 
lifetime.52  
Responding to the crisis of rape, feminist scholars and advocates continue to 
grapple with the problematic trajectory of rape cases disappearing out of the South 
African criminal justice system – this attrition being attributed to various factors including 
discriminatory practices, stereotypes, inadequate police resources and training, and 
                                               
50 Artz and Smythe, Should We Consent?, 15. 
51 A Medical Research Council study released in 2009 reported the following based on a survey 
undertaken with a broad cross-section of men in three provinces: “Overall, 27.6% of the men interviewed 
reported ever having raped a woman or girl, and 4.6% of all men had raped in the past year. Because most 
men who raped reported multiple rapes, non-partner rape was overall more common than partner rape. In 
all, only 4.6% of men report that they had raped a partner and not raped a woman who was not a partner 
(i.e. an acquaintance or stranger). 11.7% of men had raped an acquaintance or stranger (but not a partner) 
and 9.7% had raped both.” See Rachel Jewkes et al., Understanding Men's Health and Use of Violence: Interface of 
Rape and Hiv in South Africa  (Pretoria: South African Medical Research Council, 2009), 3.  
52 “Findings from the Sonke Change Trial,” Sonke Gender Justice, 5 December 2016, 
http://genderjustice.org.za/publication/mens-use-violence-women/. 
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substandard investigating.53 In the first place, most rapes are not reported to authorities. 
A widely accepted estimation in South Africa states that only one in nine rape victims 
reports, and a recent Gauteng study reports a dire figure of one in 25.54 For cases that do 
enter the criminal justice system, a 2003 study of rape attrition in Gauteng provided a 
startling picture of just how few of the total reported cases lead to convictions. It found 
that 4.1% of reported cases resulted in rape convictions.55 A newly released countrywide 
study titled Rape Justice in South Africa (RAPSSA) calculated that a guilty verdict is only 
handed down in 8.6% of rape cases.56 Updating the 2003 Gauteng study, RAPSSA 
records only nominal progress in terms of convictions for rape in Gauteng.57  
Patriarchal tropes of gender and sexual violence have long been cited as a 
significant reason for the attrition of cases. The rape myth concept originated in the mid-
                                               
53 Lisa Vetten et al. Tracking Justice: The Attrition of Rape Cases through the Criminal Justice System in 
Gauteng  (Johannesburg, Pretoria: Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre, South African Medical Research 
Council, and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008); Lillian Artz and Dee Smythe, 
“Case Attrition in Rape Cases: A Comparative Analysis,” South African Journal of Criminal Justice 20, no. 2 
(2007); Lillian Artz and Dee Smythe, “Losing Ground? Making Sense of Attrition in Rape Cases,” South 
African Crime Quarterly 2007, no. 22 (2007); Virginia Francis and Michelle India Baird, “A Rape Investigation 
in the Western Cape: A Study of the Treatment of Rape Victims at Three Police Stations in the Cape Flats,” 
(New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2000); Lisa Vetten and Danielle Motelow, “Creating State 
Accountability to Rape Survivors: A Case Study of Boksburg Regional Court,” Agenda 18, no. 62 (2004); 
Dee Smythe and Samantha Waterhouse, “Policing Sexual Offences: Policies, Practices and Potential 
Pitfalls,” in Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa, ed. Lillian Artz and Dee Smythe (Cape Town: 
Juta, 2008); Mercilene Machisa et al., Rape Justice in South Africa: A Retrospective Study of the Investigation, 
Prosecution and Adjudication of Reported Rape Cases from 2012 (Pretoria: Gender and Health Research Unit, South 
African Medical Research Council, 2017).  
54 Rachel Jewkes and Naeema Abrahams, “The Epidemiology of Rape and Sexual Coercion in 
South Africa: An Overview,” Social Science & Medicine 55, no. 7 (2002); Mercilene Machisa et al., The War at 
Home: Gender Based Violence Indicators Project (Johannesburg: Gender Links and the South African Medical 
Research Council, 2011).  
55 Vetten et al., “Tracking Justice.” 
56 Machisa et al., Rape Justice in South Africa,13. 
57 Ibid., 14. 
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1970s in the United States of America (USA), beginning with the work of sociologists 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger, and feminist author Brownmiller.58 Their initial 
theorising established a foundation for a multitude of studies about rape stereotypes, 
including their presence in the legal sphere. Utilising the rape myth paradigm, experts 
have reasoned that rape cases are judged by police, prosecutors and judges against a 
standard of what they deem to be “real rape,” a stereotyped conception of sexual violence 
that is deployed to narrowly circumscribe the range of cases that are deemed serious and 
worthy of police, prosecutorial and judicial resources and remedying.59 On the basis of 
myths, the ideal prototype of rape typically involves strangers, use of weapons, extreme 
violence and visible injuries, quick reporting of the crime on the part of the victim, and a 
victim that is deemed respectable.60 Kelly adds that the real rape template also affects the 
victim’s own view of her case and how it may be received by officials.61  
For my assessment of how rape myths operate in the social and legal contexts, I 
engage neutralisation theory, which depicts how linguistic techniques are used to 
legitimise deviant behaviour.62 An individual’s rationalisations arise from an awareness of 
normative expectations of the culture they are embedded in. Taking the disavowal 
                                               
58 Julia Schwendinger and Herman Schwendinger, “Rape Myths: In Legal, Theoretical, and 
Everyday Practice,” Crime and Social Justice 1 (1974); Brownmiller, Against Our Will. 
59 Estrich coined the term ‘real rape’. See Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987). 
60 Ibid.; Cassia Spohn, Dawn Beichner, and Erika Davis-Frenzel, “Prosecutorial Justifications for 
Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the ‘Gateway to Justice’,” Social Problems 48, no. 2 (2001); 
Zsuzsanna Adler, Rape on Trial (London: Routledge, 1987); Patricia  Frazier and Beth Haney, “Sexual 
Assault Cases in the Legal System: Police, Prosecutor, and Victim Perspectives,” Law and Human Behavior 20, 
no. 6 (1996); Liz Kelly, Routes to (in)Justice: A Research Review on the Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution of Rape 
Cases, (London: Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 2001).  
61 Kelly, “Routes to (in)Justice.” 
62 C. Wright Mills, “Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,” American Sociological Review 5, 
no. 6 (1940); Gresham Sykes and David Matza, “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency,” 
American Sociological Review 22, no. 6 (1957); Marvin  Scott and Stanford Lyman, “Accounts,” American 
Sociological Review 33 (1968). 
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techniques further, feminist social scientists have shown how neutralisation techniques are 
applied to dehumanise rape victims and the harm caused by rape; and that this language 
is actually a reflection of mainstream culture.63 
I underscore the centrality of culture so as not to depict rape myths as 
predetermined and uniform. Evolving literature on rape myths has reworked and refined 
theories and measurement frameworks of rape myth acceptance (RMA). 64 Social science 
scholars are gradually incorporating cultural, social and temporal factors to study RMA.65 
The evolved theory stresses that the content and operation of rape myths are ever shifting 
and dependent on localised dynamics.66  
South African literature has moved in the direction of problematising the rape 
myth concept as applied to the criminal justice system by incorporating a broader range 
of factors to explain the outcome of reported rapes. In a study of policing at eight 
                                               
63 Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla, “Convicted Rapists' Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and 
Justifications,” Social Problems 31, no. 5 (1984); Stevi Jackson, “The Social Context of Rape: Sexual Scripts 
and Motivation,” Women's Studies International Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1978). 
64 See Martha  Burt, “Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 38, no. 2 (1980); Hubert S Feild, “Attitudes toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, 
Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and Citizens,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978); Kimberly 
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jurisdictions in South Africa, Smythe determined that whether a case proceeded in the 
investigation phase depended less on stereotypes at the reporting stage, and more on how 
the victim presents herself during the investigation, and what level of dedication and 
attention she was able to bring to the investigation of her case.67 Additionally, Smythe 
argues that the real rape template has limited applicability in South Africa. As South 
African society is inured to all but the most egregious acts of violence, this sets the bar 
higher for victims.68 Overall, Smythe’s contribution clarifies that there are structural 
factors such as immense poverty and family pressure that make it infinitely harder for 
women to engage with the criminal justice system in the taxing manner that it demands.69  
The newly released RAPSSA study further dissects how cases make their way (or 
fail to) through the criminal justice system. Introducing a comprehensive series of 
analytical categories, and applying both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, the 
report bares a chain of hurdles for survivors, from engaging with the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) to all the subsequent actors and stages of the process.70 These include: lack 
of police emotional investment in arresting perpetrators; poor police training; low police 
morale; the police’s problematic assessment of which cases are severe; the availability of 
corroborating  evidence; prosecutors selectively proceeding with cases based on a desire 
to meet performance measures; and the time-consuming nature of investigating and 
preparing cases.71  
Analogous to Smythe’s conclusions about structural barriers, RAPSSA identified 
that many survivors withdraw their cases in order to proceed with their lives.72 Despite 
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the breadth of factors incorporated in the study, one of its findings signals the impact of 
rape myths. The report notes: “if strangers were arrested, prosecutors were much more 
likely to support their cases going to trial than with any other relationship group. In 
contrast, despite South African law clearly not giving marital and intimate partners ‘rights’ 
to sexual intercourse, prosecutors generally do not take these cases to trial.”73 
The South African literature establishes that the process of attrition is multifaceted. 
It is not solely determined by rape myths but by a plethora of other factors unique to the 
South African context. Still, the rape myths play a role in intimate partner violence cases, 
as the RAPSSA study displays. The stereotypes not only operate among those tasked with 
the responsibility of enforcing justice, but women who are raped also internalise these 
myths and this influences how they judge the violence they have experienced.  
Out of the different forms of rape, intimate partner rapes are even less likely to be 
reported.74 Aside from the fact that few cases will make it from reporting stage to 
prosecution and completion, feminists have also raised concerns about whether the law is 
equipped to address intimate partner violence. Fedler argues that “domestic abuse is first 
and foremost a social problem and only derivatively a legal problem.”75 In spite of the fact 
that only a small percentage of intimate partner violence cases reach the justice system, 
there is room for research on how marital rape survivors interact with the justice system, 
and what impact rape myths do have on their experiences. Additionally, at an empirical 
level, there is a need to understand the functioning of discriminatory attitudes by police, 
prosecutors, and adjudicators that keep marital rape cases out of the justice system.  
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1.4.2.1 Locating Marital Rape in the Literature  
Following the emergence of a feminist public discourse on intimate partner 
violence in the USA in the 1970s, ground-breaking empirical studies in the 1980s delved 
into the previously neglected arena of marital rape. This scholarship exposed the 
pervasiveness of marital rape and its highly damaging and traumatic consequences.76 
Earlier prevalence studies determined that 14% to 25% of women experienced marital 
rape.77 Based on her landmark study, Russell concluded that marital rape is a “widespread 
and significant problem in the US.”78   
Scholars across the disciplines of law, criminology, and social psychology have 
augmented the foundation laid by the early studies, reshaping theoretical frameworks of 
intimate partner violence, documenting social prejudices, and illuminating the 
experiences of survivors of partner rape.79 For example, a 2002 large-scale study by Basile 
determined that 34% of women had experienced marital rape or intimate partner rape.80 
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Variations in prevalence differ based on the methodologies employed and definitions of 
sexual violence applied, but taken as a whole the USA-based studies foreground the 
prevalence and hidden nature of intimate partner violence. Further they demonstrate that 
the institution of marriage creates damaging expectations around sex and the obligations 
of wives, which renders wives vulnerable to coercion.81 
Across the breadth of academic fields, marital rape remains one of the most 
understudied forms of sexual violence, and the preponderance of existing studies are USA-
centric.82 Compounding the problem of the concentration of literature in the USA, the 
study of marital rape is generally confined to the law, psychology, public health, 
criminology and sociology.83 A dearth of anthropological work has meant that “there has 
been little qualitative field research to shed light on how culturally shaped understandings 
of sexual violence are located in the global context.”84 The recent multi-disciplinary 
publication Marital Rape: Consent, Marriage, and Social Change in Global Context, makes a critical 
intervention as the “first account of marital rape in a cross-cultural perspective.”85 
Appreciating the need for a more localised perspective of marital rape, the authors’ studies 
“emphasize how the broader context of legal, political, economic structures and cultural 
norms profoundly shape the experience of sexual violence.”86   
Although they may not necessarily employ ethnographic methodology, there are 
local studies of marital rape outside of the USA that are equally enriching, albeit less 
globally identified. In countries where marital rape is still legal, as well as nations that have 
criminalised marital rape, scholars are engaging with questions around the law, the 
                                               
81 Basile found that 43% of the study participants had unwanted sex because they believed it was 
their “duty.” See ibid., 283; Bergen, Wife Rape. 
82 Yllö and Torres, Marital Rape, 2, 5. 
83 Bergen, Wife Rape, 223; Yllö and Torres, Marital Rape, 5, 11. 
84 Marital Rape, 11. 
85 Ibid., 10. 
86 Ibid., 5. 
 26 
prevalence of intimate partner violence, and the detrimental consequences for wives’ well-
being.87  
1.4.2.2 Empirical Research on Intimate Partner and Family Violence in South Africa  
Empirical research is vital for shedding light on the law’s limitations in stemming 
intra-familial and intimate partner sexual violence. South African scholarship documents 
how categories employed in law and public policy do not neatly map onto classifications 
of consent and rape within communities. The Medical Research Council has conducted 
some of the most impactful empirical studies in this area.88 Although, “it is widely known 
that many women cross-culturally choose not to call non-consensual sex with their 
boyfriends and partners ‘rape’,” the studies detail how definitions of sexual violence and 
coercion are locally determined, and what both women’s and men’s experiences and 
perceptions of these norms are.89  
The literature characterises social norms that diminish the culpability of the 
perpetrator and discount the harm done to the victim where there is an interpersonal 
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relationship between the two.90 The condoning of interpersonal violence is heightened by 
the inter-generational normalisation of violence within families and sexual partnerships, 
which girls are socialised into from a young age. As Vogelman and Eagle portrayed this 
South African phenomenon in 1991: “In multiple ways the ideology constructed around 
heterosexuality, marriage, and the family acts to conceal and mystify violence and abuse 
against women. Such gender ideology is absorbed at every point of socialization from birth 
onward, making its exposure a radical and complex process.”91 Violence thus becomes 
the process by which many girls and women are initiated into sex.92  
Local studies on intra-familial violence also elucidate how the normalisation of 
violence within families buries and obscures victims’ suffering in the name of patriarchal 
deference, protecting family unity and reputation to the detriment of the individual that 
has been sexually violated.93 The precarious economic circumstances of victims amplify 
their vulnerability.94 As marital rape is both familial and intimate partner violence, a more 
tangled web of obstructions works against its revelation and resolution.  
1.4.2.3 South African Public Health, Law and Psychology Studies of Sexual Violence 
and Marriage  
South African research about sexual violence in marriage mainly falls under rape 
prevalence studies, and studies measuring the impact of cultural (i.e. Black indigenous) 
views as they relate to violence in marriage. The 2003 Gauteng attrition study reported 
that about one in five adult women surveyed had been raped by a former or current male 
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partner.95 In Smythe’s study, in the Western Cape cohort of cases, rape by intimate 
partners (boyfriends and ex-husbands) accounted for 15% of the cases, and current 
husbands and boyfriends accounted for 8%.96 Under the MRC’s three-province study, 
7.5% of women reported that their first rape was committed by a partner, and for those 
raped within the previous year, partner rapes accounted for 8.8% of the reported 
assaults.97 Most recently, the RAPSSA study determined that the proportions of reported 
intimate partner rapes ranged from 9.5% (Mpumalanga) to 20.0% (Western Cape).98  
In terms of cultural outlooks, a nationwide Medical Research Council study 
measured Black and mostly rural women’s perceptions of whether sexual violence in 
marriage is acceptable.99 The study found a link between the payment of lobola100 and 
acceptance of men’s control over women. At the same time, it determined that there is 
contestation around these norms as the women surveyed held less patriarchal views than 
what they perceived their culture dictated.101 In the Sonke Change Trial, one third of the 
men interviewed in Diepsloot reported that a wife has no right to refuse sex, and 35% 
believe that the payment of lobola grants the husband ownership of the wife.102  
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The literature assesses general patterns of intimate partner violence and very few 
of the studies exclusively enter the marital terrain. The majority of the scholarship that 
explicitly engages with marital rape pre-dates the passage of the PFVA in 1993 and is 
largely law-oriented.103 Sharon Kottler’s psychology study is one of the few dedicated 
empirical studies of marital sexual violence post 1993.104 Through questionnaires and in-
depth interviews with survivors of marital rape, Kottler sought to ascertain the relationship 
between traditional attitudes and definitions/perceptions of wife rape, both to measure 
survivors’ awareness of the PFVA and to record their experiences of violence and survival 
strategies.105  
Kottler’s study tracks the complex processes by which women come to define 
sexual violence in marriage as rape, and also discloses the details of what wives are 
subjected to at the hands of their husbands. Though not exclusively a marital rape study, 
Boonzaier’s empirical research amongst married and divorced women from Mitchell’s 
Plain also makes known the forms of sexual violence that women suffer in their 
marriages.106 In the discipline of the law, a recent article by Yebisi and Balogun looks at 
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the legal framework in South Africa and briefly considers marital rape jurisprudence.107    
1.4.2.4 Digging Deeper: Ethnographic and History Research on Culture, Violence and 
Marriage  
The motif of “culture” appears frequently throughout this dissertation. In South 
African discourse, the moniker of culture is wielded as a signifier of an essentialised 
Blackness, in turn integrating the concepts of custom, tradition and customary law. The 
contribution of legal historians and socio-legal scholars such as Chanock and Mnisi Weeks 
dismantles many of the static, trite, and western-oriented constructions of Black “custom” 
and “law” that are found in official depictions of customary law.108 The scholars emphasise 
the locally-negotiated nature of living customary law, which must be understood from the 
perspectives of insiders. Their work coincides with theory on culturalism, which denotes 
the manner of demarcating the boundaries of culture as inflexible, inherent and 
unchanging.109 Culturalism is generally applied to marginalised populations, those who 
are non-white, or members of underprivileged communities.110  
In line with the critiques of rigid portrayals of the “other,” an array of scholars 
representing divergent disciplines including anthropology, history and law, have called 
attention to the superficial and scandalised discourses on coercive marriage practices on 
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the continent.111 They propose locally-grounded and multifaceted surveys of forced 
marriages that provide a richer understanding of the meanings and nature of coercive 
marriage practices, and that uncover continuities in manifestations of VAWG.112  
The frameworks established by scholars who critique simplistic research on culture 
create a platform for probing contemporary discourse on abduction marriages in South 
Africa, a phenomenon mainly located in rural Black communities. Over the past decade, 
legal scholarship and jurisprudence on ukuthwala has followed an almost uniform script in 
assessing the cultural legitimacy of violent forms of the practice. The landmark Western 
Cape High Court Case Jezile v the State and Others represents the prevailing legal standpoint 
on ukuthwala.113  
The appellant Mvumeleni Jezile had thwala-ed 14-year old Nolutho Yekiso with 
the sanction of the male elders of both families. He transported Yekiso from the Eastern 
Cape to Cape Town where he kept her in confinement in his brother’s house, raped and 
assaulted her. The Western Cape High Court declared that the ukuthwala practiced by 
Jezile and his community was “aberrant” and affirmed the 22-year sentence handed down 
by the trial court against Jezile for rape, assault and human trafficking. With little 
divergence, South African legal scholarship reinforces the conclusion that the rape and 
kidnapping are both violative of authentic customary law.114 
                                               
111 Annie Bunting, Benjamin Lawrance, and Richard Roberts, Marriage by Force?: Contestation over 
Consent and Coercion in Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 29. 
112 Ibid., 2, 29. 
113 Jezile v S and Others (A 127/2014) 2015 ZAWCHC. 
114 Chelete Monyane, “Is Ukuthwala Another Form of ‘Forced Marriage’?,” South African Review of 
Sociology 44, no. 3 (2013); Marcel van der Watt and Michelle Ovens, “Contextualizing the Practice of 
Ukuthwala within South Africa,” Child Abuse Research in South Africa 13, no. 1 (2012); Lea Mwambene and 
Julia Sloth-Nielsen, “Benign Accommodation? Ukuthwala, ‘Forced Marriage’ and the South African 
Children's Act,” African Human Rights Law Journal 11, no. 1 (2011); Digby  Koyana and Jan  Bekker, “The 
Indomitable Ukuthwala Custom,” De Jure 40 (2007); Hlako Choma, “Ukuthwala Custom in South Africa: 
A Constitutional Test,” US-China Law Review 8 (2011); Newman Wadesango, Symphorosa Rembe, and 
 32 
In juxtaposition to the formulaic legal analyses of ukuthwala, researchers engaging 
with ukuthwala through historical sources and ethnographic methods are shifting the 
discourse on the practice. Thornberry’s research unearths the long history of contestation 
around the practice of ukuthwala, and the conceptual link between marriage and non-
consensual sex.115 Long-term fieldwork conducted in Eastern Cape by Rice, Smit and 
Wood also insert greater dimension into the debates on ukuthwala, confirming that the 
coercive aspects of the practice are not in fact anomalous in some communities.116 Nkosi 
and Wasserman’s archival research displays the incredible diversity in the practice in 
KwaZulu-Natal.117 In an earlier piece on ukuthwala, Mfono shares perspectives on 
ukuthwala cases based on her work as a youth worker in the Eastern Cape in the early 
1990s.118 Taking a refreshingly divergent path from the legal literature, legal scholars 
Kruuse and Mwambene have newly examined ukuthwala by interviewing members of 
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Jezile’s community in the wake of the Western Cape High Court decision.119 They 
document the disjuncture between the legalistic framing and the community’s rationales 
for violent forms of ukuthwala.120 
Recent historical and ethnographic work also conveys insider perspectives of 
marital violence. Thornberry’s research clarifies that “the concept of marital rape would 
not have made sense to residents of precolonial Xhosaland, nor did it form a part of the 
ideas about custom that circulated in the early colonial era.”121 Connected to traditional 
marriages, the payment of lobola regularly features in local views of custom, marriage and 
sexual violence. Through extensive ethnographic work in the township of Mpophomeni, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Singleton’s work clearly depicts that, despite exposure to a human rights 
discourse of gender rights, lobola is perceived as nullifying a woman’s right to say no to sex 
with her husband, rendering rape in marriage an impossibility.122  
The South African public health, ethnographic and socio-legal studies 
compellingly portray the discord between statutory definitions of sexual violence and local 
norms around sexual violence. The literature also signals the need to push the bounds of 
the empirical research in new directions. Kottler, Boonzaier and Singleton’s projects 
provide a base for accessing women’s experiences of marital rape and their perspectives 
of sexual violence in marriage. In conjunction, there is a burgeoning of empirical research 
on ukuthwala outside of the rule-oriented legal sphere. The findings of scholars such as 
Rice, Thornberry, Wood, and Kruuse and Mwambene, confirm that communities justify 
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the sexual violence of ukuthwala through the paradigm of marriage. Notwithstanding the 
contributions of these studies, there is an absence of research that looks at the experiences 
of marital rape survivors and incorporates the subject of ukuthwala within its ambit. As 
such, the current empirical literature on sexual violence in marriage is minimal and 
disconnected.   
1.4.3 Implications for Help-seeking Behaviour  
The public health, attrition and ethnographic studies that I have cited thus far 
begin to illuminate the complexity of women’s responses to intimate partner sexual 
violence, given familial/communal obligations and pressures, and structural constraints. 
The diverse limitations imposed on them in turn complicate their help-seeking behaviour. 
Comparatively, there are important studies that look at the “what” of the help-seeking 
behaviour of marital rape victims and survivors of intimate partner violence, statistically 
assessing trends amongst study participants, for example documenting their engagement 
with family, friends, police, therapists, social support resources, church and health 
practitioners.123 Interview-based research by social scientists also provide rich descriptive 
information about how women have dealt with sexual violence in the home.124 
In tandem, studies are increasingly developing context-based frameworks for 
documenting help-seeking patterns. The earlier work on intimate partner violence from 
the 1970s onwards myopically concerned itself with victim and perpetrator traits.125 This 
approach “rendered invisible the larger socio-cultural context in which IPV occurs, and 
implicitly conceptualized violence as stemming from individual pathology or deviance, 
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ignoring the important ways that violence is embedded within social contexts and 
cultures.”126 A subset of studies has embraced an ecological approach in looking at how 
survivors seek recourse and how they interface with social support structures.127  
Scholars have moved toward analysing the “how” of women’s recourse-seeking, 
as opposed to foregrounding the “what” (what women do in finding support, especially 
within formal structures).128 As Liang et al. expound, studies of the what “limit our 
understanding of the processes of problem definition and how these processes may lead to 
or inhibit a broad range of types of help-seeking behaviour.”129 It is in seeking to 
understand the processes of women’s recourse-seeking journeys that the factors of 
economics, culture, and familial and community relationships all become key 
considerations. The creative assessments of survivors’ behaviour expand the established 
three stages of help-seeking (acknowledging and defining the problem, taking the decision 
to get help, and choosing a source of help).130  
From the context-based literature on help-seeking, one gleans a range of barriers 
to survivors’ efforts. The barriers encompass: wives’ lack of awareness about marital rape; 
reluctance to report; fear of retaliation from the husband; the severity of the abuse; police 
unresponsiveness after reporting; blame placed on the wives; the absence of family and 
community support; and fear of not being believed.131 The literature also sheds light on 
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the forms of support that have proved successful for ending the marital rape, for example 
assistance provided by social services organisations.132  
Although not concerned with help-seeking per se, research by anthropologists in 
South Africa documents the personal and structural factors that shape the decisions that 
women take. Cultural, familial, economic and social imperatives make it more difficult for 
survivors to define the abuse they suffer as rape and to subsequently seek meaningful 
redress.133 This is the case across the spectrum of marriage-like relationships in South 
Africa, including traditional unions concluded through ukuthwala.134 Even though marital 
rape has been criminalised, going to the police may be one of the last options employed 
or considered by survivors of marital rape; and even if a case is filed it is very difficult for 
victims to see the case through.135  
The factors that fuel sexual violence in marriage in South Africa and restrict 
women’s searches for recourse symbolise how marital rape is a “multifaceted phenomenon 
grounded in the interplay of individual, family, community and socio-cultural factors.”136 
Consequently ecological frameworks of violence are well-suited to evaluations of survivors’ 
help-seeking behaviour. Following Belsky’s research on child sexual abuse, Heise 
proposed the application of an ecological framework for conceptualising the etiology of 
violence against women.137 Belsky’s framework contains four levels of influence: 1) the 
individuals’ personal history factors (childhood exposure to violence, damaging parenting 
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models); 2) immediate factors in which the abuse happens, such as family and intimate 
relationships (microsystem); 3) the exosystem, consisting of formal and informal 
institutions, for example work, neighbourhood, social structures, and identity groups; and 
lastly 4) the macrosystem, representing general views and attitudes that permeate culture 
at large.138  
Refining Belsky’s framework, Edleson and Tolman conceived of the mesosystem, 
which refers to the connections between an individual’s microsystem and social institutions 
such as police, courts and social service institutions139 It has been noted that the 
mesosystem is the most significant layer in the ecological framework as it “describes the 
cumulative interaction of all of the other levels upon a person.”140  
The five layers of the ecological framework can be applied to systematically probe 
the multiple determinants of women’s help-seeking behaviour. The model encompasses a 
survivors’ individual circumstances and perspectives, in addition to the formal and 
informal institutions that she relates to in seeking recourse. The mesosystem represents 
the interaction between the layers, and exhibits how they mould women’s help-seeking 
journeys. As a whole, the ecological framework has the ability to fashion a dynamic picture 
of societal norms concerning marital rape, and how these norms impact women’s lives.  
In South Africa, there are few studies that intimately investigate what women do 
over the short and long term to alleviate the sexual abuse in their marriages. Kottler’s 
interviews with survivors present evocative anecdotes but mainly concentrates on wives’ 
experiences of rape and how they conceive of the violence. Rice’s ethnography touches 
upon the limited options available for ukuthwala survivors. To expand the literature base, 
further research on how women go about restoring some measure of dignity in their lives 
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after, or even during, episodes of marital rape, is critical. There is a need to evaluate 
marital rape survivors’ help-seeking processes through an ecological paradigm to illustrate 
the interaction between the multiple societal layers in which women are embedded; and 
to discover the recourse forms that result in sustainable and positive change in survivors’ 
lives. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The extant literature concerning marital rape clarifies why it is one of the most 
complicated, prevalent and obscured forms of sexual violence. Despite the widespread 
nature of sexual violence in marriage, the subject retains only a marginal place in the 
larger literature on sexual violence against women. This is maybe because marital rape is 
such a private and emotive form of violence, as well as the fact that survivors’ own social 
conditioning and influences prevent them from seeing the sexual harm in their marriage 
as rape.   
In South Africa, the paucity of dedicated research on marital rape is stark and 
disconcerting. There is importance in the research of intimate partner violence, and there 
are commonalities along the spectrum of relationships that fall under the “intimate 
partner” category. Nonetheless, marital rape is a distinctive form of sexual violence against 
women because it rests upon institutional premises grounded in legal history, and social 
and cultural norms. Apart from the ethnographic and empirical contributions by Rice, 
Singleton, Boonzaier and Kottler, the existing scholarship only touches upon societal 
attitudes to sexual violence in marriages (for example by measuring opinions on lobola and 
husbands’ sexual entitlement), and moreover it tends to place marital rape within the 
broader ambit of intimate partner violence.  
Notwithstanding the distinctive nature of marital rape, since the demise of the 
marital rape exemption, studies about the law’s response to martial rape are for the most 
part non-existent. It cannot be taken for granted that the legislative reform buried the 
prejudices against women and marital rape, for the lives of patriarchy and rape stereotypes 
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are long and healthy, even in the face of legislative and jurisprudential progress and a 
growing human rights consciousness.  
We know little about the trajectories of marital rape victim’s recourse-seeking 
journeys in contemporary South Africa, nor how institutions such as the courts, police, 
policymakers, family, and churches respond to marital rape. The empirical studies on 
ukuthwala and marital rape serve as a resource for grasping the restrictions wives are bound 
by, and the social and cultural drivers of sexual violence in marriage. In spite of this value, 
what is missing from the present studies is a holistic and inter-disciplinary assessment of 
sexual violence in marriage that pulls together and extends the distinct strands scattered 
across the existing bodies of literature on violence against women.  
Applying a Black and African-oriented feminist theoretical framework that pays 
particular attention to Black women’s realities, my research makes known the layered and 
interlocking forces that continue to reinforce the notion that rape within marriage is an 
impossibility. Addressing the gap in research on marital rape in South Africa, my research 
contributes knowledge about the ways in which modern state and other institutional 
bodies relate to this contested and concealed form of violence in the democratic era. In 
spite of the plethora of women-centred laws and constitutional guarantees, I document 
how both subtle and overt structures still deprive women of their bodily autonomy, in 
effect perpetuating the long-held norm that wives’ bodies are not their own. Importantly, 
I interject a unique perspective of the ukuthwala violence, placing it within the marital rape 
continuum. 
An equally, if not more significant contribution of this research is the revelation of 
individual experiences of marital rape survivors and their help-seeking trajectories over 
time. Though it implicates the workings of state structures, my dissertation positions 
women at the centre of its inquiry and is ultimately concerned with discovering their 
journeys, struggles and awakenings. It draws heavily from the perspectives of community 
workers in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape, who have extensive expertise in aiding 
and counselling marital rape survivors, and the life histories of marital rape survivors 
themselves. Addressing the lack of research on women’s journeys in seeking help for 
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marital rape across institutional layers, my research unveils the meandering, non-linear, 
and frequently fraught processes through which women realise that they are deserving of 
living without sexual abuse, and how they take steps to find solace.  
1.6 OUTLINING THE RESEARCH SUB-QUESTIONS 
The central research question of this dissertation asks: Since the criminalisation of 
marital rape in 1993, in what ways is marital rape in South Africa rendered (in)visible in 
and through the institutions where women seek protection from violence? Applying an 
ecological and interpretive analysis of institutional responses to marital rape and women’s 
experiences, I ask a series of sub-questions that highlight the different layers of institutions 
that are relevant to marital rape survivors’, from the level of the state to local, cultural and 
individual spheres. The sub-questions are as follows: 
1. Prior to and post-1993, how have ostensibly progressive legal and policy 
developments contributed to a disavowal of marital rape? 
2. How does contemporary South African legal discourse reinforce the myth that 
marital rape is a lesser form of rape?  
3. In the case of ukuthwala, how does institutional culturalism obscure the link 
between sexual violence and marriage? 
4. In what ways do individual and local contexts hinder women’s ability to seek 
recourse for marital rape? 
5. In the face of silence surrounding sexual violence in marriage, what forms of 
recourse do women draw upon that positively impact their lives? 
 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS   
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical foundations of the methodology employed for my 
research as well as a description of my research process. I also discuss the ethical 
implications of my research. The five sub-questions presented above are consecutively 
addressed in Chapters 3 through 7. In Chapter 3, I ask the question: Prior to and post-1993, 
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how have ostensibly progressive legal and policy developments contributed to a disavowal of marital rape?  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical grounding for the research. Through 
a critical examination of jurisprudence and legislative reform processes from the 1980s 
through the 2000s, I document how state actors exhibited ambivalence towards marital 
rape, and failed to tackle the theoretical and practical vestiges of the marital rape 
exemption. As the state slowly moved towards providing greater protections for women 
in the 1980s and into the early 1990s, it retained an affinity for protecting the husband 
and family at the expense of wives. I demonstrate that the eventual criminalisation of 
marital rape in 1993 under the PFVA was a political manoeuver that placed women’s 
voices and concerns at the periphery. A human rights consciousness gripped South Africa 
with the advent of democracy, engendering more women-oriented legislative reform with 
direct feminist inputs. Still, marital rape remained a tangential matter even with the 
enactment of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA), which replaced the PFVA in 1998. 
In Chapter 4, I move into the present period, still staying within the law. The 
question that this chapter grapples with is:  How does contemporary South African legal discourse 
reinforce the myth that marital rape is a lesser form of rape?  I dissect the discourse of three post-
PFVA marital rape judgements to reveal the continuity of the rape myths in the sentencing 
determinations made by courts. Relying upon social psychology, sociology and 
criminology literature on the function of rape myths and rape legitimising language, I 
illustrate how judges employ neutralisation techniques in their reasoning in order to 
diminish the culpability of the husbands. I assess feminist responses to rape jurisprudence 
following the enactment of minimum sentences legislation in 1997, and how their 
advocacy influenced the 2007 Amendment to the sentencing legislation.  
The fifth chapter asks:  In the case of ukuthwala, how does institutional culturalism obscure 
the link between sexual violence and marriage? Building upon my prior research on ukuthwala, in 
this chapter I make the argument that institutional responses to ukuthwala have had the 
effect of invisibilising marital rape, thus restricting the impact of advocacy interventions. 
I contend that the approaches of policymakers, civil society groups, the justice system and 
legal scholars, is characterised by culturalism. Culturalism refers to static and essentialised 
modes of understanding culture that cultivate and perpetuate incomplete truths about 
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certain populations. Through a romanticised discourse, institutions have largely rejected 
sexually coercive forms of ukuthwala as authentic forms of cultural expression. The 
discourse constructs violent ukuthwala – and the rapes that accompany it – as insular and 
aberrant acts, unconnected to broader gendered dynamics in marriage. I propound that 
the institutional failure to embrace a more fluid understanding of living custom eclipses 
the fact that marriage is habitually and widely employed to validate sexual violence against 
women.  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present my fieldwork findings. Chapter 6 asks:  In what ways do 
individual and local contexts hinder women’s ability to seek recourse for marital rape?  Drawing from 
my empirical research, this chapter documents the multitude of factors that obstruct 
women’s recourse-seeking efforts in the context of marital rape. My aim here is to exhibit 
that, for women, the process of obtaining help is very uncertain and non-linear, as the 
majority of survivors who approach NPOs for assistance are not aware that sexual violence 
in marriage is a violation of their rights. This stems from the cultural and social norms 
that women assimilate from their families and communal surroundings. I uncover a set of 
cultural and social norms that exist within marriages, families, churches and local justice 
structures that impede women’s ability to define and protect their sexual autonomy, and 
to seek redress when abused. I detail how, with the assistance and guidance of NPO court 
and social auxiliary workers, women are gradually able to find different tools to frame 
their experiences and aspirations in a way that emphasises their well-being and safety.  
Despite myriad challenges, some women are able to successfully draw from their 
local institutions to obtain relief from sexual and other forms of violence within their 
marriages. Thus, the question guiding Chapter 7 is: In the face of silence surrounding sexual 
violence in marriage, what forms of recourse do women draw upon that positively impact their lives? The 
goal of this chapter is to describe the forms of relief that resonated out of my research with 
community non-profit organisations (NPOs). In doing so, I relay how the state justice 
system sometimes does positively impact women’s lives, but this is mainly due to the 
continuing advocacy and support of local women’s rights organisations that incessantly 
push for state actors to protect women. Additionally, in this chapter I highlight the subtle 
means through which women obtain support and take ownership of their destinies 
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through the assistance of local NPOs – for example attending community workshops, 
going for long-term counselling, and building a stronger self-esteem. 
In Chapter 8, I integrate the life histories of two survivors of coercive ukuthwala 
whom I interviewed. Their accounts weave together the concepts of marital rape, 
institutional responses and help-seeking. The life stories represent a long view of how 
women cope with the violence of ukuthwala and the constraints of marriage across decades, 
and the steps they take to improve their circumstances. In Chapter 9, the denouement of 
the dissertation, I reflect on my own journey in conducting the research for this 
dissertation, and tease out the most important phenomena of each chapter and from the 




2 Chapter 2: Methodology and Ethics 
2.1 INTRODUCING THE METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL 
ORIENTATION 
When I began to conceive of the research scope for my dissertation, the two 
certainties I possessed were that the thesis must concern marital rape, and it must centre 
women’s lived experiences of this form of violence. I looked at literature on marital rape, 
jurisprudence, and policy documents, and noted, much to my frustration, that the subject 
of marital rape did not feature prominently in these resources.  
Scholarship has established that violence against women and girls (VAWG) 
occurring in intimate settings is the form of violence that is least likely to be disclosed.141 
It has also indicated that such violence is prevalent.142 That marital rape is hidden and 
has been socially, legally and culturally condoned, is precisely the reason for which 
research about marital rape is so critical. To shy away from understanding such an 
involute phenomenon is to risk buttressing the very societal norms that have nullified 
women’s autonomy over their bodies.  
With these motivations in mind, my dissertation begins to address the deficiency of 
research on marital rape on South Africa by exploring formal and informal institutional 
responses to marital rape, in the context of survivors’ help-seeking journeys. Using an 
interpretivist research paradigm, the dissertation uncovers how institutions conceptually 
discredit marital rape as a recourse-worthy form of abuse, which in turn obfuscates 
survivors’ attempts to find help.  Alongside the theme of erasure, I detail how marital rape 
is acknowledged, and how some survivors find relief.  
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   My research question asks: Since the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993, in 
what ways is marital rape in South Africa rendered (in)visible in and through the 
institutions where women seek protection from violence? This is an open-ended research 
question, informed by five sub-questions that probe both macro and micro-level themes 
of the erasure and discovery of marital rape. My analyses are underpinned by feminist 
theory, with emphasis on Black and African feminism(s) which call attention to 
overlapping forms of oppression within Black and African women’s lives.  
The practice of feminism within the academic space is designed to question and 
disturb the status quo.143 It drives those who believe in the feminist project to look at their 
immediate world and to ask what certain phenomena say about women’s lives. Feminist 
theory, in its myriad forms, is ultimately concerned with the agency of women and 
fostering a more gender equal society. Scholars and practitioners must therefore do the 
work of transmitting understandings of women’s lives through rich descriptions, and 
excavating meaning from the palpable silences that still surround their realities.144  
The questions that I ask in my research connect a range of motifs, for example 
cultural norms, institutional values and modalities, and survivors’ experiences of marital 
rape and help-seeking. In light of the open-ended and exploratory nature of my research 
questions, the sensitivity of my research subject, and my feminist positioning, I decided 
that I could not rely upon written resources alone. I had to go into the field and talk to 
women. My dissertation is therefore the product of qualitative research methodology. 
Qualitative methodologies allow for creativity and expansiveness in researching 
phenomena, stress inside perspectives, and are able to generate intricately descriptive data, 
also known as “thick descriptions.”145  
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As non-quantitative methodology extracts data with more depth and dimension, 
in respect of the study of violence, these exploratory tools “provide greater insight into 
motivation, meanings, and dynamics of violent relationships.”146 The studies that 
contribute most significantly to my research are those which shed light on how women 
conceptualise and respond to sexual violence. These studies all rely on qualitative methods 
such as in-depth interviews and immersion in communities.147  
Among the range of potential qualitative paradigms, my methods are rooted in the 
interpretivist tradition of research which “seeks to understand people’s lived experience 
from the perspective of people themselves.”148 Conducting my fieldwork through the 
context-oriented lens of interpretivism allowed for a richer and more elaborate 
understanding of the cultural, legal and socioeconomic underpinnings of responses to 
marital rape by state institutions, community organisations and women themselves. I did 
not go into the field knowing exactly what I would find, but as I continued I realised the 
importance of allowing interesting questions to emerge, and absorbing the unique 
perspectives of each woman I interviewed.  
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2.2 REFLEXIVITY  
Qualitative and feminist methodologies also encourage reflexivity on the part of 
researchers – the act of reflecting upon one’s positioning and interactions with research 
participants.149 As Angen poignantly articulated, as researchers “(w)e cannot step outside 
of our intersubjective involvement with the lifeworld and into some mythical, all-knowing, 
and neutral standpoint… By our very being in the world, we are already morally  
implicated.”150  
I commenced my research journey aware of the fact that I am a staunch feminist, 
that I have been studying violence against women for many years, and that I do have 
connections within the women’s rights activist and academic community in South Africa. 
It is my background as a feminist researcher of violence against women in South Africa 
that motivated me to research and write this dissertation. I also take stock of how my 
identity a Black African feminist woman shapes my perspectives in my research. I am 
extremely sensitive to women’s experiences, concerned with the empowerment of women, 
and passionate about learning women’s stories. At the same time, in many respects I am 
an outsider. I have lived most of my life in the United States, am non-South African, and 
I also possess an inordinate amount of education from institutions of privilege.  
Building trust between myself and my research participants was helped by the fact 
that the leadership of the non-profit organisations (NPOs), Masimanyane and Mosaic, 
welcomed me with open arms and arranged for me to speak to staff. I am fortunate in that 
in my time at the University of Cape Town (UCT) I have come to be supervised and 
mentored by scholars who have healthy and longstanding relationships with the South 
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African women’s rights community. My access to Masimanyane and Mosaic would not 
have been possible without my support system at UCT.  
Some interviews were characterised by ease, while in others I could see that the 
participants were wary of me, wondering where I had come from, and what exactly I was 
doing there. Where I could sense that my interviewee was uncomfortable, I endeavoured 
to build trust by speaking more about my work within South Africa and naming persons 
whom we both knew well. Many a time, when I mentioned so-and-so, an interviewee 
would light up and exclaim: “Ah! You know her?! I have known her for years. I love her!” 
They would then launch into stories about their work with the individual(s) over the years 
and their positive relationship. As I went along I became more cognisant of the fact that 
it was important that I not only introduce my research project and institutional affiliation, 
but also present information about how I fit within the South African women’s rights 
community. Otherwise I appeared as a person without context; an outsider.  
2.3 DESKTOP RESEARCH 
The nature of my research topic required that I not rely too heavily upon any one 
particular field. Beginning in early 2016, I consulted a range of existing sources within the 
fields of law, public health, anthropology, sociology and psychology that contain 
qualitative and quantitative data about marital rape in comparative and local contexts. 
This was so that I was able to build a solid theoretical understanding of the history of legal 
and policy reactions to marital rape, continuing feminist efforts around sexual violence, 
intimate partner violence, socio-cultural conceptions of sexual violence in marriage, and 
the manner in which women strive to express agency.  
I conducted my literature review with attention to feminist theorising and women-
centred empirical work, concentrating upon research that consciously broadens and 
stretches understandings of VAWG; critiques and assesses state engagement with the 
problem of VAWG; and, most importantly gives greater voice to survivors themselves. 
Studies based on large-scale surveys were pivotal for outlining general patterns in terms of 
the South Africa’s protection of women, and women’s engagement with the criminal 
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justice system vis-à-vis rape. Much of this literature is attributed to the South African 
Medical Research Council’s Gender and Health Research Unit, and its partners.151 
Incorporating their work and the studies of other scholars, I placed emphasis on 
community-based ethnographic studies as they offer a localised and embedded perspective 
of intimate partner sexual violence.  
I located survey and ethnographic studies by conducting searches in relevant 
databases using keywords such as: marriage, marital, rape, sexual violence, gender-based violence, 
culture, abduction, women, masculinity, criminal, justice, law, local, custom, tradition, attitudes, 
ukuthwala, and coercion. Many resources were retrieved from the bibliographies of the articles 
and books that I initially perused. I also incorporated reports by South African civil society 
organisations such as the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre to end violence against 
women.  
For the law and policy resources, I looked at the evolution of common law and 
statutory law concerning marital rape, the rights of wives in marriage, and sexual offences.  
I relied on materials retrievable through the university library system and on the internet 
– including case law, commission reports, parliamentary reports, and journal articles. Pre-
1993, I appraised court appeals on the issue of marital rape and legal treatises to trace the 
integration of the marital rape exemption into South African law. I also searched for cases 
in the period after the criminalisation of marital rape by the Prevention of Family Violence 
Act (PFVA) towards the end of 1993. Generally, I found case law using the Westlaw and 
LexisNexis legal databases. For unreported cases, the Southern African Legal Information 
Institute website, http://www.saflii.org, was a useful repository. It was important to dissect 
the dicta and reasoning of cases across time periods in order to ascertain continuities and 
shifts in legal discourse on sexual violence in marriage and the position of wives. I was only 
able to access reported judgments, meaning cases appealed from the Magistrate’s Courts. 
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Post-1993 the universe of cases I identified is small, comprising six decisions.152 
The Jezile decision, which is the highest court decision on the practice of ukuthwala, 
is not framed as a marital rape case, but as I am making the argument for expanding 
understandings of marital rape, Jezile is significant.153 Further, I obtained access to the 
Jezile trial transcripts. The case record is a mine of information about localised conceptions 
of the violent practice of ukuthwala and how that contrasts with the voices representing the 
state and civil society, i.e. the judges, prosecutors, and NPOs.  
In addition to case law, I perused government documents concerning violence 
against women in marriage to ascertain the trajectory of state discourse on marital rape. 
Of greatest value are the reports of the South African Law Reform Commission 
(previously known as the South African Law Commission) including the 1985 report 
entitled Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa,154 and its recent discussion paper on 
ukuthwala.155  
2.4 FIELDWORK 
2.4.1 Sampling Rationales: The Non-Profit Organisations  
As I stated earlier in this chapter, my research questions and theoretical positioning 
required that I go into the field in order to talk to women. I resolved to be present in their 
day-to-day contexts to learn more about the neglected phenomenon of marital rape, 
women’s recourse-seeking journeys and institutional reactions. Although I am not an 
ethnographer, with two interdisciplinary degrees (incorporating history, gender studies, 
                                               
152 Rowles v S [2012] JOL 29414 (ECG); W v Minister of Safety & Security & Others [2007] JOL 20000 
(E); S v Modise (113/06) [2007]; S v Mvamvu [2005] 1 All SA 435 (SCA); S v Moipolai (CA 53/2004) [2004]; 
Sekese v S [2009] JOL 23803 (ECM). 
153 Jezile v S. 
154 South African Law Commission (SALC), Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa (Project 
45)(1985). 
155 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), The Practice of Ukuthwala (Project 138) 
Discussion Paper 138 (2015). 
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anthropology, and political science), and as a former asylum lawyer who assisted survivors 
of torture and gender-based violations, I felt equipped to undertake local research on the 
very sensitive topic of marital rape. It also helped that I have civil society connections in 
South Africa based on my prior work as a gender researcher and consultant. I have long 
been drawn to the work of anthropologists, and have absorbed literature on violence 
which confirms that extended and focused interactions with communities and participants 
is valuable for examining violence in more textured and subtle ways. Documenting the 
lived experiences of those who have endured marital rape or assisted survivors allows for 
the discovery of the “gendered ways that state institutions, healthcare systems, caregivers, 
and individuals themselves enable, sanction, or aim to curtail such violations.”156  
My strategy of choosing a specific grouping of research informants is illustrative of 
the purposeful sampling method. Such sampling is suitable where the “the study aims to 
depict central, important or decisive aspects of the investigated phenomenon,” as it 
ensures that these aspects are addressed through engaging with the chosen informants.157 
The literature already demonstrates that marital rape is a largely private and peripheral 
issue which is difficult to measure through prevalence surveys. The studies however do 
not detail the modalities that render marital rape a hidden and neglected issue. By 
speaking with the staff of the direct-service organisations I could access repositories of 
knowledge and insight to learn how women experience violence in intimate settings, and 
what they do in response.  
Masimanyane and Mosaic, provide a safe space for women survivors of violence 
receive to help and guidance without being judged. The NPOs directly counsel women 
and also have techniques for eliciting information about the forms of abuse their clients 
may be suffering in their relationships, including sexual abuse. The staff could speak not 
just to the individual experiences of clients they have assisted; they could also speak to 
                                               
156 M. Gabriela Torres, “Reconciling Cultural Difference in the Study of Marital Rape,” in Marital 
Rape: Consent, Marriage, and Social Change in Global Context, ed. Kersti Yllö and M Gabriela Torres (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 13. 
157 Elliott and Timulak, “Descriptive and Interpretive Approaches to Qualitative Research,” 152. 
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salient overarching patterns in the help-seeking behaviour of women who have survived 
marital rape. Moreover, the staff of these organisations are invested in their work in very 
poignant ways. Some of them are former clients of the organisations and others came to 
the organisations during life transitions, for example leaving an abusive marriage. For this 
reason, they have a deeper understanding of what their clients endure.  
I also chose Mosaic and Masimanyane because they work in different geographical 
areas, and this would add a comparative component to the data. Mosaic is headquartered 
in Cape Town and has a presence in the Cape Town metropole and the interior of the 
Western Cape. The main office for Masimanyane is in East London, but its reach extends 
across the rural and urban areas of the Eastern Cape. The two organisations are 
embedded in the communities in which they work. The staff live in or close to the areas 
where their offices are based, and have intimate knowledge of local language(s), cultures, 
institutions and community ties.   
2.4.2 Ethical Clearance and Fieldwork Timeframe  
After obtaining ethical clearance from the UCT Law Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee in November 2016, I began my fieldwork with Mosaic in January 2017, which 
I concluded in May 2017. I conducted my fieldwork with Masimanyane in East London 
in April 2017. The ethical clearance parameters permitted that I interview staff who work 
for Masimanyane and Mosaic, as well as community members chosen by the organisations 
for participation in group discussions about sexual violence in marriage. For the 
interviewing and group discussions I drafted participant information sheets and 
corresponding consent forms. I also developed a question guide for the one-on-one 
interviews. The Research Ethics Committee approved all materials prior to my 
commencement of the fieldwork.  
2.4.3 Description of the Sample (Study Participants) 
Mosaic and Masimanyane primarily assist Black and Coloured (women of multi-
racial and multi-ethnic descent) women who live in townships and informal settlements, 
and rural areas. In South Africa, many people move across and in-between localities, so 
that the concept of ‘place’ and place-based identity is not unchangingly fixed into 
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categories of rural, urban or peri-urban. There are however conditions and perspectives 
that are more present in particular areas, and I highlight these nuances in the empirical 
chapters. I collectively refer to the women who are the subjects of this study as Black. The 
majority of the areas the NPOs service are ravaged by crime and substance abuse. Both 
organisations do have clients from all race groups, of which some are middle to upper 
class. Some of the clients are also immigrants. Both organisations offer a range of services 
in their respective locales based on an integrated care model for their clients.   
Certain staff are first-responders for rape victims, for example those who work in 
the Thuthuzela Care Centers (TCCs). The TCCs are a one-stop service facility for 
survivors of sexual violence. The TCCs, overseen by the National Prosecution Authority’s 
Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA) unit, were “established to reduce 
secondary victimization, increase conviction rates and reduce the length of time taken to 
finalise sexual offence cases”.158 The TCCs provide services such as emergency medical 
care, HIV post-exposure prophylaxis, and counselling. In most TCCs, NPOs like Mosaic 
and Masimanyane are contracted to provide the counselling services, and other forms of 
support to survivors. They do trauma counselling, and walk the client through the process 
of the medical exam, and filing a case with the police.  
Other staff work in-house at Magistrate’s Courts and police stations – the result of 
carefully cultivated relationships and partnerships between the organisations and the local 
authorities. Where there are partnerships with the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
the counsellors run the Victim Empowerment Centres in the police stations.159 Some staff 
are based at the organisations’ regional offices where they counsel women and do 
advocacy work. An additional and integral part of the work done by Masimanyane and 
Mosaic are community workshops in urban and rural areas where they educate women 
                                               
158 Machisa et al., Rape Justice in South Africa, 19. 
159 These centres are part of South Africa’s Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP), a 
component of the National Crime Prevention Strategy launched in the late 1996. As a multi-sectoral 
collaboration, the VEP is designed to provide services to victims of crime, and to create a more supportive 
environment for them as they engage with the justice system.   
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and find more individuals who need assistance. About half of the NPOs staff have been 
with their organisations for close to two decades (15 years and above). A proportion did 
similar work before joining the organisations. The majority of the staff that I interviewed 
were drawn to this work because of their own experiences of abuse within marriage and 
their families.  
To maintain the anonymity of the staff and their clients, in my empirical chapters 
I do not specify the precise office/location from which the data was obtained. I shall 
however list the areas that are represented in the data. For the Western Cape, interviews 
and observations covered Mitchell’s Plain, Khayelitsha, Worcester, Wellington, Wynberg 
and Paarl. At Masimanyane, I conducted all interviews at the Eastern Cape office, but the 
staff represented offices and programs in East London and across the Eastern Cape – in 
both urban and rural areas. The ukuthwala project of Masimanyane was based in the O.R. 
Tambo and Amathole municipalities of the Eastern Cape.  
2.4.4 Interviews  
Under the guidance of the leadership of the organisations, and through direct 
liaising with staff, I conducted interviews with fourteen members of staff: seven from 
Mosaic and seven from Masimanyane. The participants were social auxiliary workers (lay 
counsellors), court advisors, TCC counsellors, community researchers and educators. The 
interviews lasted from half an hour to two hours. For Mosaic I did interviews at the 
locations where each staff member was based. I travelled throughout the Cape Town 
metropole and interior areas of the province. For Masimanyane I conducted my 
interviews from the organisation’s main office in East London. The staff that I spoke to 
worked in East London and the surrounding townships, as well as in rural areas of the 
former Ciskei and Transkei.160  
                                               
160 The Ciskei and Transkei were two of the ten Black homelands (Bantustans) created by the 
apartheid government to strip Black South Africans of their South African citizenship and enforce race-
based spatial separation. Ciskei and Transkei were designated as the homelands for isi-Xhosa speaking 
South Africans. Following the fall of apartheid, these Bantustans became part of the Eastern Cape province.   
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While I was in East London, Masimanyane arranged for me to speak with two of 
their clients who are survivors of the violent form of ukuthwala. The women travelled to 
East London from their homes in a rural location of the former Transkei, and then 
returned home after our interview. Masimanyane provided food for all of us and covered 
the clients’ transportation costs. Given the time constraints for both the clients and the 
Masimanyane staff who were scheduled to speak with me that morning, we decided to do 
a group interview, with the Masimanyane staff providing their own perspectives on marital 
rape as well as acting as translators for the isiXhosa-speaking clients. These two members 
of staff were well acquainted with the clients as they had done work directly in their 
communities and had provided counselling to them. In this way, the staff helped to put 
the clients at ease and to explain my research to them and assist in answering questions 
that arose.  
2.4.5 Observing 
Where presented with the opportunity, I spent time at each organisation in order to 
observe their work, and to get a more acute sense of their structures, programs, activities 
and characteristics. Though I spent a shorter period of time at Masimanyane in East 
London, outside of the interviews, I spoke to many staff members, including their Director 
Dr Lesley Ann Foster, in order to learn more about the history and focus of the 
organisation. Given that Mosaic is local, I took advantage of being able to visit their office 
regularly. I attended staff meetings, had informal chats with staff, and also went on site 
visits with staff and interns.  
2.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
When I set upon the journey of studying marital rape in South Africa, I thought 
very carefully about what I wanted the study to be, and what I did not want it to be. My 
parameters and goals had to be clear, to allow for me to pick the best methodologies; but 
to do so with acute awareness of what aspects of the field I would engage with, and, as a 
result of that, what aspects would be excluded or less prominent. My motivation as a 
feminist scholar is to assist in imbuing academic, policy and other discourses with a greater 
understanding of what women endure; to work toward retrieving women’s perspectives, 
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experiences and voices from environments in which they are suppressed, trivialised or 
unacknowledged. For a topic as emotive, obscured and under-studied as marital rape, I 
recognized that there was room for myriad studies to be conducted in the South African 
context. Therefore I initially felt pulled in many different directions, all of which were 
important, all of which could have made significant contributions to the study of women 
and marital rape.  
In the end, I decided upon an exploration of the intersection between formal and 
informal institutions, marital rape, and recourse-seeking by women. By including an 
institutional lens in the framing of my research question and sub-questions, I intended to 
identify patterns in how marital rape is conceptualised at various levels of society, but to 
do so in a way that centres women. Working within an ecological paradigm facilitated a 
multi-faceted and dynamic reading of marital rape – providing not just a view from state 
entities, but also from locales in the Eastern Cape and Western cape, and from women 
themselves.  
The most important decision I had to make was whether or not speaking to survivors 
of marital rape would be a central component of my research methodology. There are 
immense and unparalleled benefits in speaking to survivors themselves. No medium can 
substitute for the telling of one’s own experience on one’s own terms. But, I am also 
sensitive to the fact that marital rape is an extremely painful phenomenon for those who 
are subjected to, and the process of coming to terms with it, of surviving it, and of finding 
help if that is what one chooses – is fraught with obstacles and uncertainties.  
Whether a woman will concede that she has suffered sexual abuse in her marriage 
is based on her own personal definitions, social conditioning, whether she has sought help, 
and the outcomes of her help-seeking experiences. The act of identifying ways to interview 
women who were at different parts of their recourse-seeking journeys (including women 
who did not seek help from NPOs) was, I decided, a different research project. It was a 
project that required immersion in the field over an extended period of time. To attempt 
to do this, without having adequate time, appropriate disciplinary grounding, and options 
for psychological support referrals, could cause immense harm to the participants.  
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Ultimately, I chose to interview staff who could, based on their many years of  
intimately assisting women survivors of violence, communicate women’s experiences of 
violence and help-seeking over the long-term. Through their perspectives, I could learn 
how marital rape hides and comes to the surface. As the staff are based in or highly familiar 
with the areas that their clients come from, they could also share observations of the local 
formal and informal institutional influences on survivors’ journeys.   
At the same time, my research design did not exclude the possibility that the NPOs 
may have clients who could speak to me about their experiences of marital rape and 
attempts to find help. But again, for ethical purposes, and with the understanding that the 
NPOs main commitments are to their clients’ well-being, I deferred to the NGOs to 
identify survivors. Consequently, the empirical component of my dissertation is based on 
interviews with a carefully selected group of women in the Eastern Cape and Western 
Cape.  
 Working within an interpretivist paradigm, my goal is to unearth some women’s 
experiences by absorbing the work of two community-oriented feminist NPOs, and 
drawing meaning from the outlooks of the informants.  By conducting in-depth interviews, 
I sought to find rich and complex data, and to proffer descriptions that represent in 
nuanced terms certain perspectives and realities of marital rape, help-seeking, and 
institutional positionalities. To that end, this is not a prevalence study and I do not seek to 
generalise my findings nor argue that they are nationally representative. The perspectives 
that I gathered are limited to certain regions – these being the Cape Town metropole and 
surrounding areas, and East London and certain rural areas of the Eastern Cape. The 
participants are predominantly English, Afrikaans, and isiXhosa-speaking, and come from 
impoverished and crime-ridden locales.  
2.6 COLLECTION AND ANALYSING DATA 
Prior to each one-on-one interview, I introduced myself to the interviewee, 
providing background about myself and my research, and then presented the participant 
with an information sheet and consent form. After they read the papers, I allowed them 
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to ask questions, and then instructed them where to sign on the consent form. I gave each 
participant a copy of the consent form they had signed. Where permission was granted in 
writing, I recorded the interviews with my phone and also took notes throughout the 
interview. The one exception to this process was my interview with the two women who 
were survivors of coercive ukuthwala. Masimanyane arranged the interviews with the 
women during my time in East London. The Masimanyane staff who took part in the 
group interview explained my research to the women in isiXhosa and obtained oral 
consent for me to interview and record them.  
Following each session I uploaded each interview to Dropbox. I then saved each 
interview to my password-protected computer, encrypting each file with a password to 
protect the identity and information of each participant. Within a week to two weeks 
following each appointment, I transcribed the interviews and saved them to my computer 
in a password protected format. Where I did not obtain permission to record,  which only 
happened for one interview, I typed out my notes from the interview and also encrypted 
the file.  
As the dissertation centres descriptions of the help-seeking trajectories of marital 
rape survivors, anecdotal and thematic information was drawn from the data. To 
categorise the data, I employed the open coding technique, an “interpretative process by 
which data are broken down analytically.”161 During my fieldwork, perceptible subject 
strands had begun to emerge organically. I made notes when struck by certain words, 
expressions and tones that the participants used, and also paid attention to observations 
that recurred in interviews and that the participants emphatically raised. I used my 
recollections and field notes as I commenced the coding process in February 2018.  I re-
listened to each interview to check the accuracy of my transcripts, and to recall the feel 
and content of each interview. I combined the impressions taken from the recordings 
themselves with areas I highlighted during my time in the field.  
                                               
161 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and 
Evaluative criteria,” Qualitative Sociology 13, no. 1 (1990): 12. 
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Noting differences and similarities in the subjects I discerned, I assigned each one 
a “conceptual label” in order to isolate similar perspectives and experiences presented by 
the participants into categories and subcategories.162 The two overarching categories are: 
factors that hinder recourse seeking; and beneficial forms of recourse seeking. Thereafter, 
I compiled a chart of subcategories, pulling out quotes from the transcripts that 
substantiated those themes. This chart was workshopped and further refined in 
consultation with my supervisor, and a mentor, Dr Kelley Moult. The structure of my 
empirical chapters follows the two categories and numerous sub-categories that I 
developed through the open coding.  
2.7 ETHICS 
Not only does this research project address a sensitive issue – that of violence against 
women in marriage – but the methodology also entailed interviewing and holding 
discussions with human beings. The very human-oriented nature of my research focus 
and methods gave rise to several ethical concerns, which I articulated in my application 
to the Law Faculty’s Research Ethic Committee in August of 2016. Ethical clearance was 
granted in November 2016. In June of 2017, the Committee granted an amendment to 
this clearance on the basis of a change to my group interview methodology. This section 
outlines the ethical concerns and how they were mitigated during research process. 
Thereafter I detail the benefits of the study.  
2.7.1 Risk and Minimisation of Harm 
Though I mainly interviewed seasoned women’s rights community workers, I 
remained cognisant of potential risks of harm to the staff of Masimanyane and Mosaic. 
Discussing such a painful topic had the potential to cause trauma to the staff even though 
they address these issues on a regular basis in a professional capacity. Several of the staff 
revealed to me that they are survivors of abusive relationships themselves and that this is 
what inspired them to do the work that they do. Moreover, spending time in the interview 
took time away from the staff’s already very busy schedules. Taking these factors into 
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consideration, I ensured that I scheduled interviews at a time that was convenient for each 
participant, and that management was aware of the interviews. Additionally, both verbally 
and in writing, I made clear to the participants that they had the right to refuse to 
participate further in the study should they become uncomfortable during the interview 
or object to the study on any basis. I emphasised the confidentiality of the interviews and 
that I would not use any identifying information in future written outputs.  
In terms of the staff’s mental well-being, during the interviews I asked the 
participants how they feel about their work, how they cope with the stress of the job, and 
paid attention to their demeanour to ensure that they continued to remain positively 
engaged. The staff members are experienced employees and were at ease in discussing 
gender violence, although some were emotionally affected when they recalled certain 
cases. Positively, at both organisations, significant support is offered to the staff. They 
debrief regularly, and also have access to counselling and other services.  
There are more risks in speaking to survivors of marital rape. Marital rape is one 
of the most concealed as well as prevalent forms of sexual abuse. Most victims will never 
speak about it or seek assistance. Families also tend to prefer to keep this violence a secret 
for the sake of saving face within their communities. Hence, not only is it difficult for 
women to talk about this violence and conceptualise it as rape, but there are also risks 
involved if it is discovered that wives have spoken to outsiders about their experiences 
(including retaliation by husbands or family members). For these reasons I chose to only 
speak to survivors who were clients of either organisation – knowing that they had already 
begun to receive help and education, and had come to these organisations of their own 
will and felt safe.  As clients, the participants would have access to further counselling and 
other support if needed.  
Prior to the group interview, I spoke to the Masimanyane staff about ethical 
considerations for the women, and in this way communicated that we must seek consent 
and outline the purpose of my research to the survivors. I did not know the specifics of 
what Masimanyane communicated to the survivors when they made the invitation and so 
wanted to ensure that we were all on the same page, and that the survivors had clarity 
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about the purpose and scope of the interview. After we provided background about my 
research to the survivors, the Masimanyane staff obtained verbal consent for the interview, 
informed the survivors that it was voluntary, and also obtained consent for me to record 
the discussion.  
The staff’s presence was a significant factor in reducing harm to the participants. 
They had done work in the survivors’ communities, had counselled them, and worked 
with them through their journeys of healing and empowerment. Their presence helped to 
create a greater atmosphere of assurance and familiarity for the survivors. The staff were 
attuned to how to broach certain sensitive subjects, what linguistic terms to use, and could 
communicate my questions in an effective and culturally appropriate manner. One of the 
survivors did become emotionally moved during her interview and cried throughout the 
latter part of her telling. We took breaks to allow her to breathe, comforted her, and 
allowed her to proceed at her own pace.  
Masimanyane covered the travel costs of the survivors and also served us lunch 
and beverages. Following the interview, we all hopped into my rental car and I drove the 
participants to a petrol station where they could hitchhike back to their homes, which is 
the standard practice in Eastern Cape. The staff ensured that the survivors found a ride, 
and then we returned to the Masimanyane office.  
2.7.2 Benefice  
As marital rape is infrequently studied or discussed, this research encouraged both 
staff members and community members to share experiences and opinions that may 
typically not be given such a direct outlet. The group interview with the survivors provided 
a safe space in which the women could open up about their lives, their emotions and their 
hopes, and trust that their perspectives are respected and valued by the researcher. While 
they may derive little benefit from the written thesis itself, the participants’ awareness that 
they have played a role in this research will be a benefit. On a personal level, discussing 
marital rape and intimate partner violence was also a cathartic experience for the 
participants, albeit painful as well. It helped them to know they are not alone, allowed 
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them to learn from each other’s journeys, and to receive reassurance from Masimanyane’s 
ongoing concern and support.   
The staff that I have interviewed are professionally and personally committed to 
bettering the lives of women in South Africa and have been making considerable efforts 
and impact in their respective communities. Participating in the research has given them 
a further opportunity to speak about a form of violence that affects a large number of their 
clients, and may also assist them in adjusting how they frame their work with marital rape 
victims. The organisations’ leadership has requested that any written materials will give 
acknowledge to their work and participation in the research. This is important to them 
and to myself, as we see this as a research partnership. Once my dissertation has been 
graded and approved by the Higher Degrees Committee of the Law Faculty, and Doctoral 
Degrees Board of UCT, I will provide Mosaic and Masimanyane with hard and soft copies 
of the dissertation. I will also be communicating with the leadership of each organisation 
in order to debrief about the research process, and to provide seminars to the staff 





3 Chapter 3: A History of the Ambivalent Place of 
Marital Rape in the Legal Sphere 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There exists a resounding ambivalence about marital rape. It is found not only in 
the day-to-day interactions and beliefs of South African citizens, but also permeates the 
various manifestations of the law that touch women’s lives. Admittedly, since the early 
1980s there has been immense legislative progress according women greater rights in 
marriage The abolition of the common law “marital power” rule,163 the passage of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA),164 and the recognition of family 
violence,165 are illustrations of the positive evolution of the law. A component of the 
legislature’s attention to family violence, the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993 
marked a high point of the legislative reform.166 But, the path towards this reform, and 
the legacy of the discourse of that era, portray a decidedly less rosy picture about the state’s 
perceptions of marital rape. That picture is the subject of this chapter.  
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a historical grounding for my later 
discussions of how harmful conceptualisations of marital rape continue to resonate within 
state and social structures. My surveying is shaped by the research sub- question: Prior to 
                                               
163 The marital power rule gave a husband power over his wife’s person and property. It was 
undone by the Matrimonial Property Act. See Chapter II of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. The 
Act however did not apply to marriages by Black people.  
164 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA). One of the purposes of the 
RCMA, stated in the Preamble, is to “provide for the equal status and capacity of spouses in customary 
marriages.” The RCMA removed any remaining aspects of the marital power from Black marriages.  
165 In the form of the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (PFVA), which created an 
interdict system for violence in the family, imposed a mandatory reporting requirement for child abuse, and 
criminalised marital rape. The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (DVA) replaced the PVFA, expanding 
the scope of “family” with the broader category of “domestic relationship,” and also introducing a broad 
definition of “domestic violence.” See Section 1 of the Act, which provides Definitions.  
166 Section 5 of the PFVA.  
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and post-1993, how have ostensibly progressive legal and policy developments contributed 
to a disavowal of marital rape? Implementing the feminist practice of questioning and 
probing, I interrogate the processes that led towards the undoing of the marital rape 
exemption. In doing so, I bring to the surface the discriminatory and superficial 
motivations that were present even as the marital rape exemption was swept away.  
In fulfilment of the central aim of this dissertation, which is to document how 
institutions (in)visibilise marital rape, in this chapter I unearth the tenuous position of 
marital rape in legislative reform from the end of the apartheid-era and into South Africa’s 
new democracy. My investigation illuminates that legislative reform did little to dismantle 
patriarchal stereotypes about marriage within the very state institutions mandated to 
protect women. Even in the democratic era, marital rape did not feature prominently in 
the reform of the domestic violence framework.  
I illustrate the uncertain and marginalised place of marital rape within the legal and 
policy arenas by appraising four historical periods: the origin of the marital rape 
exemption in South African common law; the unfavourable legislative reform of the late 
1980s; the eventual abolition of the exemption by the Prevention of Family Violence Act 
(PFVA) in 1993; and more women-centred legislative reform in the democratic era. The 
first section will narrate how the marital rape exemption was taken to be a part of South 
African common law based on Roman-Dutch and English law precedents. Although a 
minority of legal voices questioned the legitimacy of the marital rape exemption, it was 
largely countenanced and applied by legislators, judicial actors and scholars. 
The subsequent part of this chapter details the history and nature of the South 
African Law Commission’s (SALC) recommendation in the mid-1980s to undo the 
marital rape exemption. Subsequently, Parliament rejected this recommendation and 
further entrenched the place of the marital rape exemption in law by writing it into statute 
in 1989. I expose how both the SALC’s investigation and the response by policymakers 
revealed a deep and widespread cynicism about marital rape. They displayed a 
preoccupation with preserving family and the institution of marriage, and a disregard for 
the individual rights of women.  
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The outcomes of the 1980s made the developments of the 1990s all the more 
surprising. The third section chronicles how just a few years after the 1989 reform, the 
marital rape exemption was swiftly removed from South African law by the PFVA. I argue 
that this victory was not as straightforward as it appeared. As a product of political 
expediency, the PFVA was a highly flawed bill that relegated women’s voices and concerns 
to the periphery. The marital rape criminalisation provision was only added during the 
final stages of the drafting. Lastly, I recount how the PFVA was replaced in 1998 by the 
Domestic Violence Act (DVA), a more woman-centred and feminist-driven piece of 
legislation.167 While an international human rights philosophy took root within state 
structures at the advent of democracy, and women’s rights gained greater prominence, I 
argue that the state still neglected to sufficiently address marital rape in the DVA.  
3.2 THE HISTORY OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION UNDER SOUTH 
AFRICAN COMMON LAW 
3.2.1 The Roots and Parameters of the Marital Rape Exemption  
Under South African common law, the marital rape exemption ensured that a 
husband could not be held criminally liable for raping his wife. It was legally impossible. 
The moment of the exemption’s assimilation into South African law is unclear as the 
foundation of the common law was an amalgam of the traditions imparted by colonial 
forces. From the English branch, the exemption’s basis is found in a quote by Sir Matthew 
Hale, who wrote in 1736 that “the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by 
himself upon a lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife 
hath given herself up in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.”168 In 
England and its colonies, including South Africa and the United States, these words 
provided authority for the existence of the marital exemption under common law. Under 
the guise of a contract that only served the husband’s interests, a wife was taken to have 
given her irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse for the duration of her marriage.  
                                               
167 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (DVA). 
168 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (London, 1736), 629. 
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The Roman-Dutch branch of South African law carried an even firmer position 
given the “inferior” and “subordinate” status of women under Roman-Dutch law, and 
the numerous authoritative legal writings on the subject.169 As early as 1650, Damhouder 
reasoned that a husband has “full right to the person of his wife with whom he has 
consummated a marriage.”170 Some decades later, Huber explained the lesser position of 
wives as follows, at the same time sanctioning the use of force: 
Husbands have, in the first place, such authority over their wives as is given 
by the laws of nature, of God and of all nations, namely, that wives must 
be subject to their husbands in all things which do not clearly conflict with 
honour and virtue. Since no power in the world can be effective without 
compulsion, the husband must also possess certain means of compulsion, 
in case the wife refuses to bow to his sway in reasonable matters.171 
In line with Huber and Damhouder, in 1764 another legal authority, Moorman, 
stated that a husband possesses full authority over his wife’s person, and that the 
rape of a wife by her husband is not punishable under the law.172  
Oddly, the South African courts never directly confronted the legitimacy of the 
marital rape exemption under South African law.173 Instead, relying upon the iterations 
outlined above, the exemption was taken to be a part of the common law and applied in 
various judgments, each following the precedent set by the former. Early Appellate 
Division decisions such as R v Mosago & another, R v K, and R v Z serve as examples.174 In 
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these cases, as in several others, the common law definition of rape by a man was 
articulated as “carnal connection with a woman (not his wife) without her consent.”175 
South African writers also saw the exemption as forming a part of common law.176 
Quoting English law, Gardiner and Lansdown reasoned:  
 The carnal knowledge must be unlawful. A woman, by entering into 
marriage, is held to have given an irrevocable consent to carnal connection 
with her husband, and, however she may resist and however unreasonable 
his wishes may be, a husband who forces his wife to have connection with 
him against her will does not commit rape…but he may be found guilty of 
assault - R v Miller (1954) 2 All ER 529.177 
Hence, the dominant view amongst the courts and academics was that a husband held a 
practically unqualified right to sexually access his wife, even through use of coercive 
methods. Such transparent sexual coercion would never rise to the level of rape under the 
law, as a wife had no right to refuse her husband. A husband could only be charged with 
assault.    
3.2.2 Minority Critiques of the Exemption 
The almost unquestioning acceptance of the exemption’s place in South African 
common law, and lack of reflection on the acceptability of such a rule in modern times, 
was critiqued by a minority of academics and justices, notably in the 1980s. Speaking to 
the weak foundation of the exemption, Hunt reasoned: “Such authority as there is for the 
rule in South African law is flimsy. Besides the scant Roman-Dutch authority... the 
support for the rule derives from English law… and two dicta of our courts... No South 
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African court has yet definitively decided the point.”178 In the 1985 judgment in S v H, 
despite applying the exemption due to legal precedent, Justice Nienaber put forward 
strong reservations about the rule: 
… (i)f that (the rule) is indeed the state of our law on which I prefer to 
express no view there is little cause for complacency about it. The rationale 
for the rule is, to say the least, suspect, its support in authority is thin, and 
it offends against contemporary conceptions of morality. English Judges 
have sought to explain the rule by postulating the wife's irrevocable 
consent… Whether it is sound policy for the law to maintain that 
position… is of course a debate of a different kind, which is deserving of 
the attention of the Law Commission and the Legislature.179 
The views of Hunt and Nienaber epitomise that the marital rape exemption was not 
perceived as an undisputed and valid component of South African common law. Even 
where academics and judges applied the exemption based on precedent or literature, they 
critiqued its provenance and questioned whether, in light of contemporary ideals, it should 
still have a place in common law. Still, the critical voices remained a minority.  
The ongoing debate about the marital rape exemption was most starkly portrayed 
through a series of decisions from the Ciskei courts in the Ncanywa cases.180 The Ciskei was 
one of the ten Black homelands (Bantustans) created by the apartheid government to strip 
Black South Africans of their South African citizenship and enforce race-based spatial 
separation.181 The Ncanywa cases concerned a husband who had been convicted for rape 
and attempted rape of his estranged wife and sentenced to eight years imprisonment (with 
five suspended). When the crimes were committed, the couple was not living together and 
divorce proceedings had been initiated. The husband had gone to the house where his 
wife was staying. Upon finding her in a room with another man, he accused her of 
committing adultery, and proceeded to assault his wife and the man. He then ordered this 
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man to have intercourse with his wife but he was unable to do so. The husband 
subsequently removed the man from the room and raped his wife.  
The husband appealed the decision of the General Division Court on the basis 
that under South African law, and therefore by extension the law of the Ciskei, a husband 
could not be convicted for raping his wife.182 Writing in 1992 for the Ciskei Supreme 
Court in Bhisho, Justice Heath affirmed the conviction handed down by the trial court, 
concluding that the marital rape exemption was not part of South African law. He 
expounded: “The fiction of consent and even irrevocable consent by a wife to intercourse 
with her husband has no foundation in law and offends against the boni mores of any 
civilised society... The husband and wife have in modern society become equal partners 
with full dominium over their own bodies.”183 
At the time of the Ciskei Supreme Court’s decision, there had been significant 
developments in England and Scotland that bolstered Heath’s standpoint. In 1991 the 
House of Lords abolished the marital rape exemption under English common law, finding 
that Hale’s statement no longer reflected the status of women, and that common law must 
evolve.184 In 1989, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland pronounced that “(n)owadays 
it cannot be seriously maintained that by marriage a wife submits herself irrevocably to 
sexual intercourse in all circumstances,” and held that if the marital rape exemption “had 
ever been part of the law of Scotland,” it was “no longer so.”185 
The Ciskei Supreme Court cited to this progress in support of its opposition to the 
exemption: 
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…it is overwhelmingly likely that South African society is against such an 
old-fashioned principle and that society will regard it as obsolete, insofar as 
it might have existed. Support for the view that the rule has become 
obsolete is to be found in the English law and Scottish law. It is unlikely 
that any civilised country or legal community will still adhere to such a 
principle.186  
Judge Heath’s declarations were undoubtedly pivotal as they infused legal discourse with 
compelling arguments against the exemption.187 As a caveat, Campanella points out that 
the 1992 Ncanywa judgement did not hinge upon the repulsive or archaic nature of the 
marital rape exemption itself, but rather, the Court’s view was that “it is not and had never 
been part of South African or Ciskei law, as it had never been properly received into either 
legal system.”188 No matter the basis of the Court’s decision, its unambiguous stance on 
marital rape was a high point in the legal history of South Africa.  
3.2.3 The Triumph of the Exemption in Jurisprudence 
The Ncanywa Ciskei Supreme Court’s ruling in 1992 was subsequently appealed to 
the Ciskei Appellate Division in Bhisho. The Appellate Division’s Ncanywa judgment in 
1993 is remarkable for its revelation of the state’s unyielding adherence to the exemption, 
despite arguments in South Africa and abroad in favour of advancing common law. The 
panel of judges in Ncanywa concluded that, notwithstanding the changes in the English 
and Scottish law, the rule remained firmly settled in South African and Ciskeian law. They 
reasoned that Roman-Dutch law still provided a foundation for the rule. Under this law 
there was “no such fiction” like the one which had existed under English common law; 
instead, the “rule was a consequence of marriage.”189 Further, the opinions of “eminent” 
justices of South Africa’s Appeal Court also provided a solid authority justifying the 
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determination that the marital rape exemption was a part of South African law.190 The 
Court did however point out that the recommendations of the South African Law 
Commission (SALC) in 1985 could assist the Ciskei legislature in determining whether or 
not to abolish the exemption. 
The vacillating opinions of South African and Bantustan courts and academics in 
the pre-PFVA era indicate that the common law might have continued to develop and 
move in the direction of the England and Scotland. But in the end, the matter was decided 
statutorily. In 1989, legislative reform indirectly cemented the marital rape exemption in 
statute, without codifying the exemption itself.  
3.3 THE UNFAVOURABLE LEGISLATIVE REFORM EFFORTS OF THE LATE 
1980S 
3.3.1 The SALC Recommendations on Marital Rape 
The 1980s had a promising start. The government implemented significant 
changes in the law to grant wives broader rights. Under the apartheid legislative structure 
of the time, the reforms only applied to persons designated as White, Indian or Coloured. 
A husband’s right to “moderate chastisement” of his wife was done away with, as well as 
his right to control her freedom of movement.191 In terms of property, legal reform in 
1984 resulted in the elimination of the marital power, which accorded the husband control 
over his wife’s estate and person.192 In the Western Cape, from 1979 to 1982, a significant 
media focus on rape emerged.193 Kaganas and Murray found that this media coverage 
did not result from the efforts of feminist groups but unexpectedly stemmed from the 
Attorney General’s determination to bring attention to the “prevalence and seriousness” 
of rape.194 In 1982, the matter of how rape cases were being deficiently handled by the 
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criminal justice system was raised with the Minister of Justice, who in turn requested that 
the SALC undertake an investigation on the subject. The initial efforts of the Western 
Cape Attorney General culminated in the 1985 SALC report entitled Women and Sexual 
Offences in South Africa.195 
The hopeful developments of the early 1980s belied what would come later in the 
decade. For one, the SALC report, as it concerned women’s rights, did not live up to 
expectations. Taken at face value, the SALC report is a seemingly beneficial document. 
Notably, one of the recommendations of the SALC was that marital rape be 
criminalised.196 But, overall the report was a great disappointment to feminists. The 
SALC’s investigation for the report and its findings exhibit a hostility towards women’s 
interests and feminists; a scepticism about the seriousness of rape; and an ignorance of the 
criminal justice system’s poor treatment of rape cases.197 For example, claiming a 
“relatively limited response from women’s organisations and the general public” the 
SALC report cuttingly questions “whether there really is so much dissatisfaction in South 
Africa with the law relating to rape as is generally made out by the press.”198 
The SALC’s conclusions on marital rape were considered controversial and 
received significant media attention.199 Those who responded to the SALC’s 
questionnaire were equally divided on the issue, and staunch support for the exemption 
was expressed.200 In the face of the opposition, the SALC reasoned that limiting a 
husband’s culpability to assault “does not satisfy one’s sense of justice,” and relied upon 
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what it termed “jurisprudential arguments” in its decision to favour abolition.201 Amongst 
other bases, it referred to developments in family law, the fallibility of the irrevocable 
consent to sexual intercourse in marriage theory, and inconsistencies in standards applied 
to married versus unmarried women.202   
Despite the disappointing tone of the report, the SALC’s proposal that marital 
rape be criminalised was momentous. Concomitantly, it was crafted in such a way that 
marital rape prosecutions would in effect not succeed.  In order to establish a compromise 
to appease the opposition, the SALC’s recommendation included the caveat that no 
prosecutions could be initiated without the sanction of the Attorney General. This was 
included in order to prevent “frivolous” cases from entering the system, to increase the 
chances of reconciliation, and to ease the effects of the change in the law.203 This stringent 
qualification signified the profound suspicion with which marital rape cases were viewed, 
and as a result the recommendation essentially reinforced many of the problematic 
assumptions that it sought to undo. 
3.3.2 Parliament’s Response to the SALC Recommendations 
The damaging assumptions around marital rape reared their heads during 
Parliament’s consideration of the SALC’s recommendations from 1987 to 1989, 
obstructing any chances that statutory abolition would come to pass. The SALC’s 
conclusions were incorporated into a bill put before Parliament in 1987 in the form of a 
clause reading: “1(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the common 
law, a man may be held criminally responsible for raping his lawful wife.” 204 The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee that first considered the provision reported its findings in 
1989, rejecting the SALC’s position and substituting the clause with one prescribing that 
rape be considered an aggravating circumstance in assault cases where there is evidence 
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that the husband raped the wife.205 The Joint Committee opposed the SALC’s proposed 
clause on numerous grounds including that: the recommendation was of an emotional 
and sensitive nature; abolishing the exemption would increase the divorce rate, which is 
already high; criminal law should not intervene in marriage and family matters; it would 
be difficult to prove the crime of marital rape and the police would be flooded with claims; 
the “intimate and unique” nature of marriage, in which sex is guaranteed, makes it 
unacceptable for a husband to be threatened with a crime that may result in the death 
penalty; and, adequate remedies for wives already existed under civil law.206    
Citing similar rationales, a majority in the three houses of Parliament supported 
the Joint Committee’s stance. Bizarrely, the Parliamentarians were of the impression that 
the new legislation would accord women greater protection and that they were 
championing women’s rights.207 Yet, the deliberations were a patent display of the 
workings of patriarchy, the “systemic expression of male domination and control over 
women” which filters into all institutions.208 
Parliament expressed little concern for women as individuals, as human beings 
deserving of sexual autonomy. As Milton commented: “most depressing of all is that” 
Parliament “seems not to have given any real consideration to the position of a wife as a 
victim of sexual assault.”209 In line with the members of the Joint Committee, the members 
of the three houses of Parliament employed tropes of male privilege: that the family unit 
must be respected and preserved; that the institution of marriage is a sanctified and private 
space; that wives are expected and obligated to be sexually available to their husbands; 
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and husbands have a right to demand sex.210 Surely a husband should not be punished 
for forcefully taking what is rightfully theirs? This sentiment was bluntly captured by the 
words of a Parliamentarian who uttered the following:  
It is simply unacceptable for one partner to be subject to the highest penalty 
– even in cases in which no violence has taken place – if the other party 
unreasonably refuses sexual accessibility and that party is left unpunished. 
This is the kind of inexplicable situation that arises when criminal 
procedure becomes involved with the most intimate things in the law of 
family.211 
Though stated in non-gendered terms, this statement displays nothing if not sheer and 
unconcealed patriarchy in its most damaging of forms – that which plainly countenances 
violence against women and rationalises away the brutal actions of men. It casts women 
as invisible sexed subjects who hold no rights to have any say over their bodies, and are 
undeserving of the law’s protection.  
The disturbing, but very accurate conclusion drawn by Kaganas and Murray in 
their assessment of the Parliamentarians rationales, was that marital rape was perceived 
as “an understandable lapse, an overzealous insistence on conjugal rights.”212 In the end, 
Parliament passed the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act under 
which section 1 provided:  
Whenever a man has been convicted of assault in any form on his lawful 
wife and could, but for the existence of the marriage relationship between 
them at the time of the commission of the crime, have been convicted of 
rape, the fact that he could have been convicted of rape had he not been 
married to his wife, shall be regarded by the court as an aggravating 
circumstance at the passing of sentence.213 
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A measure of redemption for wives would come four years later in the form of the PFVA. 
Yet, dissecting this legislative victory brings to light that it was less about women’s 
protection, and more to do with political manoeuvring.  
3.4 THE 1993 ABOLITION OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION  
3.4.1 The Passage of the PFVA 
The reform of 1989 brought a decade that had begun with promise to a 
disappointing close. Parliamentarians were blind to the damaging impact of the new 
legislative framework, a transparent depiction of how, as MacKinnon pronounced, “t(h)e 
law sees and treats women the way the men see and treat women.”214 The law is not an 
abstract and pure force, moving gradually and consistently towards a more enlightened 
place. The legislation of 1989 was given its form by men and even women, moulded by 
male-centricity.215 Yet, at the end of 1993, in what appeared on the surface to be a drastic 
about-turn, the government enacted the PFVA, eradicating the marital rape exemption 
(and thus any tensions and debates pertaining to the common law). Section 5 of the PVFA, 
which was assented to on September 24th, 1993, read: “Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in any law or in the common law, a husband may be convicted of the 
rape of his wife.”  
The stated factors that served as the impetus for the legislation included the 
increase in family violence, especially violence against women and children; and a desire 
to create a civil system that would better address domestic violence.216 For the sweeping 
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change that it brought in criminalising rape, and as South Africa’s first piece of legislation 
specifically aimed at addressing domestic violence, the PFVA represented a “significant 
achievement.”217 In practical terms, the PFVA introduced an interdict system that allowed 
for victims of domestic violence to obtain restraining orders against their abusers, and 
permitted judges and magistrates to issue a warrant of arrest against the perpetrator upon 
breach of the order.218  
At a theoretical level, the PFVA served the critical function of symbolising greater 
rights and possibilities for women.219 Concerning the PFVA’s enactment, Campanella 
reflected: “It signals the kind of change that can be expected of a legislature which has 
become more aware of issues of human rights and equality.”220 Zooming out of the South 
African context, it is useful to take stock of the global human rights context at the time of 
the passage of the PFVA. What relevant human rights norms had been articulated at that 
point in history?  
 The first part of the 1990s did represent a high point in the development and 
articulation of women’s rights within the international human rights system. Just over a 
decade before, the foundational instrument of international women’s rights law, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
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(CEDAW) came into force.221 It did not expressly address gender violence, but prohibited 
unequal treatment on the basis of marital status.222 While any mention of marital rape is 
absent in the Convention, CEDAW formed a significant milestone as the first 
international convention dedicated to the rights of women.  
Subsequent articulations by international bodies acknowledged the breadth and 
seriousness of violence against women in the family. For example, at the end of the United 
Nations Decade for Women (1976 – 1985), the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies called 
attention to the various forms of violence against women, including familial violence.223 
In 1992, in its General Recommendation No 19, the CEDAW Committee confirmed that 
violence against women, including sexual violence and violence in the family, is a form of 
discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention. It outlined states’ due diligence 
obligations to implement comprehensive measures (including legal mechanisms) to 
prevent violations of the Convention, punish transgressions against women, and provide 
protection for them.224 From around 1993 onwards, international women’s rights 
instruments began to conspicuously utilise the term “marital rape.” 
Although marital rape was not a central topic of human rights discourse at the 
time of the PFVA deliberations, international women’s rights norms still clearly called for 
the protection of women from (sexual) violence within the family. Parliamentarians’ 
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attitudes towards women during the 1989 legislative reform cast doubt on Campanella’s 
conclusion that the PFVA reflected human rights awareness.225 It is only when South 
Africa entered the period of democracy in 1994 that the government of the day, guided 
by the progressive ethos of the Constitution, began to ratify a plethora of human rights 
instruments, and to take greater stock of international norms.226 
3.4.2 Critiquing the PFVA Through a Feminist Lens 
The juxtaposition between the mood of 1989 when the regressive legislative reform 
took place, and the 1993 passage of PFVA, raises the question of how the PFVA came to 
criminalise marital rape despite lawmakers’ adamant position against criminalisation just 
a few years prior. There are indications that the PFVA did not grow out of the 
government’s unqualified embrace of women’s right to be protected from violence.  
One singularly worrying fact is that when the legislative reform process began, the 
first draft of the PFVA actually contained the same provision as the 1989 Criminal Law 
and the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, the Act that retained the marital rape 
exemption.227 It also added that where the parties to a marriage were living apart due to 
a breakdown in marriage the husband could be convicted of rape.228 The second draft 
contained a provision based on the 1985 SALC recommendation (requiring written 
consent of the Attorney General for prosecutions), and the third criminalised marital rape 
without qualifications.229  
The preliminary versions of the PFVA denote the drafters’ and legislators’ 
disregard for  protecting women from sexual violence in marriage. It is ironic that a Bill 
designed to combat family violence initially preserved the marital rape exemption. 
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Compounding the ambiguity of the PFVA is the fact that the reasons for the change 
between the first and final versions of the Bill are not apparent from the records available.  
The radical shift between drafts of the PFVA, and speedy enactment of the law, 
may have had to with the political climate of the time. Feminist academics labelled the 
PFVA an eleventh-hour attempt by the National Party to gain more women voters during 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy.230 Questioning the underlying 
motivations for the Bill, Fedler observed: “As a prefatory critique of the timing and context 
of the Act, it is interesting to note that it was promulgated at a time when it was politically 
expedient for the Nationalist government to be seen and to seem to be doing something 
for women in order to attract the female vote in the April 1994 election.”231 
The consultations on the Bill were done in a rushed and superficial manner, and 
therefore the PFVA did not adequately incorporate the expertise or input of women’s 
advocates, practitioners and academics.232 At the time the PFVA was created, the 
National Party could have incorporated the knowledge of women’s rights groups and 
experts. From the 1970s onwards feminist and women’s groups steadily grew stronger and 
more visible in mobilising and lobbying around women’s rights at political and local levels, 
with violence against women designated a critical issue.233 Women’s rights advocates had 
made significant gains by the early 1990s, in part galvanised by the National Party’s 
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unbanning of the African National Congress and other political parties in 1990.234 Despite 
the formation of strong multi-party and multi-sectoral women’s alliances, the National 
Party hurriedly published the Bill, much to their surprise and consternation.235 According 
to Meintjes, the National Party did not even consult with Women’s National Coalition – 
of which it was a member – a network of political and civil society groups that came 
together in 1992 to put women’s issues on the political and legislative agenda as South 
Africa transitioned to democracy.236  
On the subject of marital rape, some scholars also questioned whether the PFVA 
was the best legislative home for the criminalisation of marital rape provision given that it 
is a civil statute. Branding the marital rape provision a “legislative afterthought,” 
Fredericks and Davids maintained that “the provision belongs in the Criminal Procedure 
Act since the proper forum for such a crime is the ordinary criminal courts.”237 Concerned 
about matters of proof, Novitz critiqued the PFVA for failing to “address the problem of 
substantiating the charge.”238 Referring to the deplorable manner in which the criminal 
justice system treated rape victims, she commented that “(i)t has always been difficult to 
establish rape in a relationship of past intimacy, and the PFVA does nothing to remedy 
this.”239Adding to its already conspicuous inadequacies, the PFVA was “not accompanied 
by government funding for support structures or by programmes to address gender bias 
in the police and court system or by initiatives to put an end to the inadequacies of the 
maintenance court system.”240  
The criminalisation of marital rape via a civil statute possibly betrays the 
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legislature’s wariness of family matters being placed within the ambit of the criminal justice 
system. In fact, one of the stated reasons for the PFVA was to create a system that would 
“contribute to a strategy to deal with domestic violence outside the criminal courts in order to 
maintain family unity” [emphasis added]. 241 Though progressive in creating an interdict 
system and targeting family violence, ultimately, the PFVA was a conservative piece of 
legislation designed to protect the interests of the traditional family unit. By prioritising 
the family unit to the detriment of women’s individual autonomy and rights, the PFVA in 
turn perpetuated the ideals that underpinned the preservation of the marital rape 
exemption in the 1980s. Women’s needs and rights were again relegated to the margins.  
3.5 THE DEMISE OF THE PFVA AND THE PASSAGE OF THE DVA 
3.5.1 A New Era of Legislation-building with Feminist and International 
Human Rights Influences 
The PFVA had a multitude of limitations. For instance (aside from children living 
in the home impacted by the violence) the Act only applied to heterosexual married and 
cohabiting couples, and did not contain a definition of violence.242 It was highly flawed in 
terms of the interdict procedure, the lack of guidance given to authorities, and challenges 
in its practical application, all of which led to a slew of critiques from interested parties, 
including feminist commentators.243 The procedural deficiencies of the PFVA led to its 
undoing. After a short life of around five years, it was replaced by the more robust, human 
rights-oriented and gender-sensitive DVA, which came into operation in December 1999. 
The PFVA was a product of its time, and one of the last creations of a withering regime. 
Although the rights and concerns of women may have only tangentially formed part of 
the impetus for the PFVA, and in spite of its blatant deficiencies, the Act decisively 
removed the marital rape exemption from South African law. 
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In response to legal procedural critiques levelled against the PVFA in 1995, the 
SALC commenced the process of considering options for replacing the Act.244 By 1996, 
the Commission received approval to incorporate a domestic violence legislation 
investigation into its program, and from there it undertook numerous processes to engage 
with stakeholders and canvass opinions on appropriate legislation.245 By September of 
1997, the Minister of Justice created the Project Committee on Domestic Violence to 
“assist” with comments received on the SALC’s Discussion Paper 70 on Domestic 
Violence, and to “steer the process towards a final report and draft legislation.”246 In an 
unusual but enlightened shift, the Project Committee consisted not only of academics, but 
also a formidable team of feminists, including community activists.247  
It appears that the innovation to include a diverse grouping of experts in part 
stemmed from feminist legal scholar Bonthuys’ recommendation that the Commission 
“co-operate with NGOs which have experience in working with the problem and can 
provide a broader insight into what victims of domestic abuse really need.”248 In addition 
to their grassroots advocacy, some members of the DVA Project Committee, such as 
Rashida Manjoo and Lesley Ann Foster, also brought valuable international human rights 
expertise.249 Consequently, in contrast with the PFVA, the DVA was drafted with the 
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direct input of feminist and women’s rights experts and practitioners.250 
The engagements by the SALC and Project Committee from 1996 to 1998 
culminated in the DVA. The DVA contains more expansive and detailed definitions of 
“domestic violence” and “domestic relationship,” and creates broader legal remedies than 
the PFVA.251 It repeals all sections of the PFVA, except section 5, the one criminalising 
marital rape.252 The drafting process was not without contestation. Feminist experts 
persistently sought to expand the SALC’s framing of the domestic violence problem and 
to draft the DVA in unequivocal gendered terms.253 Eventually, the DVA was sent to 
Parliament prematurely, while the Committee was still working on it, and the final version 
represented a watered down and less woman-focused version of what the Committee 
thought ideal.254  
Inadequacies aside, the DVA represents a vast improvement from the PFVA; the 
result, Vetten declares, of “unparalleled feminist involvement in the design of the law.”255 
This very perceptible development was undoubtedly shaped by South Africa’s new human 
rights ethos following the demise of apartheid. In the new democratic era, the state 
committed to adhering to international human rights principles, and retained this 
awareness in terms of legislative reform and policy impacting women’s rights.  
The feminist influences in the DVA were in part made possible by the optimistic 
collective mood of the time; underpinned by the respect for international human rights 
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norms enshrined in the Constitution, and the various international women’s rights 
instruments such as CEDAW (which South Africa ratified CEDAW in 1995), and the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (Beijing Platform).256 The formation of South 
Africa’s National Gender Machinery (NGM) also spurred progress. As a component of 
the NGM, in 1996 Parliament created the Ad Hoc Committee on the Improvement of 
the Quality of Life and Status of Women (in 1999 it became a permanent entity as the 
Joint Monitoring Committee). The Committee’s mandate is to “monitor and evaluate 
progress with regard to the improvement in the quality of life and status of women in 
South Africa” in light of the state’s commitments to CEDAW, the Beijing Platform and 
other international instruments.257 Reflecting South Africa’s progressive trajectory, the 
Preamble to the DVA cites South Africa’s commitments to international obligations, 
including CEDAW.258  
3.5.2 Naming Marital Rape: The DVA and the International/Regional 
Human Rights Context  
Amidst the pro-women’s rights mood of the mid-1900s, and the conscious 
inclusion of international women rights norms in legislation and policy initiatives, what 
consideration was given to marital rape as a discrete form of violence? Aside from 
retaining the PFVA section, the DVA says nothing explicit about marital rape, though 
this form of violence is contemplated within the definitions contained in the Act. The 
inclusive definition of “domestic relationship” covers marriage according to any law, 
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custom or religion.259 The Act also lists sexual abuse as a form of domestic abuse.260  
Indeed, the politics around naming of acts of gender-based violence are 
complicated, and the term marital rape does not universally resonate.261 How acts of 
violence are categorised or understood is contingent upon an individual’s experience, and 
influenced by their socio-cultural milieus.262 Conceding the limitations of fixed terms such 
as marital rape, there is still something to be said about the naming of forms of violence. 
This is especially critical in the arena of sexual violence within marriage, as often cultural 
and religious imperatives supersede women’s individual sexual rights. The crystallisation 
of naming at the international level has the power to shape states’ orientations, and 
influence the nature of legislative reform. Pushing from the bottom up, civil society 
activists can leverage international human rights norms to compel states to act. Most 
importantly, at the level of the individual, naming marital rape is an integral part of 
survivors’ being able to regard their experiences as abusive.263  
It was only from the early- to mid-1990s that international women’s rights 
instruments began to name marital rape. Although not binding on states, the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1993, overtly lists marital rape as a form of sexual violence within 
the family.264 The Beijing Platform, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women 
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in 1995, also specifies marital rape as a form of violence against women.265 Since the 
creation of the office in 1994, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women has raised the profile of the topic through her reports, and has consistently called 
for explicit criminalisation of marital rape in various countries.266 
At the regional level, the European system has been the most forward-thinking, 
with the European Parliament having called for the criminalisation of marital rape in 
1986.267 Under the Inter-American system, notable for its very progressive and influential 
jurisprudence on violence against women in the family,268 the Convention of Belém do 
Parà does not specify the violation of marital rape.269 In spite of that, its definition of 
violence against women encompasses sexual violence that takes place within “the family 
or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship” signalling that the drafters 
were aware of the gravity and pervasiveness of intimate partner violence. 270 Though 
relatively recent, the seminal instrument on women’s rights in Africa, conventionally 
known as the Maputo Protocol, contains a sanitised definition of violence against women, 
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which encompasses sexual violence in “private” life. 271  
To their credit, the SALC did directly engage with the topic of marital rape, even 
though their final recommendation for the DVA was slightly lacklustre. The SALC report 
cites concerns raised by South African legal scholars about the inadequacies of the 
legislative framework in assisting marital rape survivors, and the necessity of a tailored 
approach for accommodating marital rape cases.272 In response SALC reasoned: “The 
Commission takes cognisance of the concerns about marital rape. It is to be noted, 
however, that these points of criticism apply not only to marital rape, but also to rape in 
general.”273 It continued, stating: “(i)t is clearly incongruous to recommend changes to the 
legal position in respect of marital rape without reviewing the law of rape.”274 On that 
basis, the SALC adhered to its original recommendation that the DVA incorporate section 
5 of the PFVA, unchanged, into the Act until rape law was reformed.275  With the SALRC 
deciding to not consider the marital rape question until rape reform was placed on the 
legislative agenda in future, the former-PFVA section inhabits a solitary home in the DVA.  
3.6 CONCLUSION  
A cursory survey of South Africa’s legislative history tells too simplistic a story. 
Through the circumspect exercise that I have carried out in this chapter, I have illustrated 
how the reform processes from the 1980s to early 1990s were fraught with inconsistencies 
and contestations. The path towards designating marital rape as a crime was itself 
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uncertain, with conflicting and contradictory stances pervading judicial decisions and 
legislative reform processes.  
During the apartheid era, the laws privileged the institution of marriage and the 
family. Problematic myths about marital rape loomed large throughout this period, 
enduring up until the second draft of the PFVA. Even though the PFVA was ostensibly 
designed to protect women, the schizophrenic turns during the drafting process, and the 
haphazard creation of the law without meaningful public consultation with women’s rights 
groups, reflected the continued influence of discriminatory perceptions of marital rape. 
The legislators did not act from a women’s rights consciousness.  
In the post-apartheid era, South Africa has a relatively enviable and progressive 
legislative framework targeting gender-based violence. From the mid-1990s onwards the 
influence of human rights principles took root in local legislative and policy frameworks, 
and feminists played increasingly central roles in the creation of new domestic violence 
and sexual offences laws. Nonetheless, state actors repeatedly missed opportunities to 
squarely confront the retrogressive norms that underpinned the marital rape exemption 
for centuries. The DVA drafters left the marital rape question alone, believing that the 
idiosyncrasies of reporting and prosecuting intimate partner sexual violence would be 




4 Chapter 4: The Language of Erasure in Contemporary 
Marital Rape Judgments 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A flood of marital rape cases never materialised.276 Contrary to the Parliament’s 
fears in the late 1980s about criminalising marital rape,277 the South African criminal 
justice system has not found itself inundated with claims from aggrieved wives seeking to 
have their husbands prosecuted for transgressions against them.278 The subject of the 
previous chapter tracked Parliament’s and the judiciary’s approval of the marital rape 
exemption in the 1980s and early 90s. The exemption presumed that marital rape was 
not rape given that wives owed their husband’s unqualified sexual access, and that rape in 
marriage was a trivial matter not worthy of criminal redress. Notwithstanding the 
criminalisation of marital rape, and the ushering of an optimistic democracy shaped by 
human rights ideals, there remains the question of what happened to the stereotypes that 
supported the exemption for centuries.  
This chapter investigates how the marital rape myths that underpinned the 
exemption have filtered into the present, specifically in the jurisprudence. I analyse the 
language of reported marital rape judgments at the level of the High Courts and Supreme 
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Court of Appeal (SCA)279 to answer the question: How does contemporary South African 
legal discourse reinforce the myth that marital rape is a lesser form of rape? This question 
feeds into the dissertation’s central aim which is to document how institutions that women 
seek help from render marital rape (in)visible.  
In this chapter I engage with the theme of (in)visibility by demonstrating how 
patriarchal and stereotyped rhetoric in judicial sentencing determinations effaces the 
harm wrought upon survivors’ bodies and psyches, relegating the crime of marital rape to 
a minor and justified transgression on the part of husbands. I seek to move past simply 
noting the presence of marital rape myths by scrutinising how they come to the courts, 
what influence they have, and what they signify. I also look at the sociological mechanisms 
that make possible the flourishing of rape legitimising language within an institution as 
critical as the judiciary.  
Post the Prevention of Family Violence Act (PFVA), the universe of reported marital 
rape judgments that I located is small. In all six cases, the courts affirm the rape convictions 
of the trial courts. 280 Notwithstanding the final outcomes of the judgments, I found that 
in three of the cases the courts utilise rape myths and cultural stereotypes as mitigating 
factors in determining appropriate sentences for the perpetrators.281  
Lonsway and Fitzgerald define rape myths as “attitudes and beliefs that are 
generally false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male 
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sexual aggression against women.”282 I foreground my analysis of rape myths in South 
African by surveying domestic, comparative and international norms on violence against 
women which provide the South Africa judiciary with a framework for addressing marital 
rape. The framework serves as a standard against which the discriminatory language of 
judgments can be measured. In the first section, I also discuss the South African legislative 
sentencing scheme that was in application at the time the problematic judgments were 
delivered, as sentencing determinations are one of the key entry points for rape myths.  
In the second section, as a basis for my analyses of rape myths in South African 
jurisprudence, I look at theory in law, criminology and psychology that counters simplistic 
conceptions of the operation of rape myths. This critical body of scholarship brings 
attention to how myths are locally, culturally and temporally contingent. In the 
subsequent section I introduce neutralisation theory, which is largely affiliated with 
criminology scholarship on deviant behaviour. Neutralisation theory is traditionally used 
to evaluate how criminal or immoral acts legitimated in the eyes of those who commit 
them, for example the justifications that rapists use to designate their acts as not being 
rape. By looking at the main trajectories of scholarship that feed into neutralisation theory 
and locating feminist voices within, I make the argument that the tools of neutralisation 
employed by criminals are helpful for contextualising biased language by judges.  
In the fourth section of the paper, I apply neutralisation theory to dissect the 
sentencing language in the three problematic marital rape cases. I look at two types of 
justifications for marital rape put forward by judges in recent marital rape cases; the first 
being the notion that intimate partner rape is less serious than stranger rape. This is the 
denial of the victim technique. The second technique I consider is that of denial of injury 
through which rape is misconstrued as a non-violent or minor act. I end the chapter by 
describing feminist responses to the rape jurisprudence after 1997, and how their 
advocacy and inputs influenced the amending of sentencing legislation in 2007. 
                                               
282 Lonsway and Fitzgerald, “Rape Myths,” 134. 
 93 
 
4.2 ENTER THE RAPE MYTHS: “SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING 
CIRCUMSTANCES” IN SENTENCING 
Current research evidences police and prosecutors’ reluctance to invest energy 
into intimate partner rape cases. The 2017 study on the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of rape cases in South Africa (RAPSSA) notes that despite the criminalisation 
of marital rape, prosecutors are generally unwilling to proceed with these cases.283 
Additionally, in circumstances where marital and intimate partner rapes do go to trial, the 
conviction rates are lower than in stranger rape cases.284  
The six marital rape judgments reported since the criminalisation of marital rape 
in 1993 confirm that wives are finding protection through state mechanisms, despite the 
obstacles encountered amongst police, prosecutors and judges. The judgments serve as an 
important resource for how the rape myths that influence police and prosecutors come 
into play in the judicial phase. At the level of the courts, one of the points at which rape 
myths appear is in sentencing determinations. Here adjudicators are permitted to 
ascertain “substantial and compelling circumstances” that justify a departure from the 
prescribed minimum sentence.  
Sentencing has become the arena in which archaic and destructive tropes of sexual 
violence are inscribed and re-inscribed, reducing prevalent forms of rape to mere 
trivialities. It is in sentencing determinations that subjective beliefs of judges come into full 
view, and where discriminatory assessments are applied, camouflaged as legal 
objectivity.285 This happens despite the existence of important women’s rights precedents 
both domestically and abroad. The domestic, comparative and international legal realms 
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are replete with declarations of the right of women to be free from violence, to be treated 
equally, and the state’s duty to protect women from violence.  
Particularly in the 1990s, through milestones such as the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), and  the Beijing Declaration Platform 
of Action (Beijing Platform), the international human rights community highlighted the 
subject of marital rape, and outlined states’ obligations concerning violence against 
women.286 From the 1980s onwards, the courts of various jurisdictions engaged in acts of 
judicial activism by criminalising marital rape.287  
Though legislation swept away the marital rape exemption in South Africa, 
jurisprudence in the democratic era unequivocally affirms the egregiousness of sexual 
violence. In a series of landmark cases, the South African Constitutional Court has set out 
the state’s obligations under the Constitution and international human rights law to 
protect women from gender-based violence and for the law to be developed 
accordingly.288 Courts have also countered prevailing myths about rape and called for 
victim-centred sentencing that reflects the seriousness of the crime.289    
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At the time of the three marital rape decisions, the sentencing framework also 
reflected the seriousness with which rape cases should be handled. The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1997 (Minimum Sentences Act) was enacted in response to the 
shockingly high levels of sexual violence in South Africa.290 Section 51 of the Act sets out 
“discretionary minimum sentences” for various crimes including rape. A life sentence is 
imposed where the victim is raped more than once by the accused,291 and in first offender 
rape cases a minimum of 10 years is prescribed.292 The court can impose a lesser sentence 
where it identifies that “substantial and compelling circumstances exist” to justify doing 
so.293  
The three marital rape judgments that I critique all predate the December 2007 
enactment of Sexual Offences Act (SORMA), and the Amendment to the Minimum 
Sentences Act, which together expanded the scope of protection for victims of sexual 
assault and circumscribed judicial discretion in sentencing. Nonetheless, my discussion 
above confirms that at the time of Mvamvu (2005), Modise (2007) and Moipolai (2004), there 
was a normative framework against which adjudicators’ rationales could be measured. 
Guided by international and comparative developments, domestic jurisprudence and 
legislation communicated the state’s duty to take a firm position on rape.294 Moreover, the 
Minimum Sentences Act of 1997 reflected the legislature’s intention that rape cases be 
treated with sufficient gravity.  
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4.3 COMPLICATING RAPE MYTHS AND THEIR IMPACT ON ATTRITION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA  
I approach my assessment of the marital rape judgments from the premise that rape 
myths are at play in the discourse, but do so critically, heeding the literature on rape myths 
which discourages the use of stereotypes as singular explanations for rape case 
outcomes.295 Scholarship on rape myths and their acceptance in societies has evolved 
considerably, growing from early feminist agitations against rape stereotypes.296 
Pioneering rape myth studies gave rise to the notion of the “real rape” template, and 
observations that cases that deviate from the stereotyped caricature of a rape were less 
likely to lead to successful outcomes in the criminal justice system.297  
A theoretical finetuning of the earlier rape myth acceptance scholarship has 
integrated more situational and contextual factors into analyses.298 The evolving literature 
demonstrates that simplistic rape myth studies often fail to produce “robust conclusions” 
about the correlates and determinants of rape myth acceptance amongst certain 
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Exploration of Its Structure and Its Measurement Using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale,” Journal 
of Research in Personality 33, no. 1 (1999); Conaghan and Russell, “Rape Myths,” 31-33; Gerger et al., “The 
Acceptance of Modern Myths," 423; Smythe, Rape Unresolved; Lonsway and Fitzgerald, "Attitudinal 
Antecedents.”   
296 Schwendinger and Schwendinger, “Rape Myths.”; Brownmiller, Against Our Will. 
297The stereotype of a real rape is rooted in androcentric notions of what rape is and how it plays 
out. It envisions a ‘sympathetic’ rape victim as a woman who is ‘respectable’ and sexually conservative, and 
who is brutally raped by a stranger who inflicts grievous physical injury upon her. It is also presumed that 
the victim should have fought her assailant throughout the attack. See Estrich, Real Rape; Adler, Rape on 
Trial; Lisa Frohmann, “Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case 
Rejections,” Social Problems 38, no. 2 (1991). 
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populations.299 Scholars have accordingly illuminated that rape myths are not unchanging 
but are bound up with social and cultural mores. Despite parallels and continuities, myths 
function differently in each society and era, and consequently empirical probing is better 
suited for assessing them.300   
It is within the more nuanced tradition of rape myth scholarship that Conaghan and 
Russell warn that rape myths not be regarded as “consciously-held views of cognitively 
deliberative subjects” but as “culturally prevalent tropes and images” that are 
“normatively infused.”301 “Culture” is a word that will feature significantly throughout 
this chapter and the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. For my discussions within 
this chapter, my use of the word culture loosely refers to hegemonic norms and practices, 
but with understanding that there is diversity and continuous change in cultural 
expressions, and that peripheral cultures exist alongside hegemonic ones.   
Lonsway and Fitzgerald’s work re-configured the idea of rape myths to incorporate 
culture, distilling the definition of myth into three elements: “(1) false or apocryphal beliefs 
that (2) explain some cultural phenomenon and (3) whose importance lies in maintaining 
existing cultural arrangements.”302 And so, as Payne, Lonsway and Fitzgerald later 
expound, “the importance of rape myths lies not in their ability to truthfully characterize 
any particular instance of sexual violence.”303 In contrast, the salience of rape myths stems 
from their “overgeneralized and shared nature as well as their specified psychological and 
societal function.”304  
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The critical scholarship on rape myths consistently reorients the inquirer to be 
attuned to cultural mores and societal particularities. It creates a more intricate picture of 
how cases make their way through the criminal justice system. Smythe’s empirical 
research on police discretion in eight South African jurisdictions typifies the point that 
how cases proceed is shaped by a unique interplay of factors. Although there are “echoes 
of old stereotypes” amongst police, rape myth theories can only go so far in capturing local 
South African attrition dynamics.305 The RAPSSA study, which is broader in scope than 
previous large-scale attrition studies, determined that older and male investigating officers 
ascribed to rape myths more than others.306 Further it uncovered instances where 
prosecutors and judges relied upon rape myths and showed gender insensitivity.307 Aside 
from rape myths, the study cites numerous factors along the criminal justice chain that 
determine the outcome of cases.308  
The recent South African studies establish that it is not a question of whether rape 
myths influence actors’ choices, for they do. The import of the later rape attrition and 
adjudication studies is that there are other determinative elements of rape cases which 
reveal much about the society in question. In South Africa, women who are raped face 
enormous hurdles in seeking justice, of which rape myths form only a part. Yet, because 
rape myths still have applicability, there is room for examining their functioning and 
meanings, adhering to the locally-oriented and nuanced paradigms established by 
updated rape myth studies. Per Lonsway and Fitzgerald’s work, in the following sections 
I extract the “cultural arrangements” the rape myths support in South Africa. Rape myths 
are not anomalous but instead representative of societal norms, and these transgress the 
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imagined boundaries between accused and judge. I utilise neutralisation theory to make 
this link apparent. 
4.4 AN INTRODUCTION TO NEUTRALISATION THEORY AND FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES  
In this section I look at the main concepts that feed into neutralisation theory: 
disavowal techniques, vocabularies of motives, accounts, and techniques of neutralisation. 
I also include feminist literature on neutralisation theory which depicts how the language 
legitimising rape is drawn from culturally-approved vocabularies. In this sense, the 
discourse of rapists is in fact reflective of social norms, as opposed to violating norms. 
There is scant scholarship on the application of neutralisation theory to judicial language. 
Anderson and Doherty’s analysis of rape vocabularies of motive across different contexts 
in the United Kingdom, including court trials, is one of the few examples.309 Chennells 
also briefly refers to vocabularies of motive in her study of myths in South African rape 
trials.310  
On the whole, where state actors are concerned, studies have generally looked at 
instances where they committed criminal or unethical behaviour.311 Though the judges in 
the three cases I consider do not engage in judicial misconduct per se, they employ rape 
stereotypes that are shared by criminals and non-criminals alike. Following the example 
set by the feminist scholarship of Anderson and Doherty, I employ a neutralisation theory 
framework to show how rape myths burgeon across all sectors of society.  
There are recurrent devices that play out in defences of rape. A rapist may say that 
the woman deserved to be raped, or that he believed that she had consented to sex, or 
                                               
309 Irina  Anderson and Kathy Doherty, Accounting for Rape: Psychology: Feminism and Discourse Analysis 
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perhaps he was too drunk or high to be able to control his sexual urges. And after all, no 
real harm was done. For intimate partners, the perpetrator may contend that because he 
had had consensual sex with his partner on numerous occasions, this time was no different. 
He was simply taking what he believed he was entitled to. The woman in a mini skirt who 
accepted a drink at the bar, or a lift home, was clearly asking to be raped. Then there are 
those women who cannot be raped: the prostitutes, loose women, women whose skin is 
darker, and women who come from poverty.  
The tired clichés of rape have real consequences. They result in men being acquitted 
for rape, or receiving lighter sentences. They cause secondary victimisation for women 
seeking justice. They position men as uncontrollably sexed-beings whom the law will find 
ways to protect, while women must take the blame for their own victimisation. These 
linguistic rationalisations work because society allows them to. Neutralisation theory bears 
significance for conceptualising how rape myths operate and are borne from culture.  
Neutralisation theory is decades old, and scholars have applied it broadly in different 
disciplines outside of sociology. The theory has been stretched, remoulded and 
repurposed, and also stagnated, to the extent that the Maruna and Copes survey and 
critique of neutralisation theory over the past five decades is one hundred pages long.312 
Given the infinite breadth and gradual expansion of neutralisation theory, I focus 
exclusively on its foundational components that are relevant to the subject of rape myths, 
beginning with the work of Mills.  
In the 1940s Mills created the term “vocabularies of motive” to describe “socially 
established vocabularies, culturally learned and readily available, to be used as soon as the 
situation required rationalization.” 313 Under this rubric, following the commission of an 
act that is branded as deviant or criminal, the guilty actors – attuned to socially acceptable 
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scripts – will explain their behaviour to fall in line with what society deems appropriate. 
The outcome of this is that the harmful act is legitimated and the harm to the victim 
neutralised. Motives are, in simple terms, “accepted justifications for present, future, or 
past programs or acts.”314  
Building on Mill’s construct, sociologists developed related frameworks for the 
linguistic devices used in response to deviant acts. In 1957 Sykes and Matza introduced 
“techniques of neutralisation” which are the various motives and rationalisations that 
“delinquents” reference.315 In the same fashion as vocabularies of motive, techniques of 
neutralisation such as “denial of injury” and “denial of the victim,” allow for accused 
perpetrators to bolster their claims with culturally sanctioned language. This exercise 
brings so-called deviant or criminal behaviour into the realm of the acceptable.  
A decade after Sykes and Matza’s research, Scott and Lyman incorporated the 
notion of “accounts,” linguistic devices used whenever acts are exposed to “valuative 
inquiry.”316 They categorised two forms of accounts: excuses and justifications, both being 
“socially approved vocabularies that neutralize an act or its consequences when one or 
both are called into question.”317 Scott and Lyman define justifications as accounts in 
which the actor attempts to place their actions in an affirmative light, and deny the 
negative connotations of what they have done.318 Sykes and Matza’s techniques of 
neutralisation represent justifications.319 On the other hand, excusers admit that their 
actions are improper but refuse to take responsibility; their excuses are based upon 
“appeals to accident, or biological drive, or through scapegoating.”320  
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In my review of how disavowal techniques manifest in marital rape judgements, 
justifications are more frequently asserted than excuses. As a whole, the seminal 
neutralisation studies signify that defences put forward by criminals are not the product of 
individual repertoires but are absorbed from social cues and conditioning. They shift the 
inquiry of rape myths from “why” such myths are propounded, to “how” they come into 
being.321  
Feminist sociologists have applied the theories of Mills, Sykes and Matza, and Scott 
and Lyman to the context of rape, to illuminate how the neutralisation techniques are 
relied upon by rapists. Though the terminology varies, “neutralisation techniques,” 
“accounts” and “vocabularies of motives” all refer to “social explanations” for behaviour 
that is subjected to judgment.322 Rape myths are an embodiment of these neutralising 
mechanisms, for they produce a “cultural scaffolding of rape,” as Gavey terms it, 
minimising the blameworthiness of men’s sexual aggression.323 Rape myths are part of the 
social world, and so are a reflection of broader culture. The stereotypes of rape are not 
idiosyncratic. Instead they typify commonly sanctioned models of heterosexual relations.  
Writing in the 1970s,  Jackson was one of the earliest feminist scholars to apply 
neutralisation theory to sexual violence for the purpose of theorising how “rape was 
possible.”324 Combining Mills, Sykes and Matza’s research with Gagnon and Simon’s 
sexual scripts theory,  Jackson postulated that ostensibly “normal” sexual behaviour and 
“deviant” acts are in actuality motivated by the same vocabulary of motives.325 She asserts 
that “it may be argued that it (rape) not only demonstrates male dominance but serves to 
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preserve it.”326 Under this paradigm, rape is reformed as an exaggerated manifestation of 
accepted interactions between men and women, rendering the popularity of rape myths 
explicable.  
Scully and Marolla’s empirical research is another foundational feminist 
intervention in the area of neutralisation theory and sexual violence. Through their 
interviews with convicted rapists, Scully and Marolla concluded that “(m)en who rape 
need not search far for a cultural language which supports the premise that women 
provoke or are responsible for rape.”327 This conclusion is derived from the feminist 
presumption that rape does not arise from individual psychological illness but mirrors 
social norms.328  
In their evaluation of cultural definitions of rape, Stewart, Dobbins and Gatowski 
found that the import of neutralisation techniques as applied to sexual violence is that the 
use of the techniques transcends different social positions, meaning that such myths are 
held widely and are powerful.329 Lending support to the feminist literature, the results of 
Bohner et al.’s experiments on rape myth acceptance amongst German university students 
deduced that rape myths do serve a neutralising function.330 I now turn to the South 
African cases to document the operation of two techniques of neutralisation in the context 
of marital rape: denial of the victim and denial of injury. 
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4.5 NEUTRALISING LANGUAGE: MARITAL RAPE CASE SENTENCING 
DETERMINATIONS 
4.5.1 Denial of the Victim 
The technique of denial of the victim is a dehumanisation mechanism. It is most 
easily leveraged against populations whose interests are not represented in elite circles, 
and who are historically disadvantaged based on race, gender, ethnicity, language and/or 
class. The technique of denying the victim consequently exposes the insidious inequalities 
and cleavages of societies. It brings to light the groupings of citizens who are accorded 
more dignity and protections. For the marital rape cases, it is women and specifically Black 
and rural women whose humanity is erased. S v Mvamvu, a 2005 decision of the SCA stands 
as possibly the most worrying and detrimental example of jurisprudence on marital rape 
given that the SCA is the second highest court in South Africa after the Constitutional 
Court. The judgment displays the denial of victim technique through a reliance on tropes 
of Black rural culture and marital rape. 
In Mvamvu the SCA found that the marital relationship, in conjunction with the 
appellant’s cultural (read: Black, rural and impoverished) background, were strong 
mitigating factors.331 Khehlani Mvamvu had twice abducted his estranged customary law 
wife and raped her eight times on these two separate occasions. At the time of the attacks, 
the wife was living apart from her husband whom she had married according to custom 
when she was only 15 years old. She had moved away from him as she was unhappy in 
the marriage, and believed that their marriage was over. As the lobola had not been 
returned to his family, the husband testified that he believed that he and the victim were 
still married. The wife had clearly been distressed by her husband’s behaviour prior to the 
abductions and rapes. When Mvamvu first kidnapped her, she had just obtained a 
restraining order against him and was returning from court. 
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Under the Minimum Sentences Act, multiple rapes of the victim by an offender 
carry a life sentence.332 In Mvamvu the Court did find that the sentences imposed by the 
Magistrate’s court were inappropriately low, but it determined that the appellant’s 
offences did not warrant a life sentence based on the mitigating factors of his rural outlook 
and belief that he was still customarily married to the complainant. The import of Mvamvu 
is that there is a different standard for rural litigants married according to custom; and the 
SCA’s language makes plain that the application of the law can bolster and reproduce 
gender stereotypes that uphold patriarchal values.  
The Court expends energy in rationalising the actions of the husband. It states that 
it is “clear from his evidence that at the time of the incidents the accused honestly (albeit 
entirely misguidedly) believed that he had some right to conjugal benefits.” Resting upon 
racial stereotypes, the Court continues: “His actions, though totally unacceptable in law, 
might well be (albeit only to a limited extent) explicable given his background. He grew 
up and lived in a world of his own, of tradition and Black medicine which was not 
completely strange to the complainant (they grew up together and come from the same 
area).”333 
The symbolism of the court’s reasoning is that the violence of men who have grown 
up in a world of “tradition and Black medicine” is understandable; and the women who 
grow up with and marry traditional men are (or should be) acclimated to violent male 
dominance. The Court further opines that the husband’s purpose in raping and 
kidnapping was “to subjugate the complainant to his will and to persuade her to return to 
him – a consequence of male chauvinism, perhaps associated with traditional customary 
practices… These ingrained traits and habits of the accused cannot be ignored when 
considering an appropriate sentence.”334 
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On this rationale, Black women from rural areas and in traditional marriages 
should expect less in terms of how they are treated by their male partners and what 
protection a court will offer when they can no longer withstand abuse. Speaking to the 
parameters of the denial of the victim technique, Scully and Marolla clarify that even 
where the perpetrator takes responsibility for their actions, “the moral indignation of self 
and others may be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the 
circumstances… rather it is a form of rightful retaliation or punishment.”335 As Mvamvu 
denotes, the denial of the victim technique reconfigures rape as a utilitarian tool. The 
husband had a reason for raping his wife; he simply wanted her to come back home. The 
rapes are only the inconsequential symptoms of a husband exercising his valid authority 
over his wife. The fact of the wife’s race also places her at disadvantage, for one of the 
legacies of institutional racism is that historically, Black women have been branded as 
unrapeable.336  
In this series of cases, the judges’ denial of the victims is inexorably tied to their 
perceived subordinate status as wives. The S v Modise appeal concerned the sentence 
handed down by the court a quo. The regional court had imposed a sentence of five years 
for attempted rape of a wife by her husband, in order to reflect the gravity of the offence 
as well as the accused’s previous assault conviction. At the time of the attempted rape, the 
couple had been separated for a year and were in divorce proceedings. The High Court 
of the Bophuthatswana Provincial Division overturned the sentence handed down by the 
Magistrate’s Court. Justice Mogoeng (now Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court) and 
Justice Gura reasoned that the facts of this case were far less serious than in Mvamvu; 
moreover, “the relationship between the complainant and the appellant seems to have 
played no role in the exercise of the Magistrate’s discretion” and “this relationship, of 
husband and wife, should never be overlooked by any judicial officer.”337  
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It appears that the esteemed justices neglected to recall that the marital rape 
exemption had been removed from law in order to accord wives more protection, not less. 
But such is the function of the denial of victim technique that groups of people – in this 
case wives – are deemed to deserve injury.338 In Modise, the husband and wife relationship 
was a decisive factor in the Court’s determination that the crime was not serious. The 
judgment reads: 
This is a man whose wife joined him in bed, clad in panties and a nightdress. 
When life was still normal between them, they would ordinarily have made 
love. The appellant must, therefore, have been sexually aroused when his 
wife entered the blankets. The desire to make love to his wife must have 
overwhelmed him, hence his somewhat violent behaviour. He, however, 
neither smacked, punched nor kicked her. Minimum force, so to speak, was 
resorted to in order to subdue the complainant’s resistance.339 
Building upon the problematic precedent set by Mvamvu, here rape is imagined as a 
necessary and justifiable means of forcing wives to submit to their conjugal duties. The 
justifications asserted by the courts are “buttressed by the cultural view of women as sexual 
commodities, dehumanized and devoid of autonomy and dignity.”340 Women exist to 
satisfy the sexual appetites of men. Hence, a man’s desire to “make love” renders rape a 
sexual act, not one of sheer violence and the result of unequal power relations.  
The 2004 case S v Moipolai341 is the other Justice Mogoeng decision that implicates 
marital rape (common law husband and wife) and displays the same flagrant disdain for 
(common law) wives in terms of sentencing. It is decisions like Modise and Moipolai that 
prompted an outcry from civil society when Mogoeng was nominated as Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Court in 2011, as he had repeatedly revealed an astonishing disregard 
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for the rights of victims of sexual violence.342 In Moipolai a woman was assaulted and raped 
by her common law husband when she was eight months pregnant with their third child. 
The rape took place in the presence of another woman whom the husband was having an 
affair with. Justice Mogoeng made clear that he viewed the complainant’s account as 
credible and affirmed the conviction for rape, but it is in the matter of sentencing that the 
Court neutralised the victim.  
After considering the aggravating factors in the case (for example, the accused 
punching his common law wife so hard that she fell over, and raping her in the presence 
of another woman after having beaten her up), Justice Mogoeng then reasoned: “These 
factors though admittedly aggravating were, however, overemphasised at the expense of 
equally strong mitigating factors.”343 In his opinion, some of the “equally strong” 
mitigating factors were as follows: 
…the Appellant and the Complainant were no strangers to one another. They 
were lovers (virtually husband and wife) for a period of seven years…But for 
the presence of Matron, the Appellant and the Complainant would probably, 
just as they did many times before, have had consensual 
intercourse….Complainant must have come knowing that this was either 
likely to happen or was going to happen for sure and she was, given the nature 
of their relationship, willing to take part in the intercourse.344 
Mogoeng fixedly continued along this trajectory, deducing that “(t)his rape should, 
therefore, be treated differently from the rape of one stranger by another between whom 
consensual intercourse was almost unthinkable.”345 To provide support for his contention 
that the marriage-like relationship was a strong mitigating factor, Mogoeng cited dicta 
from a pre-PFVA 1988 Appellate Division case where the friendship between the 
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perpetrator and victim was found to be a “mitigating factor in that the shock and affront 
to dignity suffered by the rape victim would ordinarily be less in the case where the rapist 
is a person well-known to the victim.”346 According to Mogoeng’s line of thinking, because 
the Appellate Division had been “understanding and even lenient in a case where a man 
had raped his friend,” this permitted that he be even more forgiving towards an intimate 
partner.347 He reasoned too that for the complainant and accused, “theirs was not an 
abusive relationship” and the violence on that day of the crime was “in fact a single 
aberration.”348  
Mogoeng subscribes to a host of erroneous ideas about intimate partner rape. He 
again positions the woman as a sexual object, who, by virtue of her being in a relationship, 
gives ongoing consent to sex. Here, the vocabularies of motive applicable to conventional 
sexual situations are stretched to encompass acts of rape, thereby allowing the rapist, and 
those evaluating the rapist’s behaviour, to perceive his acts as legitimate.349 The judge and 
rapist thus speak the same language, and in the process the victim’s dignity and 
perspectives are rendered invisible.    
4.5.2 Denial of Harm  
One of the most enduring and damaging misconceptions about rape is that it is 
not an inherently violent act. This misconception unfailingly emerges in jurisprudence 
and rape defences within South Africa. Smythe’s investigation of the outcome of rape 
cases affirms that “the threshold of what constitutes ‘real rape’ will be different in contexts 
where the cultural and normative dimensions of appropriate sexual conduct are more 
accepting of violence and coercion.”350 In a society such as South Africa, steeped in 
violence, militarisation and struggle, adjudicators have become desensitised to even the 
most severe of rapes. This leads to finding after finding that unspeakable forms of sexual 
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violence against women and girls (VAWG) do not result in significant harm.351 Discourse 
that ignores the immeasurable trauma of rape is the quintessential manifestation of the 
“denial of injury” neutralisation technique.  
When denial of injury is invoked, it signals that the persons who were injured do 
not merit justice; that they belong to a class of people who do not have a right to maintain 
that they have been hurt.352 One of the patterns recorded by Scully and Marolla through 
their interviews with convicted rapists in the United States is that the men appealed to 
denial of injury arguments, even when they had used weapons to perpetuate the rape.353 
From their point of view, “(a)s long as the victim survived without major physical injury, 
from their perspective, a rape had not taken place.”354  
Rape is a highly gendered crime. Under written law and in the application of the 
law, what is designated as rape mirrors the normative bounds of  sexual relationships 
between men and women. The line between rape and “normal” sex is constantly shifting 
and being renegotiated, but this is largely on men’s terms. Whether a sex act is a crime or 
not is dependent upon “a particular hegemonic construction of woman’s sexuality, the 
boundaries of which are largely defined and negotiated through the medium of rape 
myths.”355 Consequently, a man’s conception of sex normally triumphs, secured by 
safeguards designed to discredit women’s claims to rape. When a court declares that a 
rape victim did not suffer real harm, it is because it speaks from a male-centric position.  
Courts continuously reassert that for a rape to be serious it must be accompanied 
by extreme physical injuries, as though rape in itself is not an injurious violation.356 This 
discourse is brought in during the sentencing phase where the Court can find mitigating 
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circumstances to justify a departure from the mandatory sentences prescribed by law. The 
rape sentencing determinations are often in themselves acts of violence for they employ 
neutralising language. Ultimately, they “constitute justifications for violence which has 
already occurred or which is about to occur,” and when the adjudicators “have finished 
their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these 
organized, social practices of violence.”357 I now turn again to the three problematic 
marital rape cases to document the application of the denial of injury mechanism in the 
marital rape context.  
I commence with Mvamvu since the language is replete with gender, class and race 
stereotypes. Although the customary law wife had been raped eight times during two 
kidnappings, the Court declared: “There was no evidence that the complainant suffered 
any lasting psychological trauma to speak of, although she did mention in her evidence 
that she still thought about the incidents.”358 It subsequently resolved that she had endured 
only “minor” injuries.359 Displaying both a disregard for the victim herself and her injuries 
the Court rationalised the husband’s violent behaviour through racialised cliché: 
His actions were shaped and moulded by the norms, beliefs and customary 
practices by which he lived his life. Though the rapes were accompanied by 
some acts or threats of violence, it does not appear that the prime objective 
was to do the complainant harm…He wanted the complainant back home, 
as his wife – in one piece. The threats he made were empty, albeit designed 
to frighten her.360 
It is perplexing that the Court concludes that eight rapes and two kidnappings are “empty” 
threats that have a noble purpose. The arbiters can do so because they sit comfortably 
within the reassuring confines of male privilege, blind to the further injury caused by their 
reasoning. Here, we see how when rape is “viewed as a male entitlement” it is “no longer 
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seen as criminal.”361 Like the rapists in Scully and Marolla’s study who used justifications, 
the Mvamvu language provokes the conclusion that men have raped because “their value 
system provided no compelling reason not to do so.”362 Mvamvu was merely an 
overzealous traditional husband who desperately wanted his wife back, and cannot really 
be faulted for raping and kidnapping her.   
In Modise, the attempted rape case, the Court too found that the wife did not suffer 
any real injuries. It recounted: “It is true that the complainant was injured, outside the 
house when she fell, but the appellant himself did not inflict any injury on her directly. He 
never chased after her. No real harm or injuries resulted from the throttling.”363 The 
Court believed that the attack did not even warrant a prison sentence, especially since the 
parties were married. It averred that this “case is not comparable to a case where a lady 
comes across a stranger on the street who suddenly attempts to rape her.”364  
The courts’ attitudes in Mvamvu and Modise further encapsulate the salient point 
made by Smythe that South African society has become inured to such appalling levels 
and forms of violence that it is exponentially harder for rapes to be viewed as serious.365 
Smythe writes that “high levels of violence and weapon use are no longer useful in thinking 
about what constitutes ‘real rape’. There is simply too much violence perpetrated on 
women’s bodies confronting the criminal justice system every day for all but the most 
egregious to register.”366 In Mvamvu, the wife was abducted for three days, during which 
time her husband raped her six times. During the second incident, armed with a knife, he 
dragged her to a bush where he raped her twice and hit her twice on her thigh with a stick. 
Yet, the court found that both her psychological and physical injuries were negligible. It 
is no wonder then, that in Modise and Moipolai, where only “minimum force” was used to 
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assault the victims and “no real harm” resulted, the crimes hardly rattled the consciences 
of the courts.367 
4.6 THE AFTERMATH: FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S 
SENTENCING FRAMEWORK 
The Minimum Sentences Act was amended in 2007 to limit adjudicators’ discretion 
in making mitigation assessments. The 2007 Amendment stipulates that when “imposing 
a sentence in respect of the offence of rape” certain factors “shall not constitute substantial 
and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence” [emphasis 
added].368 These include “(iii) an accused person's cultural or religious beliefs about rape” 
and “(iv) any relationship between the accused person and the complainant prior to the 
offence being committed.”369 The amendments are a response to rape myths, such as the 
ones featured in Mvamvu, Modise and Moipolai, that continued to surface in rape judgments 
following the passage of the Minimum Sentences Act.  
Though the Amendment does not specifically cite marital rape, the subject of rape 
in marriage featured in the feminist advocacy that led to the limitations on discretion, and 
even Parliamentary debates right before the enactment of the Amendment. The 
intervening years between 1997 and 2007 evince that notwithstanding its criminalisation, 
some lawmakers and judges still perceived marital rape as a lesser crime. Without the 
consistent vigilance of women’s rights groups, the 2007 Amendment would not have come 
into being.  
At the time of its enactment, the Minimum Sentences Act met with palpable hostility 
from members of the judiciary.370 It was subjected to constitutional challenges but 
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survived these.371 Addressing fears amongst the judiciary that the Minimum Sentences 
Act stripped them of their discretionary powers, the SCA in S v Malgas affirmed that 
adjudicators still have discretion, but cautioned that the prescribed sentences should not 
be “departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons.”372 While Malgas lays out what has been 
cast as a “practical method” for applying the “substantial and compelling circumstances” 
provision of the Act, it also arguably contradicts the ethos of the legislation.373 The 
judgment states that adjudicators may continue to use factors that have “traditionally” 
been used in sentencing determinations, and that none are excluded.374  
In the wake of Malgas, the SCA’s decision in S v Abrahams epitomises the damaging 
standards that courts have set for measuring the seriousness of rape. There the Court 
declared that “some rapes are worse than others” and proceeded to conclude that the case 
at hand, in which a father had raped his 14-year-old daughter, was not an example of the 
worst form of rape.375 Per the example set by Abrahams and other judgements, what ensued 
in the decade following the passage of the Minimum Sentences Act were a series of myth-
laden decisions about rape. Feminist scholars strongly criticised the litany of decisions, 
particularly child rape cases in which courts concluded that the crimes were not serious, 
and that the victims suffered no significant trauma.376  
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In addition to Abrahams, in S v Ntuli, where a man had raped a 14-year-old girl on 
multiple occasions, the Court stated that it is “fortunate for the accused that the evidence 
in this case indicates that the complainant has suffered no emotional disturbances or ill-
effects as a result of her experience, and that she suffered no serious injuries.”377 In Ntholeng 
v S, which involved a serial child rapist, the Court reasoned: “All of the complainants did 
not sustain any physical injuries other than those incidental to forced penetration and even 
those were not of a serious nature.”378 There are myriad other examples.379 
The South African courts created what Kubista has termed a “false benchmark 
standard” for ascertaining the gravity of the crime.380  Exposing an uncritical adherence 
to stereotypes and a desensitisation to the extreme violence pervading South Africa, judges 
have wielded their discretion carelessly, crafting new and problematic standards of what 
rapes are serious and what rapes are not.  Women’s rights and feminist civil society groups 
and scholars decried the deleterious precedents set by the courts in the first decade after 
the Minimum Sentences Act came into force.381 Mvamvu in fact provoked considerable ire 
amongst commentators who lambasted the Court’s deference to rape and cultural 
stereotypes.382  
The Minimum Sentences Act was not intended to be permanent, and thus was 
subjected to review every two years after 1997. In the face of mounting evidence of the 
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courts’ disregard for rape crimes, feminist groups lobbied for an amendment to the Act 
that would restrict judges’ ability to rely on rape myths, and their recommendations 
ultimately shaped the 2007 Amendment to the Act.383 The new restrictions on “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” in section 51 of the amended Act are actually taken from 
the Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women’s 2005 submission to the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.384  
Of the nine factors that the Consortium recommended for exclusion as substantial 
and compelling circumstances, the Amendment incorporated four: the complainant's 
previous sexual history;  apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant; the accused 
person’s cultural or religious beliefs about rape; and any relationship between the accused 
person and the complainant.385 The five remaining issues noted by the Consortium that 
were left out of the Act are: an accused’s use of intoxicating substances prior to the assault; 
an accused’s lack of intention to cause harm to the complainant in committing the rape; 
an accused’s lack of education, sophistication or a disadvantaged background; a lack of 
“excessive force” used to perpetrate the rape; and a lack or apparent lack of psychological 
harm to the complainant.386 The Consortium cited Mvamvu in support of the factors of the 
accused’s cultural beliefs, and the accused’s lack of intention to cause harm to the 
victim.387 
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Women’s and gender rights groups again raised concerns in 2007 when the 
Amendment was being considered. The coalition, made up of activist and academic 
organisations, cited the factors set out by the Western Cape Consortium in 2005, and 
raised concerns about the myths that adjudicators relied upon in sentencing 
determinations.388 In the end, the Department of Justice responded to the submissions 
and, with the passage of the 2007 Amendment, ultimately placed restrictions on what 
factors could be taken into account as substantial and compelling circumstances. 
Amidst the progress made by women’s rights groups, murmurings reminiscent of 
the marital rape exemption era emerged. During the legislative review process of the 
Amendment Bill, one lawmaker shared misgivings about treating marital rape the same 
as other rapes. When the Department of Justice briefed the Justice and Constitutional 
Development Portfolio Committee on the Sentencing Amendment Bill, Adv L Joubert 
(Democratic Alliance) suggested that the relationship between husband and wife be 
retained as a mitigating factor.389 The Chairperson, Ms F Chohan-Khota (African 
National Congress) and Ms Camerer (Democratic Alliance) rebuffed this suggestion. 
Chohan-Khota pointed out that, problematically, “many people in South Africa regarded 
marital rape as a ‘lesser’ rape,” and that “there was a clear need to reverse the perception 
that a person saying ‘no’ could mean ‘yes,’ and that consent did not exist in these cases.”390 
The inputs of Camerer and Chohan-Khota made clear that the country should be moving 
forward and not backwards in protecting survivors of marital rape and sexual violence 
more broadly.391 
The year 2007 brought other significant legislative reforms in the arena of sexual 
violence.  SORMA, which had significant inputs from feminist experts, overhauled the 
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outdated common law on rape, introducing broader definitions of sexual offenses and 
more comprehensive protective measures for victims.392 SORMA now provides that 
whenever a person is charged with an offence under sections 3 (rape,) 4 (compelled rape,) 
5 (sexual assault,) 6 (compelled sexual assault) and 7 (compelled self-sexual assault,): “it is 
not a valid defence for that accused person to contend that a marital or other relationship 
exists or existed between him or her and the complainant.”393 The subject of marital rape 
is thus reflected in the present legislative framework pertaining to sexual violence, 
reflecting the hard-won gains of feminist activists and academics.  
4.7 CONCLUSION  
The tone of Modise, Mvamvu and Moipolai is evocative of the ideologies that buoyed 
the marital rape exemption during the 1980s when Parliament refused to legislate it away.  
Betraying a lack of understanding about the nature of rape or attempted rape of wives, 
the courts enlisted cultural beliefs and the relationship between the accused and the 
complainant as central components of their sentencing determinations. The fact of the 
rapes is not denied, but the convictions are essentially rendered meaningless by the Courts’ 
overt disavowal of the iniquity of rape. Because the justifications are drawn from cultural 
myths, the learned justices easily lean upon them as though they represent universal truths 
about sexual violence 
The language in the sentencing determinations embodies a continuing uneasiness, 
reinforcing the longstanding idea that marital rape is still a lesser form of sexual assault; 
that it is not quite a crime or injustice and thus does not merit the same level of opprobrium 
or punishment as other rapes. They signal to women that their suffering is peripheral and 
justifiable. The cases illustrate how easily judges deviate from the minimum sentences, and 
affirm the importance of the Amendment to the Minimum Sentences Act and SORMA.  
In the South African context, the prevalence of such neutralising discourse is engendered 
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by certain factors. A societal acclimatisation to extreme levels of violence is compounded 
by normatively infused patriarchal notions of gender relations. Longstanding rape myths 
which are given life again and again as disavowal techniques are employed at all levels of 
society.  
In contrast, there are indications that the Courts are transforming to dismantle the 
false benchmarks for rape set in by post-1997 jurisprudence. In its 2010 decision in 
Matyityi, the SCA criticized unreasonable assessments of harm pertaining to rape. It 
chastised a trial judge for concluding that the victim had suffered no injuries and made 
clear that to limit the assessment of harm to physical injury is to “fundamentally 
misconstrue the act of rape itself and its profound psychological, emotional and symbolic 
significance for the victim.”394 Time will tell whether and how the reasoning in marital 
rape cases will evolve in light of the legislative shifts and transformation of the judiciary. 
For now, what decisions such as Mvamvu, Moipolai and Modise lay bare is how easily 
damaging assumptions about sexual violence in intimate relationships enter the legal 
system, and permeate its highest echelons.  
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5 Chapter 5: The Culture Conundrum: How Mainstream 
Conceptions of Ukuthwala Mask the Linkages Between 
Marriage and Rape 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Human behaviour and expression of identity and community are infinitely messy. 
This is what renders the notion of culture so precarious. When conceived of in narrow 
terms, culture forms a protective halo over languages, customs, laws and ideologies.395 It 
fosters unity and sameness, as well as diversity and division. It dictates what behaviours 
are deemed acceptable while castigating non-compliance; and it creates hierarchies of 
being. Culture in this sense is incredibly powerful, yet concomitantly dangerous. In the 
words of geographer Mitchell, “culture,” as an abstraction that is made real by its 
application, is a “structuring imposition.”396 The delineation of cultural parameters 
“creates partial yet globalizing truths,” often to the detriment of those who hold less power 
in a society.397 
The Mvamvu judgment, discussed in the previous chapter, displays the force of 
patronizing and regressive understandings of Black and rural culture in South Africa.398 
By depicting violence and unfettered patriarchy as inherent aspects of Black rural culture, 
the Court remained blind to the wife as a distinct and unique human being. Instead, on 
the assumption that the wife should be familiar with and used to violence, the Court’s 
language diminished her suffering and trivialized her right to be free from violence. By 
doing so, it invalidates the severity of marital rape.  
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The Court’s rhetoric is a flagrant example of culturalism, the position that culture 
“‘independently’ exists,” and that “cultural distinctions are necessarily real and rooted in 
the peoples being analysed.”399 In the fashion of earlier and now outdated anthropology, 
culturalism imagines culture as unchanging and with discrete boundaries.400 This rigid 
and naive assessment is largely ascribed to peripheral populations – groups that are not 
white, or that live outside of the global West.401 There is another key yet less apparent way 
in which institutions in South Africa employ culturalism to invisibilise marital rape, and 
that is concerning the matter of ukuthwala, the focus of the present chapter. Engaging with 
the larger theme of (in)visibility that underpins the dissertation, I ask the question: In the 
case of ukuthwala, how does institutional culturalism obscure the link between sexual 
violence and marriage? 
Ukuthwala is the isiXhosa and isiZulu word for the practice of abducting or carrying 
off a girl or woman for purposes of marriage. Variations of this practice are also found 
across South Africa amongst tshiVenda, siSwati, xiTsonga, sePedi and isiNdebele 
speaking groups, and others, each having their own terms and characteristics.402 Since 
2009, in response to what is perceived as a re-emergence and violent distortion of the 
practice, civil society groups, state bodies and scholars have mobilised to condemn and 
curb ukuthwala.403 Notwithstanding the multiple forms of the practice, “ukuthwala” has 
come to be used as the collective label for customary forms of bride abduction, and is now 
synonymous with forced child marriage or forced marriage. 
                                               
399 Mitchell, “There’s No Such Thing,” 108. 
400 Razack, “Imperilled Muslim Women,” 131; Sally Engle Merry, “Law, Culture, and Cultural 
Appropriation,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 10 (1998): 575-77. 
401 Volpp, “Blaming Culture,” 94-98. 
402 It is practiced in other parts of Africa, and Central Asia. It has also been practiced in Europe.  
403 For example, strategic litigation (the Jezile case), a South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) project researching ukuthwala and identifying methods for stemming the practice, a Draft Bill 
proposed by the SALRC to address ukuthwala, numerous academic articles, a taskforce set up in KwaZulu-
Natal province, and community consultations by state and local government institutions.    
 122 
In earlier research on isiXhosa-speaking groups in the Eastern Cape, I interrogated 
the claims that the forms of ukuthwala that are the subject of public discourse and policy 
efforts are inauthentic manifestations of custom. Drawing from historical and 
ethnographic sources from the 19th and 20th centuries, my research confirmed that the 
sexual violence associated with modern ukuthwala has a long historical lineage.404 Although 
the customary parameters of ukuthwala were heterogeneous, and were always contested by 
communities, recurrently the prospective marriage relationship transformed otherwise 
criminal acts of rape and coercion into behaviour that had a respectable purpose. 
According to local customary conceptions, the institution of marriage created a different 
set of understandings around sexual violence that rationalised men’s use of coercion.  
The aim of this chapter is not to rehash these prior arguments. Other scholars – 
notably historians and anthropologists – have broadened the ukuthwala discourse by 
speaking to the multi-generational prevalence of the violence, as well as problematic 
representations of the practice in archives and secondary literature.405 Building upon that 
extant body of literature, this chapter seeks to convey how the dominant culturalist 
ukuthwala narratives that are employed by legal scholars, courts, policymakers and non-
profit groups, hinder a deeper understanding of sexual violence in marriage. The 
assumptions upon which their undertakings are based perpetuate the view that the sexual 
violence in ukuthwala is antithetical to custom and exceptional.  
Drawing from multiple fields, including anthropology, history, and socio-legal 
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studies, I rely upon three concepts to illustrate how the recent discourse on ukuthwala 
distracts from a more contextual reading of marital rape, consequently limiting the scope 
and reach of policy interventions. I commence by addressing what I term the “ukuthwala 
crusade,” the very visible and urgent push by various sectors of society to curb violence 
against rural girls. I place my analysis of this crusade within the context of global culturalist 
responses to forced marriages. My critique concludes that the mainstream perception of 
ukuthwala rapes as “spectacular” and anomalous prevents the sexually violent acts from 
being seen as part of a continuum of marital rape. 
In the second section, I narrate how a rigid script has evolved out of the ukuthwala 
crusade in spite of legal precedent and literature that speak to the fluidity of customary 
practices. In order to align with Constitutional and human rights principles, the 
institutions committed to addressing ukuthwala have adopted a stubborn articulation of 
what true ukuthwala is. Such a constricted framing denies the realities of many communities 
in which violent forms of the practice are claimed as customary. Lastly, to counter the 
romanticism of the ukuthwala script, in the final section of the chapter I scrutinise 
patriarchy’s general impact upon wives’ sexual autonomy, an element the ukuthwala script 
essentially ignores. 
5.2 THE UKUTHWALA CRUSADE: HOW THE ‘SPECTACULAR HIDES THE 
MUNDANE’ 
5.2.1 The Birth of the Ukuthwala Crusade  
From 2009 onwards, television and print media propelled the issue of coercive 
ukuthwala cases into the public space. It reported disturbing accounts of young girls in the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (many of them impoverished and vulnerable orphans) 
forced into customary marriages with older men through the acts of kidnapping, assault, 
and rape.406 All of this, the sources recounted, was being done under the guise of an almost 
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extinct but now revived customary practice, though in a distorted form. While the 
sweeping shifts in South Africa’s economic, health and social landscape have uniquely 
shaped recent ukuthwala abductions, this irregular route to marriage is not novel, neither 
is the coercion that accompanies some of its forms.407 Yet, because ukuthwala was not 
widely researched nor discussed prior to 2009, there is the assumption that recent 
abductions abruptly emerged out of obscurity.  
Non-profits, academics, and state institutions contemplated these abductions 
through a human rights and legalistic paradigm; their perspectives moulded by the 
progressive principles of South Africa’s Constitution and the plethora of laws designed to 
protect the vulnerable. The resulting shock to the consciences of those removed from the 
communities in which ukuthwala has been practiced gave rise to the “ukuthwala crusade,” 
the term I use to characterise the concerted and sustained efforts of state institutions, legal 
academics and civil society to condemn and combat the abductions. The outcome of the 
crusade includes policy initiatives, litigation and ongoing public engagement. 
My central critique of the ukuthwala crusade is that the sensationalised treatment of 
ukuthwala, motivated by erroneous assumptions of culture, eclipses a broader picture of 
gender violence and marital rape. Ukuthwala is now equated with “forced marriage,” and 
like campaigns against forced marriage in other parts of the world, the institutional 
response to ukuthwala is reductive and simplistic, bearing the hallmarks of culturalism.408 
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Before launching into the critique, in this sub-section I provide a continuing overview of 
the nature of the ukuthwala crusade.  
In response to the media coverage, in August of 2009 the Gender Directorate in the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development instructed the South African Law 
Reform Commission (SALRC) to investigate ukuthwala.409 Additionally, the government, 
traditional leaders and civil society actors spearheaded a host of activities and initiatives 
designed to curtail the practice.410 They included the following: an imbizo411 in Lusikisiki, 
Eastern Cape in 2009 organised by the Minister in the Presidency; pledges and 
declarations made by traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape, including King Sigcau of 
the AmaMpondo412; an Ukuthwala Provincial Task Team established KwaZulu-Natal 
Province; calls made by the Minister of Police and Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development for stringent prosecutorial measures to be taken; and seminars, capacity- 
building and awareness-raising by provincial and national government bodies.413 
On the basis of extensive research processes, community dialogues and surveys 
undertaken by the SALRC, it recommended the enactment of a Bill to combat ukuthwala, 
and presented a draft of the proposed legislation in its extensive report released in early 
2016.414 From the submissions received and consultations conducted from 2014 to 2015, 
the SALRC reported that although some views varied, there was a “wide consensus that 
the practice of ukuthwala in its current form is distorted.”415 Emphasising the presence of a 
“social problem,” the SALRC supported law reform to address ukuthwala, as “a distinction 
                                               
409 SALRC, The Practice of Ukuthwala, 1. 
410 Ibid., 21-22. 
411 A community meeting. 
412 The AmaPondo are an isiXhosa speaking group mainly originating from the former Transkei, 
in present-day Eastern Cape.  
413  SALRC, The Practice of Ukuthwala, 21-22. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid., 25. 
 126 
should be drawn between this known custom and the current practices, which are illegal 
distortions of the custom.”416 
While citing the importance of non-legal measures at the community level to stem 
the abductions, ultimately the SALRC reasoned that the “symbolic and educational 
merits” of “a new consolidated statute” would be the most effective means of “attacking 
those distortions that have crept into olden usages and which amount to oppression.”417 
The draft Prohibition of Forced Marriages and Forced Child Marriages Bill can also be 
understood as reflecting international and regional human rights norms and guidelines, 
which obligate states to create comprehensive legislative frameworks as a component of 
addressing harmful cultural practices. 
There is certainly merit in the steps taken and proposed by stakeholders in regards 
to ukuthwala. The straightforward human rights legal application sends a clear and resolute 
message that the abuse of girls and women will not be tolerated irrespective of any cultural 
impetuses. The creation of a statute would also compel authorities to prosecute ukuthwala 
cases, as one of the concerns put forward by communities is that authorities decline to 
prosecute cases on the basis that ukuthwala constitutes a customary practice.418 The 
extensive advocacy by state and civil society groups has also helped to sensitise 
communities about the detrimental impacts of coercive ukuthwala.419 The unprecedented 
attention by institutions is undoubtedly commendable, but the crusade is also inherently 
flawed as it is framed in one-dimensional terms. I delve into these shortcomings in the 
subsequent sections.  
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5.2.2 The Shortcomings of the Ukuthwala Crusade 
5.2.2.1 The Narrow Focus on Forced Marriage and Child Marriage  
In popular discourse and legal literature, ukuthwala has now been branded as a 
harmful cultural practice – a form of forced marriage or trafficking.420 As with female 
genital mutilation, honour killings, and other conspicuous forms of gender violence that 
are perceived as abhorrent, ukuthwala has been reconfigured as a “spectacular” display of 
gender violence, the kind of violence around which multilateral bodies, governments and 
(trans)national organisations rally. These human rights-oriented movements, acting from 
a Western liberalist ideal, are often drawn to occurrences of harm that are perceived as 
unfamiliar, bizarre, and uncivilised.421 It is in this sense that the “spectacular hides the 
mundane,” in that concerted movements to stem harmful practices can fail to link the 
harmful practices they decry to the less overt or everyday forms of brutality that women 
endure.422 
By favouring the “spectacular,” the advocacy campaigns are employed to 
distinguish the Western from non-Western, the enlightened from the traditional, the 
civilised from the uncivilised.423 The modern movements against child marriage therefore 
dredge up repertoires from the past. Preoccupations with forced marriage have a long 
history, as European colonisers too obsessed over how to stem these “native” practices, 
and to protect women from the clutches of unfamiliar patriarchal practices, even though 
patriarchy prevailed in their own societies.424  
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One’s definition of “spectacular” is naturally dependent on one’s social and 
geographical positioning. Bhabha has argued that it is the reliance upon Western 
superiority that renders certain forms of violence spectacular.425 For those immersed in 
environments where violations such as female genital mutilation, rape and abduction in 
war, and coercive forms of ukuthwala are rife, the violence is not in fact spectacular. 
Violence against women is mundane, meaning that though acts vary in extremity, 
consequence and visibility, the violence is ubiquitous.  
The ukuthwala crusade bears the disquieting hallmarks of the international and 
national movements to curb forced and child marriages. As with movements in other parts 
of the world, the domestic push against ukuthwala is framed as a human rights issue, 
revealing an element of panic and urgency in rescuing young girls from a life of servitude 
and violence.426 Analogous to the comparative context, the ukuthwala crusade narrative 
elides nuances of the practice, and assumes that persons, other than white persons, are 
governed by set cultural prescripts.427  
Another critique levelled against mainstream advocacy in relation to forced 
marriage is that it does not comprehend the spectacular acts of violence against women 
as being part of a continuum of violence.428 Scholars who argue for a more contextualised 
approach to forced marriage in Africa make the point that seeing “spectacular acts of 
violence – such as rape in war or the targeting of schoolgirls in Nigeria, Uganda, or 
Pakistan” as part of a continuum of gender discrimination would allow for them to be 
linked to “daily acts of violence – such as street harassment, employment inequality, or 
intimate partner violence.”429 As the case of ukuthwala exemplifies, the customary practice 
holds a privileged place within policy and human rights agenda in South Africa. The 
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crusade focuses on girls but this is to the exclusion of other forms of sexual violence in 
marriage that also occur frequently, but comparably receive little consideration.  
The ukuthwala crusade is an archetype of how “the continuum of violence is 
surprisingly difficult to see” from a superficial standpoint.430 The re-framing of ukuthwala 
as forced child marriage parallels trends in the international and regional human rights 
discourse. Within these arenas, forced marriage is receiving an “unprecedented level” of 
interest, giving rise to “intense political, juridical” and “public interest” within nations.431 
In sub-Saharan Africa, “forced marriage has emerged as one of the more critical human 
rights challenges in the twenty-first century,” to the point that international norms are 
influencing legislation and discouraging the practice of certain customs.432   
Institutions sensationalise violence in marginalised groups, rather than conceiving 
of it as a manifestation of a broader societal ethos of gender violence. As Volpp comments, 
“(w)hen we gaze with condemnation” at other groups, “we can miss the fact that ‘our’ 
culture is also characterized by problematic, sex-subordinating behaviour.”433 Violent 
ukuthwala is named as being apart from us, a discrete form of gender violence that 
disproportionately affects girls and is committed by wayward men. But there is a need to 
apply a more expansive and sensitive approach to ukuthwala so that it becomes legible as 
part of the continuum of marital violence, and to bring to light the sexual violence that 
women suffer throughout their marriages, not just in the beginning stages of marriage.  
Writing in support of the need to complicate the discourse on forced marriage in 
Africa, Bunting, Lawrance and Roberts critique the reductive portrayal of forced 
marriage. They observe that “(i)n the case of ‘child, early, and forced marriage’, the focus 
of policy and academic discussion is often reduced to ‘child marriage.’” 434 Moreover, they 
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note, “even ‘child marriage’ is further reduced to ‘girl brides’. Thus, though a lack of 
capacity to consent to marriage due to age is a dimension of forced marriage, the 
concentration on girls obscures analysis of the limitations on consent more generally.”435 
How consent is conceptualised at the level of the local is distinct from the notion of consent 
as defined under legal frameworks. The latter often use age as a marker, but the 
accentuation of “girls” detracts from the manner in which both overt and subtle forms of 
coercion operate within familial and other hierarchies.436  
Masimanyane, an East London-based women’s rights organisation which does work 
throughout the Eastern Cape, has recently shifted its orientation in regards to violence 
and marriage. While previously the forced marriage project focused on girls, under its new 
model, the organisation now addresses the factor of coercion in marriage more broadly – 
for example examining how women in churches are compelled to marry members of the 
church who have been chosen for them.437 Masimanyane also assists older women who 
were thwelwe (the state of having been subjected to the ukuthwala process) in their youth 
and are still carrying trauma from the abuse.438 Through a more multifaceted approach 
Masimanyane is able to call attention to both overt and covert forms of marriage-related 
violence and to attend to the needs of a broader range of age groups.  
5.2.2.2 A Simplistic and Silencing Approach 
In addition to prioritising the issue of forced marriage and child marriage, the 
discourse of the ukuthwala crusade is, on the whole, unvarying. This is in part because the 
crusade operates from an intractable script that only presents part of women’s truths (I 
shall discuss this script in the next section). The status quo discourse is premised upon the 
view that Black rural culture is stagnant, possessing embedded and consensual features. 
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Further, it concentrates on just a fragment, a moment, of ongoing and pervasive sexual 
coercion.  
In stressing what it deems a uniquely abhorrent form of gender violence, the crusade 
ignores the broader social import of the concept of marriage – an institution in which such 
forms of brutality are allowed to prevail, but mostly remain invisible. Blinded by the 
spectacular, the crusade neglects to consider that the ukuthwala performance signals a 
continuation of violence that filters into the marriage. It presents a flattened representation 
of what women and girls live. There is the desire on the part of those who have power to 
speak for communities (policymakers, traditional leaders, etc) to declare that sexual 
violence is not part of custom, in the face of contrary evidence provided by survivors 
themselves.439  
Masimanyane staff reported that when ukuthwala survivors testified before a 
government body, they communicated that violent ukuthwala was the norm in their 
communities; that it was in fact custom. Some of the government commissioners seated 
on the panel flatly rejected the women’s claims that the violent forms of ukuthwala that they 
had been subjected to were customary. One commissioner bluntly retorted: “Call it 
something else. And what you are talking about here, it’s not our ukuthwala.”440   
By silencing the very communities that it seeks to help, the ukuthwala crusade 
perpetuates a form of epistemic violence.441 It shuts out the voices of rural women who 
are experts on gender violence based on what they have lived and perceived. It suppresses 
the experiences of older women who were thwelwe and raped, and whose families and 
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communities condoned this because it was custom. Writing on Spivak’s famous essay Can 
the Subaltern Speak, Kapoor reflects: 
 …for Spivak, it is dangerous to assume that one can encounter the Third 
World, and especially the Third World subaltern, on a level playing field. Our 
interaction with, and representations of, the subaltern are inevitably loaded. 
They are determined by our favourable historical and geographic position, 
our material and cultural advantages resulting from imperialism and 
capitalism, and our identity as privileged Westerner or native informant. 
When the investigating subject, naively or knowingly, disavows its complicity 
or pretends it has no 'geo-political determinations', it does the opposite of 
concealing itself: it privileges itself.442  
The institutional actors championing the crusade appear not to be aware of the damage 
they are effecting, nor their privilege. Rural women are confronted by government 
representatives, influential civil society groupings and scholars whose power radiates out 
from the metropole. In the same fashion as colonial agents, the outsiders and insider elites 
declare what culture is, and discard any narrative that diverges from their estimations. 
They feed the rural natives what they think they need to free themselves from the savagery 
of “distorted” ukuthwala, and as such do not allow the subaltern to “speak.”443  
The SALRC’s ukuthwala report too perpetuates epistemic violence against rural 
communities. The report takes for granted that coercive forms of ukuthwala are aberrant, 
and consequently its conclusions and recommendations stem from that premise. To its 
credit, the SALRC report does provide some contextual analysis. Tying in history, the 
report remarks that as an irregular route to marriage, ukuthwala served to “counter the 
influence of extreme authority” in certain scenarios and was not “a rigid and formalistic 
prescript” as portrayed by popular discourse.444 Speaking to the spectrum of violence, the 
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report stresses “it is crucial to view ukuthwala as a symptom of the larger issue of gender-
based violence and the disempowerment of women and girls.”445 It also clarifies that “the 
practice itself is not the issue, but rather the problem is circumstances that create and 
perpetuate abuse.”446 On this point, the report notes the broader patriarchal forces at 
play, highlighted by women’s rights NGOs during the consultative process.447  
In spite of the aforesaid points, ultimately the SALRC surmises that the present 
forms of ukuthwala are inauthentic. It comments: “Notwithstanding the logic of ukuthwala 
in its proper context, it is clear that there is abuse of this practice.”448 Positioned 
comfortably in the presumption that violent forms of ukuthwala have no customary 
endorsement, the stakeholders ignore the established communal patterns that sustain the 
supposed aberrations of the practice. Although HIV/AIDS myths and patriarchal 
stereotypes are cited as factors, the institutions assume that the factors of poverty and 
parental complicity are primarily responsible for the “resurgence” of the custom.449  
Aside from Masimanyane, the discourse of institutions invested in addressing 
ukuthwala does not speak to the multi-generational nature of the violence. Many women, 
including older women likely present in the community meetings which informed the 
SALRC findings, have survived of brutal forms of ukuthwala themselves. Decades ago, 
these women could not seek help; they could not return home because their families were 
complicit in the abductions and the rape which were the normative features of 
ukuthwala.450  
Explicating the need for scholarly interventions that “move beyond the 
representation of forced marriage as ‘scandal’ and increase the visibility of forced marriage 
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in Africa’s historical past and its persistence… into the contemporary present,” Bunting, 
Lawrance and Roberts declare that: 
…representations of forced marriages are often monocausal, simplistic, 
heteronormative, and reflective of vested interests. What may be gained in 
terms of public visibility may actually be to the detriment of a richer and more 
nuanced understanding of the sociocultural habitus of forced marriage in 
Africa. Very few of the developments…are demonstrably tied to empirical 
fieldwork or synthetic scholarly analysis of forced marriage practices or 
patterns.451 
There is a growing body of ukuthwala literature based on extensive ethnographic and 
archival research, but what remains to be seen is whether it will be incorporated into future 
policy agendas. For now, public and academic discourse primarily adheres to the 
standardised script. The state and civil institutions representing the crusade rely upon the 
idyllic and precise depiction of ukuthwala in customary law literature, and as such are able 
to deduce that ukuthwala “is now carried out by vagrant and loitering men who just want 
to satisfy their lust.”452 This kind of representation condenses an elaborate and 
longstanding phenomenon into a sensationalised trend. 
5.3 THE UKUTHWALA SCRIPT AND THE MYSTIFYING SEARCH FOR AN 
UNCHANGING CUSTOM  
5.3.1 The Fluid Nature of Custom  
My second critique of institutional responses to ukuthwala integrates the highly 
contested notions of “custom” and “customary law,” which fall under the ambit of culture. 
I take the position that “culture” and the components of “custom” are not discrete entities 
that are invariably patriarchal, unyielding, and confined to rural, Black populations. As 
the ukuthwala script is culturalist in orientation, it draws from a less dynamic formulation 
of custom and customary law. Before I engage with a discussion of the script itself and its 
pitfalls, it is vital to first explore debates on the construction of “customary law” and 
“custom” as these bear import for the subject of ukuthwala. The work of certain legal 
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historians and socio-legal scholars deconstructs the customary law designation, and 
encourages a more flexible understanding of custom.  
The term “customary law” is enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution also 
affirms the importance of culture generally. Section 211 subsection 3 states: “The courts 
must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.” Other provisions of the Constitution 
articulate the right to cultural life and the right to promotion of culture (sections 30 and 
31 respectively).  
The idea of customary law is not straightforward in itself with some scholars 
questioning whether such a thing exists, or whether the term is helpful. To begin with, 
there is an evident tension in terms of what customary law actually refers to. Progressive 
scholars such as Chanock take the position that “customary law” is a recent invention, 
borne out of the sweeping changes resulting from the colonial encounter, and manipulated 
into the restrictive framework of positive law.453 Free from co-optation by the state, true 
custom sits outside of customary law.454 Due to the pernicious impact of colonialism and 
apartheid on constructions of Blackness and Black customs, some scholars, such as Mnisi-
Weeks reject the terms “customary law” altogether, preferring the designation “vernacular 
law.”455 In contrast traditionalists contend that there is a pre-colonial pure form of 
customary law that can be retrieved and applied.456  
It has been accepted that what is referred to as customary law now encompasses 
both official customary law and living customary law. Official customary law refers to that 
which is set out in legislation, court precedent and academic treatises (as relied upon by 
                                               
453 Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Order, 240. 
454 Chanock, “Law, State and Culture,” 55. 
455 Mnisi Weeks, Access to Justice and Human Security: Cultural Contradictions in Rural South Africa, 62. 
456 For a discussion of the ideological differences between progressivists and traditionalists see 
Mnisi Weeks, “The Interface Between,” 14-16. 
 136 
the courts), and “imposed and constructed” by the colonial authorities.457 The latter 
description encapsulates Chanock’s view of “customary law” as an artificial construct,  
with community norms having been manipulated into “enforceable rules of positive 
law.”458 In comparison, Mnisi Weeks defines living customary law as “that manifestation 
of customary law that is developed and observed by rural communities, attested to by 
parol.”459  
Post-apartheid judicial precedent establishes that the “customary law” referred to 
in the Constitution encompasses living customary law, and not just “official” customary 
law. The seminal Constitutional Court judgments in Alexkor v Richtersveld Community 460 and 
Shilubana v Shilubana and others v Nwamitwa 461 underscore the significance and fluid nature 
of living customary law. In Alexkor, a land restitution case, the Court noted that although 
“in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must now be seen 
as an integral part of our law,” and that “(i)ts validity must now be determined by reference 
not to common law, but to the Constitution.” 462 It further averred that “(i)t is important 
to note that indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified and easily 
ascertainable rules. By its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change 
their patterns of life.”463 In the Shilubana judgment, which concerned a chieftaincy dispute, 
the Court declared that “customary law is by its nature a constantly evolving system. 
Under pre-democratic colonial and apartheid regimes, this development was frustrated 
and customary law stagnated.”464 
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Even though living customary law has been endorsed by the Constitutional Court, 
the Court and other institutions concerned with customary law have a penchant for 
extracting it from its highly localised, multi-textural and ever shifting nature.465 There is 
an inclination towards “skeletal systematizing” that straightjackets local systems of order, 
distilling varied models of customary practice into discrete and fixed rules.466 The linear 
rules documented in academic and legal texts or in prior court decisions must still be 
regarded with some suspicion. Admittedly, texts may be useful but, as Bennett cautions, 
“few, if any…can claim to be direct, personal accounts of community practice. They are 
the work of many informants, each of whom brings to bear on the subject his or her own 
preconceptions and prejudices.”467  
The salient point to take away from the more reflexive discourse on customary law 
is that, given the consistent re-negotiation of norms on the ground, it is futile to create 
metaphorical stencils depicting customary law. This may generate the question of how to 
delineate between law and practice. From her ethnographic work in KwaZulu-Natal, 
Mnisi Weeks articulates her doubts about attempting to answer the thorny question of 
how customary practices can be differentiated from customary law. Her musings are as 
follows: 
If one thing is apparent from the study I have conducted, it is the fact that the 
pull toward extrapolating positive, mechanically-enforceable legal rules from 
living law is very strong (because of the force of the positivist epistemic legal 
culture) regardless of the fact that all evidence points to its being a trap. 
Community law is essentially a negotiated order and it is therefore less than 
easily predictable or its rules mechanically reproducible.468 
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What I find most enriching about Mnisi Weeks’ work is that it induces scholars of local 
systems of ordering to constantly deconstruct and question the paradigms through which 
they conduct their work. Communities are not without law, in the sense that they are 
devoid of systems of order, but the terms of this “law” cannot be dictated by the positivism 
infused by the colonial order; instead it is more useful to perceive local law as “disparate 
forms of ensuring order.”469 But, the range of norms that exist alongside each other are 
not all readily apparent to the outsider. It means that what is seen cannot be taken for 
granted; one must interrogate that which is seemingly too neat, rigid and uniform. Hence, 
I now critique what I refer to as the “ukuthwala script,” for its shortcomings are better 
discerned in juxtaposition with the present discussion on customary law.    
5.3.2 The Nature of the Ukuthwala Script  
In addition to the “horror-stricken” and sensationalist media coverage, a very 
limited body of literature on customary law has framed much of the ukuthwala crusade’s 
agenda.470 The dominant research on customary law falls prey to the “skeletal 
systematizing” and positivism that Chanock and Mnisi Weeks warn against. Some of the 
commentary predates 2009, but a discernible body of research has been published in 
response to the heightened media and policy attention. Foregrounded by Koyana and 
Bekker’s earlier description of ukuthwala as a “charming” and “romantic practice,” legal 
experts have worked from the assumption that violent forms of ukuthwala are distortions of 
the true, historical custom.471 Although ukuthwala as a lived customary practice violates 
many of the rules of predictability – and is certainly more multi-faceted than any texts 
could capture – legal scholars treat it as a predetermined act reflecting an “idyllic 
situation.”472  
The script dictates that in the idyllic past, ukuthwala was a practice akin to elopement 
where a couple wanted to force their families’ hand in accepting their marriage; or 
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alternatively could be used to make a marriage occur quickly, where for example, the girl 
or woman was pregnant.473 Ukuthwala was also a tool that a couple or intending groom 
could employ where they could not afford to engage in the lengthy and costly negotiations 
leading up to “regular” marriage.474 While a few sources do report that some forms of 
ukuthwala employed force, they largely have painted ukuthwala as an innately benevolent 
practice involving “mock abduction” during which the intended bride would be expected 
to feign displeasure and resistance as a sign of modesty. 475  
The literature underscores too that sexual intercourse was never countenanced as 
part of the abduction, and in the event that the male did violate the female he was required 
to pay a fine.476 Even where observers recorded patent violence during abductions that 
took place decades ago, it is dismissed as being part of the mock abduction, and the matter 
of sexual violence is generally not commented upon, except as an illustration of customary 
anathema.477  
In short then, the ukuthwala narrative prescribes that under customary law, there 
were safeguards put in place to protect women, and therefore the contemporary 
occurrences of violence are patent abuses and distortions of the customary practice.478 A 
central criticism here is that the script relies upon a sanitised notion of the past. It is true 
that elopement, feigned protest on the part of the chosen bride, and protective measures 
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for women and girls did characterise some forms of ukuthwala, but there were other 
customary forms. The customary legal texts, and even some older ethnographic sources, 
reflect an idealised customary milieu. The following excerpt from a recently published 
article reflects the sense of romanticism that permeates legal discussions: 
It is important to understand the foundation of Ukuthwala and to identify the 
spirit of uBuntu behind the practise. Ukuthwala in its traditional form played 
an important role in the traditional courting process…At face value and 
especially when studying the harmful practise of the distorted ukuthwala, it is 
in contradiction to the social character of a traditional African society. 
However, the traditional form shows the caring and sense of social cohesion 
and solidarity which forms the basis of uBuntu.479 
Legal commentary such as this propagates the idea that sexual violence is extremely rare, 
if not impossible, within a genuine African setting. Sweeping classifications such as 
“traditional African society” are perplexing. They “other” Black communities and leave 
little room for agency, conflict and complexity. The Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development’s ukuthwala brochure follows in a similar fashion: It cites that 
in “ancient Africa” ukuthwala was a “condoned albeit abnormal path to marriage targeted 
at certain girls or women of marriageable age. But it did not involve raping or having 
consensual sex with the girl until marriage requirements had been concluded.”480 
As the above sources plainly show, motivating the ukuthwala script is a desire to 
return to an illusory past. In the words of Ratele, “(t)he attempt to restore pre-apartheid 
African traditions… is marked by the fantasy of a precolonial, non-conflictual and 
homogenous Africa.”481 All societies have norms and values that are created to foster 
communal cohesion. The notion of human rights is not the exclusive province of Western 
enlightenment. But sexual violence, including marital rape, has existed since time 
immemorial, irrespective of opposing norms, philosophies, treaties, conventions, 
                                               
479 van der Watt and Ovens, “Contextualizing the Practice,” 14. 
480 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, “Ukuthwala.”  
481 Kopano Ratele, “Masculinities without Tradition,” Politikon: South African Journal of Political 
Studies 40, no. 1 (2013): 136. 
 141 
legislation, or any other mechanisms human beings have developed. Sexual violence is 
also a norm – it is part of what people do and what men often agree upon – and a history 
of rape laws around the world reflects this.482 
The ukuthwala script operates not only from the reverie of a perfect past, but also 
from a rigid legalistic perspective – again reflecting the positivist pull. Scholars apply South 
Africa’s constitutional and legislative parameters, set against the broader framework of 
international human rights, to evidence that violent forms of ukuthwala violate a host of 
laws and rights.483 By the nature of their disciplinary grounding, mainstream legal scholars 
and practitioners tend to look for certainty and clear rules as opposed to nuance. They are 
guided by legislation, established principles and precedent. Problematically, by being 
securely ensconced within the clinical confines of the law, legal discourse can at times be 
disconnected from the messy and ever-shifting realities on the ground. By attempting to 
fit the acts of rape and kidnapping that routinely occur with ukuthwala into modern human 
rights and criminal law paradigms, law experts have in a sense failed to take account of 
the fact that many women and girls are subjected to rape within marriage because such 
practices are locally sanctioned.484 They are not simply the acts of a few rogue “horny 
bastards” who are abusing culture.485 
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Though there is evidence in the historical and ethnographic resources to refute the 
validity of the popular rhetoric, the ukuthwala narrative holds fast in policy initiatives and 
in jurisprudence. By disregarding the salience and reach of customarily sanctioned sexual 
violence, the rigid and myopic script explains away the rapes, branding them as abnormal 
occurrences. Smit has observed this sanitising tendency which contradicts the diverse 
realities in Eastern Cape communities: 
…there appears to be a stubborn persistence in scholarly debate of dismissing 
these realities in defence of a “real,” “authentic” and historically “correct” 
custom that never involved violence and remained static. This misconception 
can be ascribed to the fact that the majority of voices in the debate have 
largely spoken from a legal context which clearly differentiates between 
constitutionally acceptable codified forms of customs governed by laws, and 
the living custom practiced at the local level.486 
The more grounded research of anthropologists such as Smit is critical for elucidating the 
limitations of the culturalist ukuthwala script. As I noted earlier, a mushrooming of research 
outside of the strict demarcations of the law evinces that ukuthwala, as an irregular form of 
marriage, has had multiple representations throughout history, all existing alongside each 
other, and changing in prevalence and character over time through the colonial and 
apartheid encounters.487 There was never one ideal form of ukuthwala that spanned all 
communities. In some isiXhosa speaking communities, in which the majority of the 
empirical research has been done over the past decade, sexually violent forms of ukuthwala 
were widely practiced and accepted as part of custom. Notwithstanding this fluidity, in 
portraying custom as both static and egalitarian, the ukuthwala script obscures the 
sanctioning of sexual violence within marriage and marriage-related contexts. 
5.3.3 The Jezile Case: The Application of the Ukuthwala Script 
In Jezile v S and Others, the highest court decision relating to ukuthwala, the Western 
Cape High Court pronounced the type of abduction practiced by Mvumeleni Jezile as 
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“aberrant,”488 and affirmed the convictions and sentences handed down by the lower 
court. Jezile had been sentenced to 22 years for rape, assault and trafficking for abducting 
then 14-year old Nolutho Yekiso in the Eastern Cape and forcing her travel to his home 
in Cape Town, during which time he raped and assaulted her. This pivotal judgment 
fittingly takes a strong position in favor of protecting the well-being of girls. My critique is 
that, falling into the trap of straightjacketing and romanticising customary practices, the 
Court missed the opportunity to confront how strongly the cultural beliefs that Jezile put 
forward for purposes of his defence at the appeal level resonate within communities such 
as the one he came from in the Eastern Cape. 
On appeal before the Western Cape High Court, Jezile advanced the argument that 
the trial court had “misdirected itself in not proceeding from the premise that the merits 
should have been determined within the context of the practice of ukuthwala, or customary 
marriage.”489 The appellant sought to have the court assess his actions through the lens of 
Xhosa custom in order to rationalise his sexual violation of Yekiso, and render the issue 
of her consent immaterial.490 Given the constitutional implications invoked by the 
appellant’s customary law argument, the Court issued letters of interest to organisations 
to provide submissions on the “complex and contested issue” of ukuthwala under customary 
law.491 
I will not delve into the details of the (at times conflicting) customary law arguments 
presented by the appellant Jezile, nor relate in detail the varied perspectives of the seven 
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amici curiae and various experts whose evidence the Court relied upon.492 What I seek to 
draw as salient from the case are the divergent viewpoints on the accepted customary 
parameters on ukuthwala. Per the test articulated in Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa, the 
court set out to determine the content of the practice as only the “traditional form of 
ukuthwala could be recognized under our law.”493 The Court’s determination to pin down 
the one traditional form of ukuthwala elucidates the tendencies of courts to seek certainty 
by casting a wide net over distinct groupings of Black people.  
The norms that are presented before any court, or in texts, are “but a small sampling 
of legal norms. A plethora of norms exists that are implicit and hence unarticulated – 
existing as conditions, qualifications and exceptions to articulated rules – and do not 
surface except when members seek to appeal to them.”494 Jezile sought to appeal to his 
own lived version of custom. At the appeal level he maintained that the form of ukuthwala 
that he had practiced constituted living customary law, and did not require consent, nor 
adhere to the age restrictions set out in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
(RCMA).495 Before the trial court, appellant’s expert witness Professor Francois De Villiers 
testified that the process followed by Jezile did accord with tradition (albeit in violation of 
the RCMA) and that “historically women and girls could indeed be forced into these 
‘marriages.’”496 He further spoke to the conflicts between constitutional principles and 
customary practices, conceding that legislation sought to enforce compliance of traditional 
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practices with the Constitution.497 The import of Jezile’s expert’s testimony is that even 
though the violent forms of ukuthwala did not comport with legislative and constitutional 
standards, they were customary nonetheless and could gradually be brought in line with 
those standards.  
In contrast, all of the amici curiae and other experts before the court followed the 
ukuthwala script, with some difference. Some amici curiae spoke to how the coercive form of 
ukuthwala does depend on “a degree of participation and acceptance” in “many 
communities.”498 On the subject of patriarchy, the 4th to 7th amici curiae499  articulated that 
both the traditional (the “relatively benign form”) and aberrant form of ukuthwala “feed on 
the patriarchal nature of customary law.”500 Thus some evidence before the court did 
highlight the diverse and gendered manifestations of the practice. Ultimately though, the 
Court accepted the position of the amici curiae and experts that the version of ukuthwala that 
Jezile followed was “aberrant,” and could not be protected under the law.501 Outlining 
Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo’s evidence, the Court stated that the essential features of 
traditional ukuthwala included, amongst other characteristics: consent by both parties and 
consent by the parents; the woman being of marriageable age; a mock abduction (with 
feigned resistance by the woman); and prohibited sexual intercourse during the abduction 
process.502  
Notwithstanding its value, by enforcing a narrow view of culture and custom, the 
Western Cape High Court decision blatantly negates the custom as lived by Jezile and 
many other South Africans. The essentialising of Black customary practice is a 
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consequence of culturalism; for the “idea of culture demands localization; it demands that 
distinctions be clearly demarcated at the expense of the scalar messiness of social 
interaction.”503 As I rejoined following the issuance of the judgment:    
Jezile’s own views…most clearly show how the subject of ukuthwala still 
remains a complicated territory; and what a great disconnect exists between 
many South Africans who sustain certain forms of living customary law, and 
those who may speak on their behalf.  The complainant’s male relatives and 
Jezile’s own brother and sister-in-law supported his actions. His methods 
comported with local perceptions of culturally sanctioned behavior. If the 
form of ukuthwala and marriage practiced by Jezile is not traditional, and is 
instead as the Court determined, “aberrant”, we must subsequently ask: 
aberrant to whom?504  
The interpretation of customary law espoused by the Jezile judgment follows the 
idealising predisposition of the ukuthwala script, as well as a preference for written 
customary law or interpretations by authorities and elites. Understandably, before 2009, 
a sizeable segment of the South African population did not know of ukuthwala’s existence 
– let alone the coercive forms of the practice – and consequently this unfamiliarity and 
shock in response to the practice filters into the ukuthwala discourse. The Jezile decision 
and the ukuthwala script conflate “customary” with “benevolence,” as though violence or 
injustice is never perpetrated in the name of custom.  
The Court need not have branded coercive ukuthwala aberrant in order to ultimately 
fall on the side of Yekiso, and the rights of women. It could have noted the established 
status of violent forms of ukuthwala, and then taken steps towards developing ukuthwala in 
line with Constitutional standards. The refusal, in the specific context of ukuthwala, to 
imagine custom differently prevents any further exploration of the customary prescripts 
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that both enable and conceal sexual violence within marriages. In the final section of this 
chapter, I consider these prescripts.  
5.4 DOCUMENTING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN PATRIARCHY, CUSTOMARY 
MARRIAGE AND VIOLENCE   
5.4.1 Questioning the Theme of Benevolence in the Ukuthwala Script  
By demarcating the allegedly new and violent forms of ukuthwala as criminal and in 
contravention of established custom, civil society activists, and legal practitioners and 
scholars regard the assaults on girls and young women as anomalous acts by men who are 
blatantly abusing culture. As the preceding paragraphs make clear, the culturalist 
approach to determining the authentic form of custom adheres to official custom whose 
boundaries are determined by outsiders and elites. This approach denies that other 
realities do resonate as custom – even ones that offend Constitutional and human rights 
ideals.   
What is unclear is why in the specific case of ukuthwala, benevolence is assumed to 
be part of the custom, with more harmful forms excluded as inauthentic. This stance is 
confounding, for there is already significant evidence regarding the patriarchal strands of 
customs, which official customary law rigidified. In customary succession cases of Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the 
Republic of South Africa the Constitutional Court struck down the apartheid era law 
provisions that codified the custom of male primogeniture.505 Shilubana, concerning a 
chieftaincy dispute amongst the Valoyi Royal family in Limpopo, also addresses gender 
discrimination.506 Here the Constitutional Court upheld the Valoyi’s appointment of a 
woman as Hosi of the community, agreeing that it represented a development in living 
customary law. In Gumede, a customary marriage divorce case, the wife successfully 
challenged provisions of the Natal Code of Zulu Law and the KwaZulu Act on the Code 
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of Zulu Law that granted men full ownership of the marital property, as well as custody 
of family members.507 
The apartheid-era provisions struck down in Gumede and Bhe/Shibi starkly 
encapsulate how patriarchy was written into law, leaving less room for negotiation and 
contestation at the level of the community, and rendering Black women even more 
vulnerable in the eyes of the law and within their communities.508 In Gumede the court 
noted: “Whilst patriarchy has always been a feature of indigenous society, the written or 
codified rules of customary unions fostered a particularly crude and gendered form of 
inequality, which left women and children singularly marginalised and vulnerable.”509 
While these cases do not speak to physical and sexual violence, they symbolise an 
environment in which men’s bodies and positions were privileged. 
The status quo understanding of ukuthwala appears to be that, with focused attention 
on curing the present-day uncharacteristic violence, the customary practice can be 
restored to its original benign nature. But, the existence of violent ukuthwala cases cannot 
be divorced from the broader context of time-honoured patriarchy and the obligations 
ascribed to women in their roles as wives. The following section looks at how customary 
norms circumscribed the bodily autonomy of wives, making it far more difficult for sexual 
violence in marriage to be designated as unjust. 
5.4.2  Searching for Patriarchy in Marriage 
In this section, I make use of historical, ethnographic, and legal materials to convey 
that, although customary mechanisms existed to protect wives and norms dictated that 
wives be treated well, this was balanced against the uxorial rights that husbands held, and 
ultimately the fate of a woman lay in the hands of a man (whether it be her husband or 
male elders). As the previous section shows, it is important to bear in mind that many of 
the sources on customary law are presented through numerous filters (shaped by 
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colonialism and apartheid and other ideologies or methods), and do not reflect the unique 
and dynamic realities of communities. At most they are representative of overarching 
patterns. 
To be clear, my argument is not that African custom or tradition is entirely 
patriarchal and impervious to change. Just as there are various forms of ukuthwala, there 
are various models of tradition, not all of them androcentric and patriarchal, and not all 
of them heterosexual. Ratele reminds us that, “even though there are hegemonic hetero-
masculine voices within traditions, traditions themselves are not exhausted by such 
dominant voices.”510 Official customary law in fact suppressed competing iterations of 
custom that lessened the hegemony of tribal and family authorities.511 Without that 
partnership between dominant men of different races, “the practices of young men and 
women, of divorcees and widows, all of whom struggled against aspects of the maintained 
patriarchy, would be clearly visible as custom.”512  
Within my present research, I narrow in on the masculinist exhibitions of custom 
that constrained wives. I do not delve into discussions of the meanings of consent that are 
central to the ukuthwala debate and have been articulated elsewhere.513 In contrast, I de-
centre ukuthwala to consider expectations placed on wives’ bodies during the life of the 
marriage. Using ethnographic and historical literature, I broadly survey how male-centric 
customary norms and practice detrimentally impacted wives’ rights to bodily autonomy. 
Patriarchy enabled and concealed sexual violence in marriage – not simply during the 
thwala process but across women’s lives.  
It may be helpful to begin by assessing general positions on the treatment of women 
in marriage in order to extract a number of tensions. This exercise is done with an 
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awareness that the categorisations of peoples (Tswana, Xhosa, Sotho, etc) that feature in 
the academic sources, are colonial and apartheid constructs.514 I use these sources only to 
proffer everyday patterns of patriarchy. I am cognisant that these are generalities and that 
women have always found creative ways to navigate patriarchal hegemonies and assert 
themselves.  
Several ethnographers of the 20th century took pains to describe the benevolent side 
of marital relations and the structures that existed to ensure that wives were well treated, 
even though the wife held a subservient position to her husband. In regards to Tswana 
law and custom, Schapera found that “although a wife is thus under the legal tutelage of 
her husband, various rights and privileges must be accorded to her. It is his duty to respect 
her, and to treat her kindly and considerately.”515 He continues: “The husband’s power 
over his wife is by no means absolute. He may beat her if she has misconducted herself; 
but her own family’s power, to which she can always appeal and flee, is generally an 
effective check against abuse of this right, while if he carries it to an extreme he may be 
punished at the kgotla (local court).”516 
Amongst isiXhosa speaking groups, there were also protective mechanisms for 
wives, which existed alongside the husband’s right to discipline his wife even by use of 
physical force as long as no “permanent injuries” were caused or “excessive blood” 
 drawn.517 The uteleko custom, described by JH Soga as essentially meaning, “don’t you 
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dare” to a husband, acted to “guarantee…considerate treatment” of wives.518 The wife 
would go to her own family’s home where she would stay until the husband had done 
enough to appease them, typically by paying a fine.519 Soga went so far as to state that 
there was no need for dissolution of marriages since wives could find support under Xhosa 
law and at their parent’s homes.520  
Customary marriages also emphasised two categories of rights: the sexual and 
domestic obligations of a wife (uxorial rights) which belonged to her husband, and 
(genetrical rights) relating to motherhood and childbearing wherein all children born of 
the marriage belonged to her husband’s family (in patrilineal communities).521 The uxorial 
rights granted the husband sexual access to his wife, and he could cite a wife’s refusal to 
render conjugal rights as a basis for dissolution of the marriage; though under codified 
customary law in some jurisdictions, both sexes could use this justification.522  
Although the ideal under official customary law was that wives be treated well, and 
if abused they could seek refuge from their families, the protections available were limited 
given the patriarchal features of local ethos.523 A woman’s fate invariably lay in the hands 
of a man. Under Pedi custom, where a woman was raped or assaulted she had to rely 
upon her husband or her male elder to seek recourse on her behalf.524 Under Xhosa 
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custom, dissolution of the marriage mandated the return of a portion of the ikhazi (lobola 
cattle), which required acquiescence on the part of her paternal family.525 If the woman’s 
father or guardian refused to support the dissolution, she would then have to seek help 
from her paternal uncles, with the Chief’s Court as the final arbiter.526 The process 
demonstrates a woman’s dependence on her family to secure her protection. Bennett’s 
insights also poignantly capture the vulnerability of women in scenarios of conflict: 
…customary law allowed only imperfect methods of enforcement; and it is in a 
procedural sense that the woman’s vulnerability becomes more apparent. A 
husband’s duties were of a moral or conventional nature; if he neglected them 
or abused his authority, his wife had no direct action against him. She was 
expected to appeal to her own father for protection; and his obligation was also 
nebulously conceived in morals and custom. As a last resort, the woman might 
appeal to her headman, but even in this instance she depended upon a man for 
her protection.527 
A woman’s inevitable dependence on a man placed her in a precarious position in 
instances of rape, especially in the marriage and stages leading up to marriage, like 
ukuthwala. Historical and ethnographic sources are useful for elucidating the relationship 
between marriage, familial demands, and sexual coercion. Put simply, as was apparent 
from the justifications provided for the marital rape exemption under common law, a 
wife’s rights came second to the needs of the husband and the preservation of the marriage 
and family ties.  
Due to the weight placed on marriage and family, under customary law “sexual 
assault was not consistently considered to be immoral, especially if it served a socially 
recognised purpose – such as precipitating marriage. The framework of marriage made it 
harder for the gravity of sexual violence against women to be recognised.”528 The different 
meaning given to sexual violence in marriage also rendered the abuse less visible to 
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outsiders, as wives were generally expected to endure it. The invisibility of the rapes 
perhaps makes clear why,  apart from its connection to the subject of ukuthwala, marital 
rape appears to be a non-issue in academic sources. Bennett asserts that customary law 
“remains untouched by controversies (like marital rape and wife-battering)…that have 
been topical in the common law.”529 The virtual absence of discussions on marital rape in 
sources on customary law speaks volumes. It evidences how sexual violence in marriage 
was not in itself perceived as an injustice based on the uxorial demands placed on wives, 
as well the right of husbands right to use some measure of coercion to subordinate their 
wives. It also points to the erasure of women’s experiences of violence in marriage.  
Historian Elisabeth Thornberry’s research on consent and rape in the Eastern Cape 
in the latter part of the 19th century sheds invaluable light on the obligatory subservience 
of wives and its relationship to marital rape: 
Men claimed the right to use force to command their wives’ obedience, 
including the fulfillment of sexual duties – although…this right was 
substantially limited in practice by women’s ability to seek refuge with their 
natal families…Women were expected to assent to their husbands’ demands 
for sex; the concept of marital rape would not have made sense to residents of 
precolonial Xhosaland, nor did it form part of the ideas about custom that 
circulated in the early colonial era.530 
Writing on the absence of rape in marriage in the historical record, Thornberry adds: 
Early colonial court cases contain numerous examples of women seeking to 
dissolve court cases on grounds of ill-treatment, including sexual abuse. One 
woman complained in court that her husband had attempted to insert a loaf 
of bread in her anus, while another told the court that her husband “never 
had connection with me once, but mauled me about in a most unmanly way.” 
By contrast, complaints of simply being forced to have sex are conspicuously 
absent in these records, suggesting that such an act did not rise to the level of 
a legitimate complaint. In precolonial and early colonial Xhosaland, then, a 
discourse of custom defined and circumscribed sexual behavior – particularly 
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for women. The forms of sexuality condoned by custom…assigned control 
over marriage to women’s families and male guardians.531 
Thornberry’s extensive research on sexual violence in the colonial Eastern Cape richly 
contextualises the ideas around marriage, sex and coercion that resonate to this day. The 
cases and records that Thornberry consulted confirm husbands’ privilege (albeit 
moderated by the protective mechanisms), the condoning of sexual coercion within 
marriage, the palpable silence on the subject of marital rape, and the power that men 
generally wielded over women. As the cases of sexual abuse that came before the courts 
displayed, husbands sexually abused their wives, yet, the subject of marital rape was not 
squarely confronted or spoken since it fall outside the parameters of customary protection.  
Thornberry did find evidence where women directly complained, but only in 
narrow circumstances where they were at liberty to do so: “… Xhosa women in 
polygynous marriages gained missionary support when they complained of marital rape 
more than one hundred and fifty years before South African law criminalized 
nonconsensual sex between spouses – albeit at the price of repudiating the validity of the 
marriage itself.”532 Thornberry’s findings should not be taken to mean that rescue from 
marital rape was only possible within a missionary setting, but that seeking relief using 
customary support structures was a circuitous process given the silence around marital 
rape, the expectation that wives be sexually available to their husbands, and the family’s 
control over a woman’s marriage.  
The literature which generically depicts the expectations placed upon wives at the 
communal level serves to place the violence of ukuthwala in context. Brutal abductions did 
not take place in a vacuum; they were part of a continuum of violence sanctioned under 
the banner of marriage. As an ideal, marriage was envisioned as a respectful symbiosis in 
which the husband holds more power but treats his wife in a considerate manner. But in 
tandem, a husband was granted the right to discipline and demand by force, this only 
                                               
531 Ibid., 64. 
532 Ibid., 115. 
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being tempered by whatever support the wife’s family provided. Custom did not wholly 
shield women from sexual violence.  
Though culture is ever changing, and an ethos of rights is growing in South Africa, 
patriarchy is also a part of modernity. In her research on the construction of gender 
identities amongst formally-educated adults raised in Zulu polygamous families, Mkhize 
documented the tenacity of the notion of a reified patriarchal “Zulu culture” amongst 
some of her research participants.533 Informants made statements such as: “Culture is 
culture. Women would be happier if they accepted that won’t change”; and “A woman is 
below a man and that is what it is, no amount of time, money and education will change 
that certain fact.”534  
One informant, a woman, sent an admonition to Mkhize, warning: “Tell this 
young woman who is conducting this research that it is good that she is highly educated 
but she must remember her place as a Zulu woman in our Zulu culture.”535 
Notwithstanding the lofty principles of the Constitution, a solid and broad human rights-
oriented legislative framework, and the fact that women have greater access to education 
and financial means than they did in the past, hetero-masculine cultures within South 
Africa resolutely live on.  
5.5 CONCLUSION  
The critiques in this chapter are not offered to justify the gendered violence of 
ukuthwala, nor to lend support to a cultural relativist position from which culture can serve 
as a defense to abuse of women. The present research aims solely to show that state and 
non-state responses to ukuthwala are precariously facile. As feminist legal scholar Razack 
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propounds, “(u)ntil we can actually see…communities in all their complexities, we have 
little chance of making spaces less violent.”536 While at face value the initiatives of 
government, scholars and non-profit organisations appear resolved in protecting women 
and girls by narrowing in on the damages wrought by ukuthwala abductions, this chapter 
elucidates how these responses are motivated by a discourse that is conspicuously divorced 
from the reality of marital rape. The ukuthwala crusade and script operate from a place of 
culturalism, casting customary practice as one-dimensional and homogenous.   
There are myriad erroneous assumptions about the nature of ukuthwala in the policy 
and legal realm, and the steps taken to curb the practice have had the effect of masking 
the mundanity of marital rape. Rape in marriage is not extraordinary; countless wives 
carry the physical and imperceptible scars of sexual abuse as they fulfill their quotidian 
roles and responsibilities. The sensationalised campaign around ukuthwala, which frames 
the rapes as atypical acts and attends to one age group, detracts from how sexual violence 
is not uncommonly countenanced prior to and within marriage.  
At face value the ukuthwala crusade is praiseworthy, shedding light on practices that 
were heretofore mainly hidden from outside scrutiny. In spite of its meaningful intentions, 
the discourse emerging from law and policy discourse is narrowly tailored to suit a legal 
positivist outlook of the extreme forms of this cultural practice. These narratives are 
silencing. Historian Peires writes that “(a)lthough the mantra of ‘custom’ is frequently 
invoked as a universal panacea to solve all problems and cure all ills,” certain applications 
of custom mark “the extent to which it serves as a mask, or even a blunt instrument.”537 
By insisting on uniformity, and a reliance upon written text and human rights-oriented 
archetypes of custom, the ukuthwala script eclipses the numerous ways in which ukuthwala 
is practiced, and shuts out the voices which attest to the longevity and typicality of sexual 
coercion within familial and intimate partner settings.  
                                               
536 Razack, “Imperilled Muslim Women,” 162. 
537 Jeff Peires, “History Versus Customary Law: Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes 
and Claims,” South African Crime Quarterly 49 (2014): 19. 
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Though custom is a variable entity, the dogmatism of the ukuthwala script 
perpetuates a dangerous fiction about the benevolence and homogeneity of customary 
practice. By yearning for a past that never existed, the current ukuthwala perspective that 
dominates policy and law developments disregards women’s realities. The fiction 
exacerbates the already conspicuous silence around ordinary marital rape in literature and 
public dialogue.  
There is much to be gained from a more subtle and critical analysis of the violence 
that accompanies ukuthwala. The more one moves away from the inclination to categorise, 
polish and tuck existences into discrete boxes, the greater room there is for the unearthing 
of women’s voices hitherto unheard, and phenomena previously distorted or concealed 
by outsiders, or even insider elites. As I stated earlier in this chapter, marital rape is not 
exceptional, and no amount of theoretical whitewashing can undo it. The next chapter 
counters the whitewashing and brings to the fore some of the challenges faced by marital 





6 Chapter 6: Uncertain Journeys: Barriers to Recourse-
seeking for Marital Rape Survivors 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
For many survivors of marital rape, the journey from abuse to liberation is 
tortuous. It is rarely defined by precise and calculated decisions about the next steps to 
take and grounded in certainty about what sources will bring succour. Various stumbling 
blocks abound.538 The unpredictability and difficulty of help-seeking for survivors arises 
from the fact that marital rape is unlike other forms of sexual violence and familial 
violence. It is bound up with a history of social, cultural and legal constraints on the female 
body; constraints that transformed a married woman into an ownable being that is easier 
to violate.539  
The previous chapters have elucidated that the state institutional sphere entrenched 
an inferior position for sexually abused wives, a position that was only officially undone 
beginning in the early 1990s. Even following the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993, 
and despite the gradual progression of the law with respect to women’s rights, judges 
continue to express qualms about the severity of marital rape. Further, the significant link 
between rape and the institution of marriage is absent from policy and academic 
discourses on ukuthwala. In spite of legislative, judicial and policy actions ostensibly aimed 
at protecting marital victims, the explorations of this thesis expose how state institutions 
have invisibilised marital rape.  
                                               
538 In the American context, the literature sheds light on the isolating, frustrating, and tortuous 
nature of help-seeking among marital rape survivors, and how their decisions are shaped by numerous 
considerations. See Patricia Peacock, “Marital Rape,” in Issues in Intimate Violence, ed. Raquel Kennedy 
Bergen (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), 230; Bergen, Wife Rape; Hanneke, Shields, and McCall, “Assessing 
the Prevalence.”; Frieze, “Investigating the Causes.” 
539 Gqola speaks of how certain categories of human beings are “throwaway people” – people who 
are easy to violate. Gqola, “Brutal Inheritances,” 211-13. 
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The profound state institutional dis-ease with marital rape detailed in the previous 
chapters evokes the hindrances that mark women’s encounters within social institutions. 
The present chapter travels out of the policy and legal realm and into the social and 
communal space. Developing the subject of institutions’ erasure of marital rape, I ask the 
question: In what ways do individual and local contexts hinder women’s ability to seek 
recourse for marital rape? This chapter illustrates how social, cultural and community 
forces thwart women’s efforts to secure safety, pushing marital rape further into a state of 
obscurity and placing women at greater risk of harm.  
The chapter documents the meandering journey of marital rape survivors through 
the lens of community workers who possess extensive experience in guiding and 
counselling them, as well as two survivors of coercive ukuthwala. The in-depth interviews 
that I conducted with court counsellors, social auxiliary workers (lay counsellors) and 
Thuthuzela Care Centre (TCC) staff from the non-profit organisations (NPOs) 
Masimanyane and Mosaic, uncovered resonant descriptions of the paths of marital rape 
survivor clients.540 Following the integrative model proposed by Belsky, I adopt an 
ecological approach to probe the conditions that circumvent survivors’ help-seeking 
processes.541 The ecological paradigm captures the multiplicity and interconnectedness of 
factors that shape individual experiences. The levels within the framework conceptualise 
an individual’s embeddedness within their immediate and broader environments.542  
In addition to the individual’s personal history, the ecological approach assesses the 
individual’s microsystem (family and social units); the macrosystem (the “larger cultural 
fabric in which the individual, the family, and the community are inextricably 
interwoven”); and the exosystem (which refers to structural factors such as socioeconomic 
                                               
540 Unless otherwise specified, I will generally use the term “counsellor” to encompass the various 
forms of staff, because they all do forms of counselling. 
541 Belsky, “Child Maltreatment.”; Edleson and Tolman, Intervention for Men Who Batter: An Ecological 
Approach; Heise, “Violence against Women.” 
542 Belsky, “Child Maltreatment,” 321, 27. 
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conditions, as well as larger social units).543 The mesosystem also forms part of the 
ecological framework, representing the linkages between an individual’s microsystem and 
institutions such as police, courts and social service institutions.544 The value of an 
ecological approach lies in uncovering the intricacies and diversity of women’s help-
seeking processes.   
Consequently, through the information provided by my informants, I seek to 
understand how individuals are socially positioned, to identify the relationships between 
the systems they are embedded in, and to portray how these interactions shape survivors’ 
paths. In this chapter I will demonstrate how factors such as individual social and cultural 
conditioning, economic reliance on the husband, complicity by families and churches in 
the abuse, and finally, poor training and ignorance by police, all create a climate that 
stifles women’s endeavours to obtain security.  
As the staff described survivors’ recourse-seeking stages, what became apparent is 
that most women address marital rape by happenstance. The facts of the sexual abuse and 
a realisation that the abuse constitutes rape primarily emerge through counselling, 
education and empowerment provided by the organisations. In this chapter I walk 
through the early stages of help-seeking to exhibit the circuitous process through which 
women come to acknowledge and seek recourse for the sexual violation of their bodies. I 
begin with the social and cultural impediments to women, transition to Masimanyane and 
Mosaic staff’s initial engagements with survivors, and conclude by describing taxing 
interactions with police and court systems. This data is drawn from the NPO staff as well 
as the survivors (who are interviewees 13 and 14).  
It must be noted too that although I use the term “marital rape,” not all counsellors 
use that term when speaking to their clients or educating groups of women. For a 
multitude of reasons that will be discussed, formal rape terminology generally does not 
resonate with intimate partner violence survivors, especially at the start of their journeys. 
                                               
543 Ibid., 320-21, 24, 27-28; Heise, “Violence against Women,” 264-65. 
544 Edleson and Tolman, Intervention for Men Who Batter: An Ecological Approach, Chapter 6. 
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Counsellors instead focus on identifying behavioural traits of the husbands and the 
emotions of the survivor in order to elicit occurrences of sexual abuse. The counsellors 
then  begin the education process.  
As the study of marital rape has grown more sophisticated, the research stresses the 
importance of being sensitive to language and terminology around sexual violence in 
marriage.545 The region and socio-cultural milieu in which one is immersed should 
determine the phraseology.546 Further, as opposed to reading marital rape as a clearly 
defined act that fits neatly into legal definitions, survivors’ realities lay bare that the acts 
of violence they are subjected to blend into one another and are intertwined. Hence it is 
more constructive to understand marital rape as a form of abuse occurring along a 
“continuum” of sexual and other violence, and this also leaves room for survivors’ self-
perceptions to develop and shift.547  
6.2 INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY DYNAMICS 
6.2.1  “This Problem Has Been Hiding”548: The Pervasiveness of Marital 
Rape  
The work that Masimanyane and Mosaic staff conduct with women confirms that 
marital rape commonly occurs amongst the married women whom they encounter. The 
subject is relevant to individually counselled clients as well as workshop participants. 
Certain counsellors related that during workshops, it is jarring for women to conceptualise 
of  sexual violence in marriage as rape, indicating that they have experienced it but defined 
it differently (Interviewees 8, 10). In other words, sexual violence in marriage is not rare 
or unusual. Rape takes place as part of a wider structure of abuse: verbal, psychological, 
physical and economic. Interviewees explained that rape in marriage is a “big problem” 
                                               
545 Martin, Taft, and Resick, “A Review of Marital Rape,” 334-35. 
546 Representing different regions of the world, the contributors in the recent publication, Marital 
Rape: Consent, Marriage, and Social Change in Global Context, use a variety of terms including forced sex, sexual 
assault, sexual abuse, reproductive abuse, intimate partner sexual violence; Yllö and Torres, Marital Rape, 4. 
547 Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence. 
548 Interviewee 3. 
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that “has been hiding,” and is accepted as normal by women for a range of reasons that 
will be further explored in this chapter (Interviewees 3-9, 11-16).  
Marital rape takes various shapes (Interviewees 1, 2, 6, 8, 9). Some of the clients 
reported that they succumbed to coerced sex out of a desire to prove to their husbands 
that they were not sleeping with anyone else. The perpetrators tend to impart blame onto 
the women, accusing them of cheating when they refuse to have sex. Women additionally 
recounted to the NPO staff that they submitted to the sexual violence in order to avoid 
physical, verbal and psychological abuse, which they perceive as worse. In cases where 
women refused sex, their husbands retaliated by beating them up.  
The community workers also recollected cases of clients subjected to sadistic rapes. 
On the day that I interviewed one of the Mosaic TCC workers, she was deeply shaken by 
a case from her weekend shift (Interviewee 4). A 55-year old woman came into the centre, 
dishevelled, overcome with pain, and barely able to walk. For the past five to six years her 
husband had been raping her with a broomstick each weekend when he was drunk, and 
her broken down body bore the wounds of this recurring cruelty.  
In another case reported to staff at one of the Mosaic court sites, a client told of 
how her husband asked her for sex late one night (Interviewee 6). She refused as she was 
menstruating. Her husband became incensed and began to swear at her and beat her. He 
retrieved a broom from the kitchen, broke it on her back and continued to assault her. 
Once he had finished beating her he declared, “Now I’m gonna take my sex. Remember 
one thing, I’m married to you.” He raped her until five in the morning. This was not the 
only case that my informants relayed about husbands beating wives and then raping them 
for hours until drained, nor that demonstrated extreme sadism. One husband tried to 
force a hammer into the vagina of his pregnant wife saying “my penis is nothing, that’s 
why you sleep around” (Interviewee 9). 
The scenarios of marital rape shared by the informants disinters the extreme 
brutality that women endure within their marriages. This comports with the experiences 
reported by Kottler in her interviews with marital rape survivors, some of who had been 
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raped with weapons (bottles, brooms, knives), had been raped after being severely 
battered, and had been raped frequently (30 times per week).549 In her study of divorced 
and married women in Mitchell’s Plain, Cape Town, Boonzaier found that over half of 
the participants who she interviewed had been sexually abused by their husbands.550 
Paralleling the types of sexual coercion reported by Masimanyane and Mosaic, the women 
in Boonzaier’s study recounted giving in to sex out of fear of sexual abuse, fears of threats 
of physical harm should they refuse sex, battering prior to being raped, and being battered 
for refusing sex.551 
Cultural practices also fuel sexual violence in marriage as is evident in the context 
of ukuthwala. The Masimanyane staff who work in the ukuthwala project conveyed that rape 
took place in all of the cases they looked at in the specific rural locales where their project 
is based (Interviewees 15, 16). This coincides with findings from other ethnographic 
studies in the Eastern Cape affirming that rape is not an uncommon part of the thwala 
process.552 That does not mean that sexual violence is part of abductions in every area in 
which ukuthwala is practiced; there is great diversity in the practice, contingent upon 
regional and temporal influences.553 Nevertheless, there are areas where the coercive 
forms predominate.  
Speaking to ukuthwala as practiced decades ago in their communities, my 
informants described the process as follows (Interviewees 11-14). After a woman is 
abducted she is taken to the homestead of the “husband” and kept in a room. On that 
day, or a few days after her arrival, a man is sent inside the room and directs her that they 
must have sex. This is when the abducted girl discovers who her husband is. Where the 
girl is strong and fights back, the peers of the husband hold her down in order for him to 
                                               
549 On the subjective realities of wife rape, see Kottler, “Wives’ Subjective Definitions,” Chapter 
7, 182-239. 
550 Boonzaier, “Woman Abuse,” 65. 
551 Ibid., 65-70.  
552 Rice, “Ukuthwala in Rural South Africa,” 398; Wood, “Contextualizing Group Rape,” 313. 
553 Nkosi and Wassermann, “A History of the Practice.”; Smit, “Rights, Violence.” 
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rape her. Over generations, rape served the purpose of securing the marriage, for now the 
body and status of girl/woman was irretrievably transformed. Rape also had practical 
utility. To prevent the girl from running away the would-be husband would brutally rape 
her so that she was unable to walk due to the trauma to her underdeveloped body. In 
some communities, family and others stood outside of the room, listening to ensure that 
the marriage is consummated, if even by force. Another historical feature of the practice 
is that after taking the girls’ virginity the man presented a cloth stained with blood to prove 
to the elders that the new bride was in fact a virgin.  
When I asked the Masimanyane ukuthwala project staff whether the communities 
in which they conduct advocacy explicitly voiced that rape is a part of their ukuthwala 
practice, the staff looked at me with perplexed countenances (Interviewees 15, 16). They 
explained that community leaders do not meet and declare that rape is an accepted norm. 
The sexual violence simply happens and continues to happen over generations, and is 
organically established as an agreed upon practice. Addressing how violent forms of 
ukuthwala became entrenched, one of the staff of the Masimanyane ukuthwala project 
remarked: “And the way in which we have kind of understood it…in respect to referrals 
that we have done and having the experience of women, older women, old, old women and 
the younger generation, you will find that this pattern, or the way in which the practice is 
being done, it has been the same!” (Interviewee 15).  
Mwambene and Kruuse’s interviews with the family and community of 
Mvumeleni Jezile (the husband in the Jezile ukuthwala High Court case) in the Eastern 
Cape, are also revelatory. They bring into focus how, in the eyes of some  communities, 
the institution of marriage nullifies claims of rape on the part of the woman. One 
participant they spoke to stated adamantly: “I want to emphasise the part about rape, he 
did not rape her, he was following his custom.”554 Resoundingly, the participants 
                                               
554 Mwambene and Kruuse, “The Thin Edge of the Wedge,” 33. 
 165 
appeared incredulous that a man could be convicted for rape since, according to their 
norms, marriage rendered sex consensual.555   
The data provided by the informants at Masimanyane and Mosaic depicts the 
forms that sexual violence in marriage takes, and how it recurs from the beginning of 
marriage processes and throughout the duration of marriages. Their knowledge, and the 
literature make plain that the very deeply embedded social norms negate a woman’s right 
to claim rape in marriage. What compounds women’s inability to leave or resist is the fact 
that they have been inculcated into ways of thinking that privilege men’s wants in 
marriage. I discuss this in the following section.     
6.2.2  “They Thought Maybe it had to Happen That Way”556: Women 
Socialised to Suffer in Marriage 
Culturally and socially enforced sexual entitlement held by men fuels the 
continuation of marital rape, and the erasure of the scale of the violence. Marriage gives 
men the right to demand and take sex by force, and by normative standards, this violence 
does not rise to the level of rape. Through advice passed on by elders, and the standards 
to which women are held in their respective communities, women enter marriages with 
the expectation that they are not equal to their husbands, and are instead beholden to 
him, and wider family directives (Interviewees 3, 8, 9, 11-12). The staff at both NPOs 
reported that women marry with little awareness of what their rights are. There is lack of 
consciousness in communities about what constitutes domestic violence and rape within 
marriage (Interviewees 3, 8, 9, 11-12). This is not to say that the language of the law and 
human rights is the only way that survivors should conceive of their experiences; it should 
not be. Rather, the goal of feminist work such as that of Mosaic and Masimanyane is to 
assist their clients in seeing their experiences in ways that privilege their own well-being 
and that foster safety and greater autonomy where possible.  
                                               
555 Ibid., 32. 
556 Interviewee 3. 
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Not infrequently, the payment of lobola plays a determinative role in how women 
and men conceive of their rights and roles within the marriage. Studies in South Africa 
attest to the inexorable association between the payment of lobola and a husband’s 
unfettered powers. In Singleton’s ethnographic study in Mpophomeni township, located 
in the uMgungundlovu Municipality of KwaZulu-Natal, the subject of lobola featured 
prominently in distinctions made between rape and coercive sex. “Forced sex is demand 
of sex from my husband,” one young woman clarified, “[but] I would never say ‘My 
husband raped me,’ because my husband paid lobola for me. My boyfriend paid nothing 
for me, so that is rape.”557 The three province Medical Research Council study in 1999 
recorded that, although women’s own personal views differed, 74% reported that their 
culture dictated that if a man paid lobola, it meant that the wife could not refuse him sex.558  
Through my interviews, similar outlooks emerged. The counsellors relayed that 
women who have been married customarily through lobola tend not to conceive of forced 
sex as rape (Interviewees 3, 9). One Mosaic staff member recounted that some women 
thought that sex had to happen in this violent manner because the husbands would remind 
them that lobola had been paid, and therefore they could have sex anytime they wanted to 
(Interviewee 3).  
There are clients who did not perceive of their husbands’ behaviour as abuse; and 
were unaware of their ability to report their husbands for rape (Interviewees 2-4, 8, 9). 
The persistence of marital rape amongst Black and rural women was explained in racial 
and cultural terms: “… I think to us… you will find in our culture… the other languages 
are understand that this is rape, like a white people they will understand that this is rape. 
But to us, you know, it will not be easy especially those that are coming in rural areas” 
(Interviewee 8).   
It is known that marital rape exists across all racial and economic groups, and the 
perception that marriage gives husbands a right to “sexual intercourse on demand” is not 
                                               
557 Singleton, “The South African Sexual Offences Act,” 67. 
558 Jewkes et al., “He Must Give,” 8-9. 
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unique to South Africa, nor to Black South Africans.559 Van der Westhuizen writes of how 
within White Afrikaans communities, a “discourse of denial buttresses intra-family 
violence.”560 Speaking to how some Afrikaans men hold violently enforced power over 
women, one of van der Westhuizen’s informants stated, “(My mom of 70+ years old) 
says… ‘If your husband has to have sex, my child, then you have to (oblige).’”561 There 
are undoubtedly parallels across racial groups.  
Notwithstanding commonalities, the perspectives of the NPO staff concerning 
rural Black populations foregrounds the consequence of language and naming at the 
individual and local level. Through her extensive work with survivors of sexual violence, 
Kelly underscores the magnitude of naming in survivors’ healing and empowerment 
processes. She writes that, “In order to define something, a word has to exist with which 
to name it…The name, once known, must be applicable to one’s own experience.”562 The 
NPO counsellors’ opinions on whiteness implicate two kinds of naming. The first points 
to the absence of a locally resonant and internally derived vocabulary for sexual violence 
in marriage in some Black communities.563 The second form of naming applies not just to 
Black communities but all survivors, and that concerns individual perceptions of violence. 
For a survivor to begin to acknowledge the abuse they must “develop names and 
definitions of sexual violence that accurately reflect… experiences from their own frames 
of reference.”564 This form of naming is not imposed; instead it comes from self-processing 
                                               
559 For discussions of patriarchal entitlement and familial violence in Afrikaans communities see 
Christi van der Westhuizen, Sitting Pretty: White Afrikaans Women in Postapartheid South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: 
UKZN Press, 2017). Within the American context, see Raquel Kennedy Bergen, Issues in Intimate Violence 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), 238. 
560 van der Westhuizen, Sitting Pretty, 164-65. 
561 Ibid., 161. 
562Kelly, “How Women Define,” 114.  
563 Recall from Chapter 5 that under the cultural and legal frameworks of some Black South 
African populations, rape in marriage was not recognised as a crime. 
564 Kelly, “How Women Define,” 132. 
 168 
and contemplation.  
The counsellors repeatedly stressed that their clients do not have a name for what 
they are experiencing, and don’t necessarily conceive of it as abuse even though it causes 
immense physical and emotional harm. This theme came through as counsellors described 
their clients’ views in different ways: “They don’t regard that as a rape”; “that man abused 
me for all these years and I didn’t know it”; “they thought maybe it had to happen that 
way because this man would say, I paid lobola”; “the rape issue, it’s like a normal thing.” 
(Interviewees 2-4, 9).   
The fact that survivors who do not have a name for the abuse still end up seeking 
help evinces the gravity of their pain. The clients are traumatised and worn down by the 
abuse, although they may not have the language to articulate it. In these scenarios, the 
counsellors play a role in drawing out the suffering (Interviewees 1-3, 6, 8, 9). A court 
counsellor from Masimanyane summed up her interactions with clients: “They don’t 
think… that this is rape but emotionally it’s hurt them,” she said. She elaborated how one 
client had said, “Sisi… it was so painful when he took my underwear off, and then he 
didn’t even took my underwear off, he just torn them, you know, and then open my legs…  
and then put his penis” (Interviewee 8). The counsellor then asked the client what she was 
doing during that time. The client responded: “I was just lying because he’s gonna beated 
me, and then turn my face on the side, and then he carry on.” The counsellor responded: 
“At that time doing that, how do you feel?” The counsellor continued, “‘[y]hu Sisi’… she’s 
crying, crying [she snaps fingers]. Then it’s where I found that it’s hurting them. Whether 
they don’t regard that as a rape but it’s hurt, it’s hurt” (Interviewee 8).  
By assisting the clients to connect to their emotions, the counsellors bring the pain 
of the abuse to the surface. This encourages the clients to accept that what they are 
subjected to in their marriage is hurting them. When a client describes the sexual abuse, 
another counsellor said that she asks, “how do you feel? How do you feel about that?” 
(Interviewee 9). As the client connects with her emotions, the counsellor begins to educate 
her, asking her “do you know what is rape?” This happens through counselling over 
several sessions.  
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Without an outlet, women endure extreme levels of violence and go for long 
periods of time in silence. When Masimanyane first began its ukuthwala work in Eastern 
Cape, the older women said that they supported the project in terms of its work with 
younger women and girls, but they had a specific request: “You must start with us because 
we are still carrying the scars of this practice… we are still there in these marriages… 
because of our children” (Interviewees 15, 16). It was only in their mature years that these 
women, through the intervention of Masimanyane, could feel safe enough to name the 
violations and ask for support.  
Some women have enough self-awareness and courage to articulate their rights 
and to leave on their own (Interviewees 9, 10, 15, 16). In the past, women would enact 
cultural methods of protest such as entering and protesting in the in-law’s kraal, or 
smearing excrement on their face.565 Instances of protest aside, one point that 
Masimanyane staff consistently relayed is that [Xhosa] women “learn to stay in their 
marriages” (Interviewee 12). In the training that older women provide to young women 
entering marriage, they instruct them to obey and not argue with their husbands. 
Consequently, even if the marriage is unhappy the women persevere because 
perseverance is the marker of a good and respectful wife (Interviewees 8, 11-14).  
6.2.3 “They Learn to Stay in Their Marriages”566: Family and Community 
Pressure and Ostracisation  
The inculcation by elders ties in the role of family and the community at large in 
pressing women to remain in abusive marriages. There is an entanglement of constraints 
that deter women from reporting abuse or leaving their marriages. More often than not, 
women communicated to the counsellors that they had informed both families, but were 
                                               
565 According to the practices of some isiXhosa-speaking communities, when a makoti (wife) is 
seeking to rebel against her circumstances, there are cultural acts she can do so that she is taken back to her 
paternal home. A makoti is not allowed to go into the in-law’s kraal, but Masimanyane explained that 
especially in the case of ukuthwala, if a woman were brave enough, she would enter the kraal, do something 
bizarre, and then be taken back to her own family (Interviewees 15, 16). Also see van Tromp, Xhosa Law of 
Persons, 17, 33. 
566 Interviewee 12. 
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discouraged from seeking help, and began to distrust their own judgment (Interviewees 2, 
3, 7, 9). Another issue is that where the man is the financial provider for both the wife and 
the wife’s family, when the wives try to seek protection from their families they are turned 
away (Interviewee 3). The families retort that they received lobola and are not able to pay 
it back, so the makoti must return to the marriage no matter how horrible it is.  
Families (both sides) also express scepticism that marital rape has taken place 
(Interviewee 2). They assume that because the husband is cheating or has moved on, the 
wife is using the rape allegation as revenge. For ukuthwala the possibility of escaping is 
extremely thin where the girl/woman’s family was part of the negotiations. The families 
say: “No, we know you are there, that is your family now, that is your new family, you 
must stay there” (Interviewee 15). Lobola has been paid, and the male elders have already 
determined the fate of their daughters. Some survivors thought it futile to seek help from 
their parents (fathers especially), since they were responsible for them being abducted in 
the first place, knowing the forms of brutality that awaited them (Interviewees 11-14).  
Fear of community perceptions and tainting the husband’s reputation is also a 
factor in survivors’ minds (Interviewees 3, 8, 9). The potential stigma of being a divorced 
woman, and a preoccupation with the husband’s reputation, weigh heavy on clients’ 
consciences. Clients have asked how they could move forward in their claims when their 
husbands are well known church ministers, or persons of high standing in the community. 
In instances where the husband is respected in the community, it is harder for the wife to 
be believed (Interviewee 3). Connected to this, churches also contribute to the abuse, and 
in fact, Masimanyane staff related that they have come across numerous cases of pastors 
abusing their wives, including sexually (Interviewees 8, 9). One woman reported to her 
church, that her husband – the priest of the church – was abusive. The church advised 
her to stay, telling her that everything would be fine (Interviewee 8, 9).  
In rural settings where traditional authority structures are in place, women are at 
greater pains to secure assistance (Interviewees 11, 12). Masimanyane reported that if the 
family refuses to assist, a woman cannot speak on her behalf in filing a grievance within 
the traditional hierarchy. It is her family that has to approach the chief, and the road to 
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the chief is very long. There are many steps that must be taken. After the reporting to the 
elders, the case must then be taken to the isibonda.567 As a rule, you must be represented 
by a male (an uncle, brother, father) in all the venues, and if you do not follow the right 
procedures before going to the chief, the chief’s guards will send you back to your in-laws. 
Despite commonalities, the processes and options differ in communities, and there is 
variation in how people address disputes at the local level.568 People draw from different 
institutions, for example using a mixture of civil law, criminal law and traditional 
institutions.569   
The disinclination on the part of some traditional leaders to intervene is connected  
to the fact that they themselves are benefiting from the practice of ukuthwala (Interviewees 
15, 16). At the Palmerton Child Care Centre in Lusikisiki, a safe haven for girls escaping 
ukuthwala, the Centre staff reported to Masimanyane that their lives are at risk because of 
the work that they do. They are upsetting the traditional leaders’ determination to protect 
the practice as part of their culture, and to enjoy the benefits they receive from the 
practice. There are men gaining financially and otherwise from ukuthwala, and because of 
this, advocacy around ukuthwala poses a threat to their systems of profit.  
Men hold considerable power over women in terms of the abductions, but  women 
too benefit, for the hierarchies of power in rural communities are simultaneously tied to 
age. Based on her 17 months of ethnographic work in a Bomvana community of the 
Eastern Cape, Rice dismantled the assumption that ukuthwala is the “manifestation of an 
inflexible and hobbling patriarchy in which women are powerless.”570 She recounts cases 
where older women organised abductions for younger members of their family and by 
doing so significantly increased their social standing and standard of living.571 In one case, 
                                               
567 Isibonda is the isiXhosa word for a headman. 
568 See generally Mnisi Weeks, Access to Justice and Human Security: Cultural Contradictions in Rural South 
Africa. 
569 Ibid., 61. 
570 Rice, “Ukuthwala in Rural South Africa,” 392. 
571 Ibid., 392-395. 
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a widowed mother who had approved of the abduction refused to rescue her daughter 
from her abusive marriage until she learned that her daughter had been gang-raped by 
her husband and his peers.572 Mfono also tells of a case where a mother allowed her 
daughter to be thwala-ed in order to profit financially.573 
There are other barriers. In certain rural areas of the Eastern Cape, the stigma of 
being a divorcee or having run away from a marriage instituted through ukuthwala is 
consequential (Interviewees 11-14). According to cultural beliefs, when you leave a 
marriage, whether by running away or through divorce, you are labelled a failure. The 
community gives women who leave their marriages the derogatory name mabuya kwendeni 
and isolates them. Community shaming makes it difficult for organisations like 
Masimanyane to address marital rape. Women are reluctant to leave for fear of being 
victim to community disapprobation.  
For young girls who are thwelwe there is also the question of where they fit in the 
community once they escape their marriages (Interviewees 11-14). If a girl returns home 
she enters a liminal space. As a young girl who was married and is no longer a virgin, she 
is not able to participate in age cohort events. She cannot wear the traditional mini-skirt, 
go to school, or take part in social festivities. Now carrying the status of umfazi,574 she must 
wear conservative attire, such as the long skirt and other garments. A preponderance of 
the abducted girls that Rice interviewed were able to return home, but that is only because 
their families disapproved of the marriages.575 While aware of their human rights to not 
be forced into marriage, the rest of the interviewees decided to remain in their marriages. 
Reporting their parents would “violate their obligation towards and love for their 
                                               
572 Ibid., 396. 
573 Mfono, “The Custom of Bride Abduction,” 78. 
574 A woman.  
575 Rice notes that it is hard to draw generalisations about why the families rejected the marriages, 
but she does provide some discuss some potential motivations. See Rice, “Ukuthwala in Rural South 
Africa,” fn 52. 
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parents… the local structures of gerontocratic authority had far more bearing on their 
circumstances.”576  
Mirroring the inputs of the informants in the present study, the participants in 
Rice’s research also communicated that to rebel against the marriage would ascribe them 
an unsettled and difficult status. One young woman whom Rice interviewed said that if 
she left her marriage, she would end up “child at home alone,” meaning a child without 
practical and collective support from her family, an impossible state in which to exist.577 
Prior to the emergence of the ukuthwala crusade, a survivor whom Mfono interviewed also 
shared that she knew that her forced marriage was against the law and that she could seek 
help from social workers, but that without her family’s support, community social workers 
would hesitate to become involved and risk upsetting her family.578 In parallel with Mfono 
and Rice’s findings, the voices of the women in this study clearly express how family and 
community relationships weave a constraining web around the lives of survivors; a web 
that survivors cannot easily extricate themselves from.   
6.2.4 “And if I Do Decide to go, Where do I go?”579: Economic Insecurity  
Compounding the indistinct and isolated status that may come with leaving one’s 
marriage, there is also the very practical concern of finances. Throughout a survivor’s 
recourse-seeking journey she is greeted by the prospect of not having financial support 
where she and her children have been economically dependent on the husband 
(Interviewees 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10). Husbands use this as leverage over their wives. They 
threaten that if they are reported to the police and go to jail, there will be no one to feed 
the family, no one to pay the bills, and the bank will take the house. Even when women 
do begin the process of opening a case, the staff reported that one of the central reasons 
that they withdraw is fear of financial insecurity (Interviewees 4, 5). The survivor will 
obtain medical treatment and trauma counselling, and then stop at that point. The 
                                               
576 Ibid., 396. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Mfono, “The Custom of Bride Abduction,” 79. 
579 Interviewee 6. 
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challenges of leaving the husband are augmented where the woman is living far away from 
her family. In Cape Town, where wives travel with their husbands from the Eastern Cape 
and have little social and material support apart from their husbands, the feasibility of 
departing the marriage is limited further (Interviewee 3).  
Conveying the difficulties of moving away from the husband, a court counsellor 
from Mosaic stated: “It’s very difficult for the victim to pack up and leave. There are so 
many things to take into consideration, so, people are staying there for years, and people 
die there. If they didn’t get help quick enough, people are dying there” (Interviewee 7). 
Going to the shelter is not a long-term solution. Even though there are shelters for abused 
women in the Cape Town area, they are very full (the situation may differ in the Eastern 
Cape, and Masimanyane also established its own shelter). Although there are shelters that 
will take women in if they have children with them, the social auxiliary workers struggle 
to place their clients (Interviewees 2, 4). Moreover, even if the woman does find a place at 
the shelter, she is only allowed to stay for three months. The staff make attempts to find 
the clients a job while they are at the shelter, but they reported that this is difficult where 
the clients do not have the requisite skills.  
Lastly, after a woman has stayed at a shelter for three months, she is barred from 
seeking sanctuary at other shelters in the area in future. There is a policy against “shelter 
hopping” (Interviewee 2). If a survivor stays in the shelter for three months and 
circumstances at home do not change, what does she do? And where does she go? These 
are the rhetorical questions that the interviewees presented, driving home the point that 
leaving the marriage may be an impossible option for their clients (Interviewees 2, 6, 7).  
6.3 SEEKING RECOURSE FROM FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
6.3.1 Approaching Institutions: “They Come with the Presenting Problem” 
A theme that recurrently surfaced during the interviews is that clients do not report 
sexual violence as their foremost concern when they come to the police, the courts, and to 
the NPOs. With the continuous physical, verbal, economic and psychological assaults on 
their beings, and the social tolerance of sexual violence in marriage, marital rape is not at 
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the centre of women’s minds, choices and words as they enter institutions of recourse. 
They enter these spaces carrying untold trauma and an accumulation of iniquities, and 
only disclose the forms of abuse they perceive as being critical to their survival.  
As court staff at Mosaic put it, “they come with the presenting problem,” the 
problem they believe is at the core of their suffering, but which in actuality only represents 
a fragment of the broader amalgam of harms they live through (Interviewees 6, 7).580 As I 
pressed interviewees to speak to the issue of sexual violence, their responses were telling. 
One social auxiliary worker declared, “no, no, no, no, no… it’s not your core issue, the 
sexual thingy, it’s the physical and emotional and psychological and economical” 
(Interviewee 2). The informants continually stressed that economic, verbal, and physical 
abuse are their clients’ predominant concerns (Interviewees 2, 6-9).  
Research on the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) accords 
with the counsellors’ observations. In dissecting applications for protection orders in Cape 
Town, Mitchell’s Plain and George, Parenzee, Artz and Moult found that the two most 
common bases for seeking an order were physical and psychological abuse.581 Economic 
abuse was listed as a basis more than sexual abuse.582 Most of the applicants in the court 
cases they studied were wives seeking protection from husbands.583 An empirical study on 
perceptions of marital rape amongst prosecutors and defence attorneys in Ontario, 
Canada also provides an interesting parallel. The prosecutors whom Lazar interviewed 
observed that sexual violence is normally not reported, however the rape surfaces as the 
                                               
580 At Mosaic, staff related that some women are motivated to come to the courts when there is 
another woman involved. They want the courts to help them get rid of their husband’s mistress, without 
delving into the mistreatment at home. 
581 Penny Parenzee, Lillian Artz, and Kelley Moult, Monitoring the Implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Act: First Research Report, 2000-2001 (Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 
2001), 41. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid., 27. 
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survivors testify about physical abuse in the marriage.584  
As Kelly’s continuum of violence illustrates, the forms of abuse “merge,” which 
prompted one prosecutor in Lazar’s study to rhetorically ask: “(H)ow do you separate out 
the horror, he is punching you in the face and he is raping you, it is all horrible, which 
one is more horrible and which one do you tell the police about?”585 What the clients 
choose to articulate is based on what they deem central to their survival and well-being, 
as well as considerations of potential responses by authorities. Clients prefer to present 
issues that they believe the authorities will find easier to address, since the courts are 
perceived as hostile environments.586   
Survivors are also reluctant to disclose experiences of marital rape due to the belief 
that a husband is entitled to sex. There have been cases where the woman will come for 
the protection order, asking the husband to stop beating her and insulting her, but if the 
court does ask about sexual abuse she will retort, “he’s still my husband” (Interviewee 2). 
As sex is considered a private and sacred issue in some communities and households, the 
clients also feel deep shame and guilt in speaking of sex-related matters with their 
husbands – whether before the courts or in counselling with the NPO staff. Even after the 
protection order is obtained and the staff continue the counselling sessions with the client, 
when they ask the client whether she would like to address the sexual abuse, a typical 
response is, “[n]o Sisi, I only want to do this protection order, just him not to beated me 
again, I cannot say he must not sleep to me” (Interviewee 8). The interviewees were 
adamant that is it extremely rare that a client will say upfront that her husband is abusing 
her sexually (Interviewees 1-2, 6-9).  
In circumstances where the client does not consciously articulate the sexual abuse, 
it typically surfaces out in one of two ways. The first, discussed in depth by Masimanyane 
                                               
584 Lazar, “The Vindictive Wife,” 27-28. 
585 Ibid., 27. 
586 Interviewee 2; Parenzee, Artz, and Moult, “Monitoring the Implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Act: First Research Report, 2000-2001,” 107. 
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staff, is that women speak of rape in their marriage in passing (Interviewees 8-9). As they 
are articulating their unhappiness at home, the clients will mention sexual coercion 
casually – not to highlight that it is a discrete form of abuse – but to air their general 
frustration about the marriage. A counsellor at Masimanyane described it as such: “... if 
people are married… in their story they talk about that, saying that, ‘yes, he is forcing me 
to have sex with him although I don’t want to’ but to this woman, it’s not an issue, you see 
that, she’s just telling me but I’m trying to educate her” (Interviewee 9). This pattern is 
emblematic of how women enter marriages with limited awareness of their right and 
ability to negotiate the terms of sex with their husbands. Where sex is designated as an 
unqualified right of the husband, wives are unable to characterise the coercion and 
brutality as abuse and rape. 
Given the social and cultural barriers to recognition of rape in marriage, the staff 
who counsel clients refrain from using the term “rape” right away. Instead – and this is 
the second manner in which the issue comes into the open – the NPO counsellors walk 
the clients through the different forms of abuse and ask them questions about how sex 
takes place in their relationships (Interviewees 2, 3, 6-9). In the next chapter I delve into 
how clients are educated and empowered, but before that takes place, the counsellors must 
first ascertain whether there is sexual abuse and how it happens. A counsellor at 
Masimanyane relayed the gradual process: 
So then as you continue with her, you know, interviewing her, and give her 
counselling and… I didn’t want, she, she wouldn’t even say, “he raped 
me,” (s)he will say “he slept with me without a condom and I was saying 
no, I was saying no and then he force himself to me,” you know, she doesn’t 
mention the name rape, or sexual assault, you know… So you will just 
continue with that person and then you will only state when you will assist 
her to write also that he abused her sexually and then it was not a first time, 
this thing it was continuous. But, what I’m trying to say, when they come, 
the women, they come for a physical abuse, and other form of abuse. Then, 
this, it will come after as a counsellor you dig and on the session, then it 
will come (Interviewee 8). 
The task of drawing out the fact and nature of sexual abuse is thus a purposeful and 
sensitive undertaking on the part of the counsellors at Masimanyane and Mosaic. It 
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requires expertise, patience and empathy, and trust between the counsellor and survivor, 
for survivors bury the wounds of marital rape very deeply. Kottler’s study attests to this. 
Some of the survivors she spoke did not tell their experiences of marital rape even within 
the shelters they were housed in where counsellors were available.587 A few shared their 
stories for the first time during the interviews with Kottler.588 
There are cases where the physical trauma of the rape is so apparent that it must 
immediately be addressed (for example the TCC client raped with a broomstick). I return 
to the story of the Mosaic client whose husband had beaten her with a broom and raped 
her overnight after she refused to have sex with him because she was menstruating 
(Interviewee 6). That woman initially sought help for her injured finger at a pharmacy. 
The chemist looked at her finger with concern and advised her to go to the hospital as it 
looked like her finger was broken. That physical injury prompted her to go to Mosaic on 
the Monday. Apart from such cases of evident physical injury, the norm is that the 
counsellors play a vital part in bringing sexual abuse in marriage into the open.   
6.3.2 Police and Court Environments and Responses  
Each survivor’s experience with government bodies is influenced by the levels of 
training, resources and personal inclinations of the state authorities they encounter. As 
Street Level Bureaucrats (SLBs), lower-ranking members of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) and court clerks (who represent the Department of Justice), are essentially 
the face of their respective institutions as they directly engage with and provide services to 
the public.589 The decisions of these state actors are a determinative factor in whether and 
how citizens are able to access government resources. It is tempting to read SLBs through 
a homogenising lens – to see them either as fully embodying and applying that which is 
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588 Ibid., 107.  
589 Street Level Bureaucracy theory stems from the discipline of sociology, and there are various 
models postulating  how they should ideally operate to best serve the public. It is often associated with the 
foundational work of Michael Lipsky. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
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mandated by directives and laws, or alternatively to perceive them as subjective human 
beings who act based on prejudices and preferences. In implementing a more adaptable 
view of SLBs, Moult comments that, “viewing street-level bureaucrats as either ‘state-
agents’ or ‘citizen-agents’ would seem to be artificial and polemic.”590  
In her study of the how court clerks in South Africa exercise discretion in domestic 
violence cases, Moult established that court clerks are in actuality both “gatekeepers and 
rights keepers.” On the one hand, they endeavour to “provide that ‘maximum protection 
from violence’ for the largest number of complainants, including in some cases, clients 
who did not immediately seem to qualify under the Act.”591 On the other hand, the 
“severe systematic constraints” in which clerks work (safety risks, busy courts, limited court 
staff, and lack of physical resources), compounded by subjective re-shaping of which cases 
are “legitimate,” means that access to justice is uneven and locality-dependent.592  
In line with Moult’s position, while I address the shortcomings of the state 
institutions, my research also highlights their good intentions and efficacy. The present 
chapter and the subsequent one characterise the seemingly contradictory nature of police 
and courts. I draw out these inconsistencies to provide context for the diversity and at 
times unpredictability of clients’ experiences. 
6.3.2.1 Lack of Police Training: “They Don’t Know, they’re coming from the Camp” 
Both Masimanyane and Mosaic have partnerships with Magistrate’s Courts and 
SAPS.  As a result of these partnerships, some of their offices are located right in/adjacent 
to the police stations and courts, and they work together with the authorities to provide 
services to clients. At times the SLBs rely heavily upon the organisations.  The court clerks 
and SAPS – including the police staffing the Domestic Violence office at police stations – 
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Administration of Justice in South Africa” (Phd diss., Faculty of the School of Public Affris, American 
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send clients straight to Mosaic or Masimanyane for advice and for assistance with filling 
out forms and writing affidavits. Interviewees noted that a certain locales it is as though 
they are expected to do the authorities’ job for them. Another interesting aspect of the 
NPOs’ work is that in the past they conducted training for the police, educating them 
about protection order procedures and other matters. Some Mosaic offices no longer do 
these workshops and one counsellor remarked that presently police are not as well 
informed about protection orders (Interviewee 3).  
The lack of police training and transfer of knowledge concerning domestic 
violence procedures is a source of apprehension within the organisations, for it means that 
the NPOs are constantly performing the role of watchdogs, calling attention to, and 
rectifying mistakes and ignorance on the part of the state actors (Interviewees 3, 4, 8, 9). 
Nonetheless, there are police stations that perform better than others. In both the Western 
Cape and Eastern Cape locations, informants remarked that the police attending to 
persons who walk in to the stations are usually fresh from training camps. Stationed at the 
front lines so to speak they must follow through on established procedures which are 
designed to protect domestic violence victims, yet these police exhibit a blatant naïveté 
about what they are mandated to do.  
The danger is that some police proceed based on their own assumptions about 
domestic violence procedures, or they follow the erroneous procedures that have taken 
root at their stations (Interviewees 3, 8, 9). A counsellor at Mosaic said that one gross 
misperception is that protection orders expire (Interviewee 3). When women take the 
order to the police so that it can be enforced, the police tell them it has expired. That 
Mosaic office has been battling this issue for years. The counsellor explained the police do 
not understand that once it is granted by the court, the order is “permanent up until you 
die.”   
Prior to the intervention of Masimanyane staff, at one of the local police stations 
the police tended to serve the interim protection order and let the perpetrator sign it, 
without issuing him the return of service (Interviewee 9). Following the issuance of an 
interim protection order by a Magistrate, the court cannot proceed – and therefore a final 
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order cannot be issued – unless there is proof of the return of service. The NPO staff have 
been compelled to teach the police how to read protection orders and how to follow the 
correct procedures.  
Police officers are not without their own concerns about their limitations. Some 
come to the NPO staff for assistance, exasperated with being ill-informed about what their 
job entails. A Masimanyane court counsellor recounted that the officers say: “(W)e really, 
really don’t understand this Act of Domestic Violence, especially how to serve the 
protection order, because when these trainings come to the province, the Station 
Commissioners will go by themselves, will take all those police that are in a higher position 
to go and attend that training.” (Interviewee 9). The police in higher ranks who go to the 
training do not update the rank and file members about what they have learned 
(Interviewees 3, 9). The current state of affairs results in the newer officers remaining 
confused about how to properly carry out their duties, for example, how to serve the return 
of service (Interviewee 9).   
While there are explicit laws, directives and rules in place to ensure the efficient 
and impactful operation of the police force, at the local level the implementation is flawed 
and haphazard. Although South Africa is 24 years into its democracy, the SAPS remains 
beset by myriad inefficiencies.593 The study on the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of rape cases in South Africa report (RAPSSA) released in 2017 found that 
in 50% of the rape cases, the investigating officers were of the lowest rank, yet they are the 
ones who have the least amount of training and resources.594 There is clearly a dire need 
for better police training and advocacy, for at present survivors cannot rely upon the 
promises carved out in writing by the state.   
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6.3.2.2 “She’s Fighting a Losing Battle”595: Challenges within the Justice System  
Despite their best intentions, a portion of police officers fail to enforce the laws 
properly due to lack of training and education. Simultaneously, some act from a place of 
patriarchy and apathy. SAPS have a duty to accede to the requests/preferences of victims, 
and to efficiently and responsibly investigate cases that are filed, but they do not 
consistently do so. Between lack of police training, resource constraints and the prejudicial 
motivations, the conduct of SAPS routinely falls short of the standards set out the National 
Instructions. In addition to the substantive protections laid out under the existing sexual 
offences and domestic violence legislation, the Sexual Offences Act of 2007 (SORMA) 
mandated that the SAPS National Commissioner develop directives to police for how they 
should handle sexual offences cases.596  
The relevant National Instructions 22/1998 and 3/2008 are comprehensive in 
scope laying out in meticulous detail how victims should be treated, and the protocols that 
the investigating officer and other SAPS actors must follow to ensure that cases proceed 
smoothly through the system.597 The Instructions are also designed to ensure that victims 
are treated with dignity and not exposed to further harm and victimisation. While some 
SAPS locations and individuals commendably carry out their duties, the experiences of 
my informants point to some of SAPS’s weaknesses.   
 The NPO staff described how front-line police officers and detectives discourage 
marital rape survivors from following through on the courses of action they have identified 
for themselves. SAPS do not take the claims of marital rape seriously, showing scepticism 
and disdain when women assert that their husbands have raped them (Interviewees 3, 8-
10). They ask, “how can your husband rape you?” and utter other disparaging remarks 
that make survivors reluctant to engage further with the criminal justice system 
(Interviewees 8, 9). It is not just at the level of SAPS that marital rape myths persist. The 
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597 For a thorough overview of what the National Instructions require, see Smythe, Rape Unresolved, 
35-38. 
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RAPSSA study found that prosecutors are reluctant to take marital rape cases forward, 
and that the conviction rate in intimate partner cases is lower than in stranger rape 
cases.598  
There are known detectives who refuse to open any cases for rape, let alone marital 
rape. This happened at one of the stations that Mosaic works with. During one December 
month, there were no cases of rape filed, which prompted Mosaic to report the offending  
detective to his superiors (Interviewee 4). Some authorities simply do not want to engage 
in the work necessary for building a marital rape case. Aware of the fact that such cases 
are emotionally charged, and the victim may eventually withdraw her complaint, the 
detectives persuade the women to drop their cases earlier (Interviewees 8, 9). They ask the 
woman who will support her and her children.  
Another routine deterrence method by SAPS is to pressure a woman to file a 
protection order instead of laying a criminal charge (Interviewee 8). They have said to 
clients: “No, at the moment, it’s your husband, go and do the protection order,” exhibiting 
the discriminatory belief that abuse in the family is a private matter not worthy of 
intervention by the criminal justice system (Interviewee 8). In conjunction, the police 
appear to hold the view that the woman should not take any decisions that would 
jeopardise chances of reconciliation with her husband. The trite reasons raised by 
Parliamentarians in the 1980s against the criminalisation of marital rape are brought to 
life again and again at the local level.  
The literature also indicates that the courts do not place adequate emphasis on 
sexual violence when applicants seek protection orders, which corresponds with survivors’ 
reluctance to open up about sexual abuse when engaging with the criminal and civil justice 
systems. In their study of the implementation of the DVA, Parenzee, Artz and Moult noted 
that magistrates only rarely made any orders with respect to sexual abuse in cases where 
it was cited in the applicants’ affidavits. The statistics reflect this disparity:  
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“No orders were made against sexual abuse in Cape Town or George in spite of 
the fact that sexual abuse was noted in 20 affidavits and requested in 2 cases in 
Cape Town and noted in 7 affidavits and requested in three cases in George. 
Mitchell’s Plain made 7 orders against sexual abuse, where this was mentioned in 
19 affidavits and requested in 3 cases.”599 
The findings reflect the continuity of state actors’ unwillingness to take sexual violence in 
intimate relationships seriously.  
At the same time, the state of affairs within the justice system is varied, and rape 
myths do not invariably come into play.  Smythe’s attrition study found that “police are 
now less concerned with who reports… than they are with how the victim comports herself 
as a responsible and engaged ‘complainant’ throughout the process.”600 Also, the 
RAPSSA report documents that, of the investigating officers they interviewed, female and 
younger ones held more gender equitable views, and were less beholden to rape myths 
than male and older investigating officers.601  
Depending on the region of the Eastern Cape within which they work, my 
informants imparted different perspectives on whether girls who were thwelwe and raped 
are reporting perpetrators to the police. In some locations, with greater awareness of their 
rights, girls are reporting and the police are intervening, which has acted to discourage 
men from abducting (Interviewees 11-14). In contrast, the ukuthwala project staff at 
Masimanyane state that the abductions they know of have not been reported to the police 
(Interviewees 15, 16). In her time in the Eastern Cape, Rice learned of just one case in 
which the ukuthwala survivor did report her husband to the police. Within that community 
reporting to the police was anomalous, however in this instance the sexual violence against 
the wife was conspicuously heinous, and the husband and his peers were convicted for 
gang-raping her.602 This means that for communities such as the one in which Rice 
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conducted her study, ordinary rapes are not reportable offences. The sexual abuse must 
rise to such an excessive and dangerous level so as to warrant police involvement.   
On the occasion that ukuthwala is reported to the police, the cases are unlikely to 
result in arrests let alone prosecution. Statistics provided by SAPS to the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Women, Children and People with Disability exhibit that in 2012/3 
out of the 255 ukuthwala abductions reported nationally, only 21 led to arrests.603 There 
are various factors which push cases out of the criminal justice system and back into 
community structures where traditional authorities or elders will ultimately determine the 
fate of the survivors. Research undertaken in rural parts of the Eastern Cape determined 
that  police and prosecutors are hesitant to interfere in what they deem “cultural” matters, 
preferring for them to be settled according to customary processes.604 One issue that 
hinders prosecutions is the framing of the crime. A girl will say she was thwelwe, without 
detailing the rape and force, and because ukuthwala is not per se a crime, the authorities 
decline to prosecute.605 Further, it has been reported that in some areas, both authorities 
and communities resist prosecutions. In one case that legal researchers learned of where 
an act of ukuthwala was taken to court, the community came and caused a commotion in 
the courtroom.606  
Displaying local resistance to the prosecution of violent acts associated with 
ukuthwala, Jezile’s community reported that the outcome of the Western Cape High Court 
case would have been different were the case held Engcobo and not in a “white man’s” 
court (in Cape Town).607 In Engcobo, locals proclaimed, “(c)ases like this one are common 
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in this area, but you don’t hear too much hype about them, because magistrates, 
prosecutors and defence attorneys who deal with these cases are familiar with and 
understands our customs, it’s not like it’s something new to them.”608 In light of the local 
dynamics, outcomes such as the one in Jezile, where the accused was convicted of rape, 
trafficking and assault, are anomalous. 
6.3.2.3 The Limitations of Legal Processes and Remedies  
Once a survivor has succeeded in getting a final restraining order or taking her 
case to criminal court, the obstacles do not cease. She is exposed to secondary victimisation 
as the husbands discredit them in court, or they are unable to provide solid proof of the 
rapes to sustain their claims (Interviewee 2). Bolstered by the power of their status as 
husbands and as men, the accused ask the court: “How can I rape her? She’s my wife. 
How can she say I raped her, she was giving me willingly sex.” (Interviewee 2). The 
likelihood of being disbelieved, the inability to present concrete proof of the abuse, and 
castigation (especially when not separated from the husband) creates a disenabling 
environment for wives seeking recourse. 
Describing the detriment of secondary victimisation a Mosaic counsellor stated the 
following: “Because to her it seems now, she’s fighting a losing battle, because people think 
she’s crazy… how can she prove that this man has brutally raped her? Maybe she don’t 
even have money to go to a doctor” (Interviewee 2). The counsellor also commented that 
wives are more willing to move forward with cases if their husbands have left them. That 
prompts the survivors to be more assertive. She further recollected that in some 
circumstances the case is treated more as a stranger rape, as opposed to an intimate 
partner rape where the husband raped the wife after a period of separation. At the same 
time, these potentialities exhibit the weight of rape myths for it is the cases that are more 
akin to the real rape template that have a greater chance of succeeding.  
The comment about survivors not being able to afford a doctor evokes the 
structural hurdles that women must overcome in order to get help. In Eastern Cape, 
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travelling from a rural area to a police station or court in the nearest major city is 
prohibitively expensive. Survivors spend about R50 for a return fare to East London, 
which is an excessive amount for someone who is unemployed. One of the main courts 
stops taking forms at 12 noon, so that even where a woman has arrived at quarter past 12 
she is directed to come back the next day. As there is a shortage of magistrates in some 
areas, the courts are struggling to keep up with cases and this is why they stop taking forms 
earlier in the day. For the unemployed woman who must spend R50 return fare from the 
rural areas, the act of taking the first step at the court or at the police station consequently 
demands sacrifice in terms of time and already limited financial resources.   
Finally, at the end of the day, a protection order is a piece of paper, and its force 
lies in the survivor claiming her rights, the state securing them, and the perpetrator 
complying. All of these factors must be present in order for the protection order to do its 
work. On the day before one of my interviews with a Mosaic court counsellor, she was 
laying out the particularities of a protection order to a client: 
I said you’re here for a protection order, you remember this thing is not 
gonna work on its own, you have to put it in place. You have to lay a 
complaint, but you must also remember that the protection order can go 
two sides that it can go. It’s either he can understand and realise that what 
he’s doing is wrong, it’s against the law, or, he would come to the 
conclusion that he’s busy losing control because you’re busy taking control 
back over your life and then it can escalate, and he can kill. That’s the 
possibility and that’s a very big possibility. And it do goes to that extent 
(Interviewee 6). 
A conclusion drawn by one of my interviewees is that the only way women can be 
absolutely safe  is if the perpetrators are indefinitely locked up in jail (Interviewee 3). There 
is much that can go wrong with a protector order, or other legal action, as some men are 
so violent and determined to control their wives that state interventions do not frighten 
them. This is why leaving the perpetrator is a very dangerous act.  In Kottler’s interviews 
with 20 survivors, eight of the women’s lives were threatened when they disclosed their 
intention to leave, and several informants were raped after leaving/divorcing.609 At 
                                               
609 Kottler, “Wives’ Subjective Definitions,” 205, 12-13. 
 188 
Mosaic, a counsellor told a disturbing story of a woman who obtained a protection order 
against her husband (Interviewee 3). While she was making a phone call at a public phone 
booth, the husband came with a hammer and hit her to death. “You see,” she said to me, 
“sometimes you’re dying having your protection order on your hand.” With intimate 
partner violence, the prospect of death at the hands of their husband or boyfriend looms 
over a woman’s present and future, an eventuality the law cannot prevent.  
6.4 CONCLUSION  
Through the distillation of the critical themes that surfaced from my discussions with 
the Mosaic and Masimanyane staff, the present chapter begins to capture the innumerable 
limitations that influence and mould the help-seeking behaviour of the marital rape 
survivor. By exploring women’s help-seeking behaviour through an ecological framework, 
the research threads together the range of social, cultural, economic, and legal 
curtailments that women confront throughout the length of their endeavours. The barriers 
are high and consequential. Just one of the hurdles is sufficient to derail a survivor’s 
attempts to find reprieve from harm, yet in most cases the survivors must battle many 
barriers at once or in succession.  
South African women are carrying enormous levels of trauma, their lives steeped in 
violence. It is in their homes and the neighbourhoods that they live in. The result is that, 
as Lazar puts it, “sexual violence by the husband is hidden behind events of battering and 
veiled by a broader framework of physical, emotional, and economic abuse.”610  Moreover 
women are inculcated to maintain subordinate positions to their husbands as a result of 
socialisation and cultural norms, which further obfuscates survivors’ ability to conceive of 
sexual abuse as rape and to speak out.  
The formal and informal institutions implicated in the research – families, 
communities, traditional authorities, police stations, courts, etc. – are far from 
homogenous in their compositions, ethos, and functioning. They are not wholly 
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patriarchal and hostile to rape victims, and marital rape victims in particular. They all 
have the potential to contribute to greater safety for women; but, the aim of the present 
chapter has been to document the manner in which the institutions fall short. 
Social and cultural notions of rape reject marital and intimate partner sexual 
violence as wrongs that must be remedied. In so doing these notions tuck the commonness 
and magnitude of marital rape away. This is why a Mosaic counsellor declared, “this 
problem has been hiding” (Interviewee 3). Family elders, traditional authorities and 
churches are complicit in the sexual violence (whether stemming from the ukuthwala or 
occurring during the life of the marriage) preferring reconciliation, silence or avoidance. 
The police do try but regularly lack the knowledge to effectively implement protection 
order procedures. Worse are the cases in which the police, detectives and prosecutors 
simply dismiss marital rape claims as ridiculous or trivial; or are plainly unwilling to move 
such cases forward because of the paperwork entailed, or the chance that the wife may 
drop the charges.   
It is difficult for a woman/girl to find security by herself. If she is brave enough to 
step out, she risks ostracisation by her family and surrounding community. She may 
become a pariah or find herself unable to fit in with age mates. Along with those issues, 
she must consider basic sustenance: food, shelter, and money. Weighing up all these 
factors, she may remain beholden and confined to the institution of marriage.   
The picture is not entirely bleak however, as the next chapter demonstrates. The 
very same institutions discussed have the capacity to facilitate or enforce justice or at least 
some measure of improvement in the lives of marital rape survivors. The NPOs are a 
steadfast influence working in groups or one-on-one with women, playing the role of 
intermediary between the victims and the state institutions, and advocating where the state 
authorities fail to fulfil their duties. And finally and most pivotally, women’s individual 
awakenings, exasperation, and determination bring about change in forms that are bold 
as well as understated.  
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7 Chapter 7: Awakenings: Bringing Marital Rape to the 
Surface and Finding Recourse 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The prior chapter illustrated how the recourse-seeking paths of victims are not 
smooth, but instead are laden with hurdles and diversions. The paths are also highly 
individualised. Yet, amidst the interplay of hindrances, some women are able to 
successfully change their circumstances for the better. Consequently, in this chapter I 
answer the question: In the face of silence surrounding sexual violence in marriage, what 
forms of recourse do women draw upon that positively impact their lives? This 
examination is critical for discerning options that may not be well documented in present 
literature on marital rape in South Africa, as well for highlighting the pivotal work of non-
profit organisations and the significant potential that state institutions hold in protecting 
women from violence.   
Masimanyane and Mosaic, the two non-profit organisations (NPOs) that I 
conducted research with, adhere to similar philosophies in their practice. Both 
organisations are feminist and attuned to women’s rights norms. They do not dictate to 
clients the courses that they should take, nor judge clients’ past and present decisions. 
Their primary goal is to empower women so that they are able to make decisions on their 
own and implement sustainable progress in their lives. Some clients arrive at the 
institutions with assertiveness and clear sense of what they want to ask of the NPOs. On 
the other hand, given the prevailing social and cultural norms attached to intimate partner 
violence, through their encounters with Masimanyane and Mosaic, clients are exposed to 
a different way of seeing their experiences. They can find resonance with a new language 
for describing their pain, and be in a safe space in which they can explore their emotions, 
well-being, and options for bettering their lives. Through the counselling and 
empowerment processes, over time clients act with greater confidence, awareness and 
intention.   
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In light of the fact that Mosaic and Masimanyane staff members are the primary 
informants for my research, the outcomes that I detail in this chapter closely mirror the 
processes and ethos of these organisations. I walk through how clients are able to find 
greater security engendered by the advocacy, counselling, and oversight roles (with respect 
to the police and court systems) of the NPOs. In so doing, the types of recourse that 
survivors find meaningful become apparent. Concepts of relief and justice are personal to 
each survivor. Some stay in their marriages, and the relationships grow healthier as a 
result of a shift in the survivors’ mindsets and actions. What the informants stressed is that 
internal work is essential; the slow and sustained process of counselling and encouraging 
the clients to think differently about themselves and their circumstances. The measurable 
milestones of protection orders, arrests of husbands or divorce provide a beneficial 
compliment to the survivors’ well-being, but they do not represent the totality of their 
healing and triumphs.   
In the following sections, I commence by chronicling the psychological and 
cognitive developments that take place during the survivors’ journeys within the 
environments of safety and empowerment provided by the NPOs. The clients start to 
unlearn disempowering long-held beliefs about marriage, gain awareness about what 
constitutes abuse, and begin to accept the right to dignity and equality in the marriage. 
The “remembering and redefining” of the abuse is central to empowerment, for “(i)n 
acknowledging abuse, women are able to look at and find ways of coping with its effects. 
They are also likely to develop precautionary strategies in order to prevent further abuse. 
These strategies involve taking more control over their lives and choices.”611  
As a complement to the descriptions of awakening, the last section looks at external 
remedies, highlighting the forms of recourse that wives seek and receive through the 
criminal justice and civil legal system, with the NPO staff acting as facilitators and 
advocates throughout. While the research concentrates on remedies that are mainly 
facilitated/observed by the NPOs, this does not mean that wives lack means of coping 
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with marital rape. They do, and their daily survival often depends on these strategies.612 
The layout of the initial sections parallels the three conventional stages of help-
seeking (acknowledging and defining the problem, taking the decision to get help, and 
choosing a source of help).613 In addition to documenting the kinds of steps women take, 
my aim is to delineate the individual, social, cultural and structural drivers of women’s 
journeys.614 This ecological approach to analysing women’s help-seeking behaviour 
concerning violence does not solely focus on “what women in violent relationships do, but 
“rather… how they interpret their violent encounters, or how these interpretations affect 
their process of help-seeking.”615 The previous chapter outlined how women interpret the 
violence in their marriages, and here I consider the range of actions and developments 
that flow from their internal processes as well as social, cultural and material conditions.   
7.2 REACHING THE LIMIT OF TOLERATING VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 
The vignettes of Chapter 6 detail the forces that precipitate women’s searches for 
help outside of their homes and families. There comes a time where a woman’s body and 
psyche can no longer tolerate the assaults, and she is propelled to act. At times, some 
women gather enough courage so that when they arrive at the NPOs or the police station 
they declare in determined and unequivocal terms that they were raped by their husbands 
and want to file a case (Interviewees 3, 8, 9, 10).  
For others, the call for help is triggered by the condition of their own bodies; the 
scale of the physical injuries, or an increase in the severity of the rapes.616 Recall the case 
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of the 55-year old woman who arrived at the Thuthuzela Care Centre (TCC) riddled with 
pain and struggling to walk (Interviewee 4). While at a cognitive level she did not 
distinguish that her husband sexually violating her with a broom constituted rape and 
abuse, the damage wreaked upon her body caused her to reach a breaking point. There 
is also the client who came to the court on a Monday after realising the extent of the 
damage to her hand caused by the brutal rapes she experienced over the weekend. The 
Mosaic counsellor said that as she spoke with the woman and delved into her marriage 
history, the woman divulged that this was not the first time such a brutal beating and rape 
had taken place (Interviewee 6). The counsellor said to me, “so I had to go into the 
relationship over the years. So she said this has been his behaviour. The things that he did 
on that specific day to her made her to get over that edge.” 
7.3 FINDING A SAFE SPACE: COUNSELLING, TREATMENT AND SUPPORT 
It is vital that a survivor feel safe before she can begin to trust the institutions from 
which she is seeking help, and slowly open up about her life. Various forms of counselling 
are offered by both organisations and form a foundational component of the resources 
they offer. Some staff conduct “containment” or “trauma” counselling. Over numerous 
sessions they listen to the clients, put them at ease, and start to build a relationship of trust. 
The counsellors used similar language about how they see their roles and how their main 
concern is to help the client to heal and feel stronger (Interviewees 1-5, 8,9).  
The counselling allows women to tell their stories at their own pace and utter 
things that they may not have spoken of before. This is a critical component of marital 
rape survivors’ healing journeys; unburdening oneself in a safe space. The counsellors 
described this process of listening, affirming the clients, and encouraging them to speak: 
“I listen to the story”; “We are letting them to speak their feelings, their emotions”; “They 
open up. They open up”; “We give them the trust, so that they trust me that they can 
share whatever to me”; “You don’t have to be afraid when I’m here” (Interviewees 3, 8, 
9). What emanates from the staff’s words is the importance of non-judgment, patience and 
trust for survivors. Without these factors, marital rape survivors risk remaining stuck in 
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their circumstances and feeling more isolated, as Bergen’s study of certain social services 
organisations in the United States elucidated.617 
In addition to these forms of counselling, which are “a sort of something healing 
the soul” as one social auxiliary worker from Masimanyane put it, the staff provide 
pragmatic forms of guidance (Interviewee 9). The ones who are based at the police stations 
and courts are experts in the court and criminal procedures and take the clients through 
each step. This involves assisting in filing criminal charges, filling out the paperwork for a 
protection order, preparing the client for the interim and final protection order hearings, 
and making referrals for legal advice. Where clients are afraid to go to court, the 
counsellors go with them to provide moral support.  
On substantive legal matters, at some locations clients are referred to lawyers at 
the courts or in the area. In this way, certain misconceptions about (lack of) legal remedies 
are clarified, the implications of divorce being one of them. A Mosaic interviewee relayed 
the following: “There are lawyers that are working here, so we transfer them… so that 
they explain better, in the terms of the law, what will happen, what is needed, so a person 
will come and be clear now, no I can divorce this one, it’s not like what I heard from other 
people.” (Interviewee 3). Regularly survivors believe that if they divorce their husbands 
they will lose all the assets and be left destitute, consequently accurate legal advice is 
indispensable. 
The TCC staff perform sensitive and consequential functions as “first-responders” 
(Interviewees 4, 5).618 Some rape victims go to the police station and then are brought to 
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the TCC; others come to the TCC first and then are taken to the police after the 
counselling session and medical examination have been performed. One of the TCC 
Mosaic counsellors detailed the procedures that take place at the site she staffs (Interviewee 
4). She serves as an intermediary between the survivor, the doctor and any detective 
handling the case.  
At the TCC the client must go through a series of processes. A hospital clerk opens 
a medical file so that a record of the client is placed in the system. This is followed by 
“observation” during which the nurse records their blood pressure, weight, etc. and also 
administers an HIV test. Before the survivor sees a doctor, the Mosaic counsellor does 
trauma counselling, and communicates with the South African Police Service (SAPS) as 
needed. For the trauma counselling, she puts the client at ease, assures her of her safety at 
the Centre and interviews her about the violence. This information is gathered in advance 
of the doctor’s examination given that when the victims arrive in a state of immense shock 
and trauma they are sometimes unable to talk about what happened. By the time the 
examination is conducted, the counsellor can report to the doctor what the client 
experienced. Before this, the counsellor would have put the client’s medical file in a 
designated place and notified the doctor of the need for a medico-legal exam.  
For privacy and security, the victim does not wait for the doctor with other patients 
in the hospital waiting room, but is taken back to the TCC to wait with the counsellor, 
and that is where the doctor conducts the examination. Where the doctor is a male, at 
times he requests that the Mosaic counsellor be present throughout the procedure. As part 
of the forensic rape kit, the doctor completes the J-88 form.619 The detective that the 
counsellor has contacted signs for the kit, and then accompanies the victim to the station 
to file her case or continue with the filing if it has been commenced already. The 
information obtained at the TCC and on the J-88 captures what happened to the victim, 
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of evidence gathering for the prosecution of the case.  
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how they were injured, and their physical and mental condition. It is vital component of 
the state’s evidence for prosecuting the rape.   
All counsellors, whether at the TCC or the court or police station, follow up with 
their clients. For instance, after the critically injured 55-year old woman came to the TCC 
over the weekend, the counsellor said that on the Monday her job was to call the police 
station to find out if she opened a case and whether there was a case number (Interviewee 
4). She then calls the victim to ask her how she is, whether she still needs counselling, and 
whether she and her husband have reconciled. If a client’s well-being is in immediate 
danger sometimes the NPOs send her directly to a place of safety.620   
The counselling continues prior to, post, and during any legal remedies sought by 
the clients. The counsellors make themselves available based on the survivor’s preferences. 
One session is usually not sufficient to “reach” the client as the survivors need time to 
process their trauma: “They come to see me, they talk about their experiences, they talk 
about their feelings, and how they wish to grow beyond their, but sometimes if a lady sits 
with you and she’s in tears, and you talk to her, it seems to me, that my words don’t go in, 
because the hurt blocks it out. Yes, that is why we have to see the client more than once” 
(Interviewee 2). It is subsequent to the preliminary meeting that the full details of the abuse 
can be drawn out. Apart from where it is physically apparent, the marital rape accounts 
continue to remain hidden. Certain tools, perceptiveness and language on the part of 
community workers are necessary for unearthing and naming the sexual abuse.   
7.4 EDUCATION AND BRINGING THE SEXUAL ABUSE TO SURFACE 
The findings presented in this dissertation, in conjunction with a significant body of 
literature on rape, affirm that the concept of rape ensconced in the law is different to the 
perceptions that stubbornly hold fast in quotidian spaces. There was a time when codified 
law was not progressive, and narrowly prescribed the criminal law parameters of rape. As 
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I described in previous chapters, the androcentric philosophies that imbued the law grew 
out of social spaces. While codified law has moved ahead, those age-old standards that 
privilege men are very much alive. I have demonstrated in Chapter 6 how women are 
trained to endure violence in marriage. Accordingly, community educators and 
counsellors invest resources and time in educating clients and communities so that they 
understand what rape is, and are able to apply this learning to demand more from their 
marriages than they have in the past, or to make the decision to leave if they determine 
that is best. The purpose of this education is not to impose a universal truth on clients, but 
to give them various tools for making sense of their experiences. This allows them room 
to self-define and to evolve as they choose. It opens up new avenues of perceiving. 
The informants for the study described the process of educating and counselling 
over time as an awakening of sorts, an opening up of the mind to see life anew 
(Interviewees 1, 3, 8, 9). Preceding this awakening it is extremely difficult for clients to 
understand how “rape” and the “sex” that their husbands coerce them into are one in the 
same, and that the force constitutes an act that violates their personhood, and is also 
criminal. Counselling also reorients the survivors to see that the problem for which they 
initially sought help – the presenting problem – is not the foundational problem. As the 
counsellors “unpack” the categories, the clients are able to define what was happening to 
them, and how the husband’s behaviour fits into the abuse framework. 
To ensure that clients are informed about all forms of abuse the counsellors talk 
about each discrete category, sometimes using posters on the wall and pointing to the 
various types of harm (Interviewee 3). They highlight physical, economic, mental, 
psychological and sexual abuse. As I discussed in the preceding chapter, some women 
speak of sexual abuse in passing, and so this presents an opportunity for the counsellors to 
educate. A counsellor from Mosaic went through the education method and how she had 
applied it for a client who had come in the previous week. The client was in a highly 
abusive marriage that was also characterised by a range of cruelties. Her husband was 
having an affair with one of his male friends, as well as sleeping with young boys. He also 
physically, sexually and financially abused his wife. The counsellor recalled the steps she 
walked through with the client: “As you entered here, the board that highlighted all these 
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types of abuse, we pointed to that board and you will see, these are the types of abuse, and 
she could pick one of them that are happening to her” (Interviewee 3). 
Accounts such as this one exhibit the significance of naming abuse as part of 
recourse seeking. Regarding the same client, the counsellor further relayed: “This lady 
couldn’t even know the name domestic violence. It was her first time. And then, whatever 
the husband was doing to her, she thought it’s okay.” Spending time talking about each 
form of abuse aided the client in finding a name for what she was subjected to: “Now 
while we’re unpacking all the things, she could define, oh this is what was happening to 
me, oh this was a domestic violence, these are the sexual abuse, this was the emotional 
abuse, oh this was psychological abuse” (Interviewee 3). 
To further extract what is taking place in a client’s life – where for example the 
client has not highlighted any instances of sexual abuse – the counsellor will ask questions 
that are carefully designed to elicit the information (Interviewees 1,2, 6, 8, 9). As part of 
this process, the informants repeatedly told me that they tend to refrain from using the 
word “rape” in the early stages (Interviewees 1, 2). The word can be jarring and invasive 
to a survivor. Moreover, it is unhelpful where the survivor does not yet identify forced sex 
as rape. One staff member expounded: “Normally you first have to ask the question: All 
this kind of abuse is taking place so when you have a fight and he want to have sex with 
you and you refuse, what is his behaviour then, then they will come out” (Interviewee 6).  
Connecting to one’s feelings, one’s inner sense of right and wrong, and one’s 
desires is part of the counselling process. Once the survivors have spoken of what has been 
happening, this prompts counsellors to follow up with questions such as “how do you 
feel?”, “do you think this is a right thing to happen to you?”, and “do you think this is a 
right partner?” (Interviewees 3, 9). Having been indoctrinated according to patriarchal 
norms, self-reflection and self-recognition are a revelatory outcomes of counselling.  
In contrast to individual counselling, in community settings there is the 
opportunity to raise the subject of marital rape more directly. Masimanyane is emphatic 
about their workshops and they travel far and wide in the Eastern Cape in order to reach 
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new communities of women who can then in turn train other women about their rights. 
In their workshops they specifically cover the subject of marital rape, making the 
distinction between consensual and non-consensual sex (Interviewees 8-10). Notably in 
the rural areas, this lesson generates significant confusion as women are taught that sex 
takes place on the husband’s terms and is an irrevocable part of marriage. The community 
workshops also allow both organisations to identify clients, as the lessons stimulate 
awareness.  
Further, community advocacy has made a mark in some areas where ukuthwala is 
practiced (Interviewees 13-16). Both the survivors that I interviewed, in addition to the 
ukuthwala project staff commented that because of cases in the media, a spreading of 
democratic and human rights ideals, and local education about ukuthwala, in some locales 
girls are more inclined to not stay in such marriages and men are increasingly reluctant to 
follow practice in its brutal form.  
7.5 PREPARATION, EMPOWERMENT AND DECISION-MAKING  
For survivors, there are other developments that take place in conjunction with their 
new awareness. Some progress is pragmatic, safety planning for example, and others are 
less tangible but are monumental. These significant sequences flow from a cognitive shift 
in the survivor, the result of counselling and contemplation. The client becomes more 
independent, self-assured and decisive. Such milestones are in fact all the more salient and 
lasting for they arise out of renewed strength, confidence and knowing. 
7.5.1 Safety Planning  
Immediately, safety for the survivor and her children is paramount. It is necessary 
for her to determine how to remain as safe as possible while remaining with her husband 
in the home, or after having left the home. Accordingly, safety or contingency planning is 
a facet of the counselling provided by the organisations. With the appreciation that 
survivors cannot totally rely upon legal remedies to protect them even when the remedies 
have been put in place, they must begin to proactively think and act. Victims of domestic 
violence and abuse are experts in their partners’ behaviour. They are familiar with what 
 200 
triggers the abuse and what trajectories the assaults follow. The counsellors encourage the 
survivors to use this expert knowledge to try to diffuse the abuse or to determine when to 
escape if the danger escalates to a critical point (Interviewee 2).  
If remaining in the home, it is imperative for the survivor to keep important official 
documents together, and one’s keys and money if possible, so that if she must flee quickly 
with her children she is in possession of essential items. For the cycle of abuse, the act of 
leaving can give rise to the greatest harm. Feeling a loss of control, it is the point at which 
perpetrators decide to violently retaliate, including by raping, or killing their victims. The 
counsellors advise their clients to act calmly and surreptitiously when having to leave, and 
to be prepared in advance with their belongings. This also ensures more safety for the 
children as the husband may try to grab/hold them hostage should the survivor inform 
him that she is leaving (Interviewee 2).  
The act of obtaining a restraining order also provokes some abusers to lash out, 
and so contingency planning comes into play while the survivor is engaged with the law. 
A counsellor based at one of the courts where Mosaic has a presence described her 
recommendations to clients: “…when you’re coming here to do protection order you must 
have plan B, knowing that I’m not going there, when he receives this, he will go mad, so 
I must be away from him up until this thing settles” (Interviewee 3). Thus for the duration 
of survivor’s help-seeking, irrespective of whether it entails legal remedies, she must 
remain consistently vigilant and learn to be one step ahead of her abuser. Without such 
vigilance and preparedness, her life and her children’s well-being are at stake.  
7.5.2 The Markers of Empowerment 
The counsellors stressed that empowerment of clients is the essence of their work, 
and in fact represents a highpoint in the course of their relationships with survivors 
(Interviewees 3, 5, 8, 9). Empowerment refers to a state of believing that one has the right 
to determine the course of one’s life, and can consequently make decisions to bring  wants 
and hopes to fruition. Empowerment is fundamentally the outcome of time, a period over 
which the survivor undergoes counselling, and looks at her marriage more critically. The 
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relief that comes from empowerment not only presents in a survivor’s bolder and more 
confident behaviour but also in physical transformation.  
There are markers which evidence the client’s transition to empowerment. The 
display of assertiveness and the intention to stand on one’s own feet are positive signs 
(Interviewees 3, 8, 9). A client’s ability to shed old conceptions and affirm that she does 
not deserve maltreatment in her marriage, are telling signals of her progress. “Up until 
you get empowerment, they would see now, no, this was wrong, this was happening to 
me,” one of the informants conveyed (Interviewee 3). A veteran counsellor from 
Masimanyane submitted similar views: “Our mission is to empower the women more than 
of assisting them; empower the women to be able to assist themselves, to be able to take 
their decision with a clear mind knowing all those things, knowing straight away what is 
sexual assault, what is physical abuse, what is financial abuse, all those forms of abuse” 
(Interviewee 8).  
Exuding elation, the counsellors remembered encounters with present and former 
clients who had physically transformed or shown vast improvement in their lives stemming 
from the counselling they had received (Interviewees 1-2, 4, 6, 8, 9). The Mosaic TCC 
counsellor who walked me through the routines at her location said that when she goes to 
the shelters months later to visit clients that she has assisted, sometimes she does not 
recognise them. Smiling she said, “I don’t even know them, as beautiful as they look… 
from the day they was coming there to the Thuthuzela, out of an abusive relationship or 
marriage, they was like… they pretty” (Interviewee 4). The references to outward 
appearances are not reductive or superficial, for the counsellors are not advocating for a 
precise form of beauty nor emphasis on appearance. The impressions of clients’ 
transformations are instead a representation of how abuse inscribes pain on the bodies 
and psyches of victims. The relief from suffering materialises physically, as well as 
psychologically.   
The counsellors also witness their clients’ progress through chance encounters. As 
the staff live near or within the communities that they work in, they meet their clients 
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while walking in the streets or running errands.621 This is where they see the long-term 
impact of the counselling sessions. Referring to clients who remained in their marriages 
but underwent counselling about how to be more assertive, a Mosaic counsellor 
announced: “Some of them say thank you, and some, you know we all live in the same 
area, so now sometimes they would say, ‘it worked you know!’” (Interviewee 2). A survivor 
need not always leave a marriage. An improvement in the relationship too counts as a 
success.  
7.5.3 Decision-making 
Resolute and deliberate decisiveness grows alongside and out of empowerment. 
Survivors make decisions along their journeys but the nature and motivations for such 
decisions are different. Before empowerment the choices that survivors make are 
preponderantly reactive and not proactive. Initial decisions stem from the survivor’s 
urgent need and desire to be safe, or are connected to the presenting problem as opposed 
to the underlying problem (Interviewees 6, 7). There are clients who do come to the 
institutions with self-assurance and clarity about the courses they would like to take. 
However, as the data on barriers evidences, marital rape survivors generally arrive at the 
organisations weighed down by the psychic and structural chains of gender inequality.  
The goal then, of counsellors, is for their clients to ultimately take decisions rooted 
in strength (Interviewees 3, 8, 9). This may take months or even years, with changes of 
mind along the way. As the philosophy of both organisations is to refrain from pushing 
any specified agenda for the client, the staff prefer to lay out recourse options and then 
allow the survivor time to think and arrive at a decision when they are ready. At that point, 
the counsellor assists in the implementation of the chosen course of action.  
The counsellors also appreciate that for the survivor leaving the marriage is not 
always feasible or desirable; but where the client decides to divorce her husband, this is 
                                               
621 For privacy purposes, not all of the counsellors acknowledge their clients in public. They 
instruct their clients to not reveal that they are acquainted since the community and the abuser may then 
learn of the fact that she is seeking help.  
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celebrated since leaving an abusive relationship demands immense courage and will 
(Interviewee 8, 9). It generates confusion and worry about what people will think, how the 
children will be supported, and how they will live without the materials things and 
standard of living made possible by the husband. A police station-based counsellor from 
Masimanyane stated: “I feel very happy when a woman comes into decisions that I want 
to do this now. I’m strong. Because you see that, you are taking an extra mile to know that 
you are in an abusive relationship, and it’s very hard to pull out. It’s very hard” 
(Interviewee 9). 
To illustrate how decision-making comes about through empowerment, I include 
two quotes from counsellors, for their own words most vividly communicate the victory of 
clients’ decision-making: 
…maybe after some few months, you will hear that client call you, “Hello 
Sisi, how are you, fine and fine and you? How did…”, then I will ask as a 
counsellor, “How do you feel now after that…,” “Yhu, I feel great, I feel… 
I wanted to see you because I made up my mind, I need to apply for the 
divorce, or I need to apply for the protection order. I’ve take the decision. 
I’ve take the decision” (Interviewee 9). 
You know, so you will see those steps, steps and steps, and it’s the same 
applies with the maintenance. You will talk to the woman, talk to the 
woman, then she will phone, “Sisi, I made my mind, this man has to 
support my children”. So you will see there, where is your work 
following… otherwise you can’t see the change on the first day or in two 
sessions you will be able to see the change, you know (Interviewee 8). 
The factor of the passage of time resonates across the informants’ utterances. The 
survivors do not travel along a straight road, but one that meanders and marked by peaks 
and lows. Yet, in due course, they can and do find their way to more stable  ground.  
7.6 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CIVIL LEGAL REMEDIES  
The social and cultural embeddedness of marital rape points to the fact that law-
oriented, cookie-cutter remedies are ill suited to situations of intimate partner violence. 
Shortly after the enactment of the Prevention of Family Violence Act (PFVA), feminist 
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legal scholar Fedler wrote that the “strange alchemy of violence within intimacy lends 
domestic abuse a unique quality as a legal problem, for there are no stark realities, no one-
dimensional solutions.”622  If properly applied, the comprehensive and victim-centred laws 
enacted after the PFVA do have the potential to increase survivors’ chances of legal justice 
through legal remedies, but most victims do not utilise the law. The pressures of retaliatory 
abuse by the husband, family and social control, and financial dependence, are strong 
deterrents.  
In spite of the plethora of challenges laid out in the previous chapter, women are 
able to find justice through the courts and the police. At times, this is because a detective, 
or police station is already inclined to helping victims of violence. Notwithstanding the 
efficiencies of some SAPS locations, the data collected from the interviews indicates that 
not infrequently state authorities are pushed to act or guided by the NPOs situated on 
their premises or whose offices are based in the locale (Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 8, 9). On that 
account, the positive functioning of state authorities is correlated with NPO resources, 
expertise and activism. In some environments, the relationships between authorities and 
NPOs were, or continue to be characterised by antagonism, for the NPOs hold the police 
and courts to account for their failings.  
Nevertheless, a veteran counsellor at Masimanyane noted that over the years the 
relationships at specific locations have improved considerably (Interviewee 8). Also, the 
authorities appreciate the work of the NPOs as it helps their sites to run smoother, and 
helps survivors to be better informed and prepared for navigating their cases. In the 
Eastern Cape, an informant reported that “many” courts want Masimanyane to be part 
of their Victim Empowerment Programmes, but Masimanyane does not have the capacity 
to do so (Informant 8).  
I will now look at the beneficial impact of two legal remedies: protection orders, and 
arrests in conjunction with rape charges and violation of protection orders. The protection 
order can act as a short-term emergency remedy. In instances where the client arrives just 
                                               
622 Fedler, "Lawyering Domestic Violence," 231. 
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having been assaulted, certain counsellors stated that they immediately recommend a 
protection order. Once that is in place, they begin the counselling process. The staff of 
both organisations spoke to the benefits of protection orders, affirming that they actually 
do work (Interviewees 3, 4, 6, 7, 9). Some husbands stop the abuse after receiving the 
order. Clients reported that there was a discernible difference in their relationships 
because of the protection order. 
Returning to the Mosaic client who came to the court for help on a Monday, her 
case exemplifies the positive shifts that protection orders can bring about. After the sadistic 
rapes by her husband (he had beaten her with a broomstick and then raped her from 
midnight until 5 am) and the gravity of her injuries, she did not file criminal charges. The 
Mosaic counsellor remarked that the client only wanted a protection order despite the 
many options the counsellor laid out for her. A few years later, the counsellor recollected, 
“I met her again and I didn’t even recognise her. And she came to me and she said, ‘can 
you remember me?’” The former client spoke of her relationship with her husband, saying 
“We’re so good now together. Our life is wonderful, you won’t believe. It was a good thing 
for me to come to court to look for help” (Interviewee 6). 
It is noteworthy that a civil remedy, as opposed to a criminal one can reap such 
profound and lasting change, especially in a marriage characterised by substantial levels 
of abuse. At the same time, this client’s outcome encapsulates another point, which is that 
criminal remedies are not necessarily preferred. Survivors may want a remedy that results 
in as little disruption as possible in their marriage.  
A counsellor at Masimanyane voiced her views on survivors staying in their 
marriages: “Sometimes you’re not supposed to go out of the marriage, but know your 
rights while you’re inside. Sometimes you have to draw the line, saying that, this… is been 
years happen to me. My husband, you can’t do this again to me” (Interviewee 8). The 
Mosaic client made a conscious decision to send a firm message to her husband by 
obtaining a restraining order, but also resolved to stay in the marriage. Others do leave 
after getting the order. One court counsellor stated that some of their clients feel so 
powerful after getting the order they separate from their partners out of a fear of returning 
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to the trauma (Interviewee 7). Empowerment means that clients have the ability to make 
choices for themselves, and while there are certain patterns of behaviour, each survivor’s 
path is unique.  
Another commanding feature of protection orders is the risk of arrest of the 
perpetrator if the order is violated. The threat of arrest deters some husbands from 
committing further abuse. The perpetrators who hold disdain for the law receive 
increasingly harsher punishments each time they violate the order. The first violation 
results in a short period of imprisonment, a day or a weekend. Subsequent jail terms go 
up to a week or two weeks. The prison term can go up to five years. Taking stock of how 
the law puts unruly perpetrators in their place, a Masimanyane counsellor based in a 
Victim Empowerment Centre commented, “… but you see that abusers becoming scared, 
they are arrested not for the first time, they think that it’s a joke, they repeat it but they 
stop, they see that now, because it’s not nice inside the jail, because others are coming out 
being sodomised” (Interviewee 9).  
7.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has documented some recourse forms and outcomes that bring both 
short-term and enduring relief for survivors of marital rape. Within an ecological 
framework, the research presents a multi-textured depiction of what recourse, relief and 
justice mean and look like from non-law-centric perspectives. Each form of recourse draws 
the existence of the sexual violence from darkness and into full view, reshaping the rape 
from a state of invisibility to that of visibility. During my fieldwork, there were cases for 
which it was too early to tell which direction the survivor’s life would take, but overall, the 
trajectories described by informants confirm the critical role of the NPOs and effective 
partnerships with law enforcement.  
I bring the chapter to a close by revisiting the case of the TCC client whose 
unspeakable agony (being repeatedly raped by a broom) remained prominent in the mind 
of the counsellor after her weekend shift (Interviewee 4). The detective who brought the 
client to the TCC and the Mosaic counsellor worked together to provide the best care for 
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the woman. After the medical examination was complete, the counsellor advised the 
detective to take the client home so that she could bathe and rest. She then instructed him 
to bring her back to the TCC on Sunday to collect her prescribed medication, which the 
counsellor would have ready.  She continued to direct the detective, recommending that 
only after these steps should the detective take the client to make a statement and open a 
case, and lastly, arrest the husband. “He did it like that,” she said.  
On Sunday, the police arrested the husband, and the detective brought the client 
back to the TCC. “And then I was there,” the counsellor said to me, and continued “she 
was looking nice, she was clean, she was washed, but because... and I feel so painful to her 
when I see her, but then I was looking… she was smiling, she was giving me even a hug… 
a lot, she hugged me a lot.” The client said to the counsellor, “if it wasn’t for you I would 




8 Chapter 8: The Life Histories of Two Ukuthwala 
Survivors 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters provide insights into survivors’ lives; events and feelings 
that they recounted to the NPO counsellors, and personal change that the counsellors 
walked survivors through. Through the framework of (in)visibility, I first looked at the 
interlocking local forces that impede emancipation from abuse, and subsequently 
juxtaposed these impediments with the kinds of relief and assistance that effect emotional 
and physical healing, and increased security for survivors. These themes emanate from 
the present, from the era of democracy. In the present-day South Africa, a robust civil 
society indefatigably calls attention to the many ways in which the notions of democracy, 
human rights, equality, and liberation still remain abstract concepts for the majority of 
South Africans, for they still live under precarious and desperate circumstances.     
Women’s lives are at risk because of the thoroughly gendered manifestations of 
inequality in which they are submerged. This is not a feature of the present alone, but has 
deep and long roots in the pre-democratic period. We do not know enough about violence 
against women in the past because academic texts and public memory exclude, gloss over, 
and camouflage women’s frames of reference. The ukuthwala crusade that I detailed in 
Chapter 5 clarifies the dangers of romanticising Black culture and selectively listening to 
communities. The recent dominant literature on ukuthwala and rape avoids the past, 
except to make the argument that culture assured protection for women and designated 
rape in marriage rituals as an anathema.   
In this chapter I present the life histories of two ukuthwala survivors, Asanda623 and 
Anele624 (Interviewees 13 and 14). I include their stories in order to counter selective 
                                               
623 This is not the survivor’s real name. I have created a pseudonym to protect her identity. 
624 As with the other survivor, this name is a pseudonym which I use for confidentiality purposes.  
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portrayals of ukuthwala and rape in marriage. Further, the insights of the survivors present 
a long view of how women navigate abuse in their marriages across different spaces and 
time. During my visit to Masimanyane in East London, I conducted a group interview 
with two veteran staff members (Interviewees 11 and 12) and the two ukuthwala survivors 
who are Masimanyane clients. They had travelled to East London that morning from a 
rural area of the former Transkei in order to meet with me. The staff translated as each 
woman spoke, and provided contextual information based on their ongoing work with 
these survivors, and other women in rural communities.  
Asanda was about 60 years old at the time of the interview, and Anele was in her 
late 50s. They had both been thwelwe in their teens. I lay out each life history as the survivor 
told it. Many of the (in)visibilising factors that I documented in chapters 6 and 7 are woven 
throughout their testimonies. Yet because the survivors are older, we also travel through 
successive eras, from a time when children’s/girl’s rights received no consideration, to 
contemporary times in which a consciousness of equality is slowly – albeit unevenly – 
taking root across South Africa. Moreover, from a historical standpoint, the survivors’ 
voices expose the longstanding acceptance and practice of culturally sanctioned rape in 
marriage within the communities in which they grew up in the former Transkei. They 
were only able to begin to find healing in their mature years once they came into contact 
with Masimanyane. Asanda and Anele are in quite different stages in their journeys. As 
we spoke, Asanda displayed acute pain and trauma from the events of her youth. Anele, 
who had worked with Masimanyane over a longer period and had told her story many 
times in different platforms, displayed more confidence and self-assurance.  
8.2 ASANDA’S STORY  
Asanda got married in 1974 when she was 16 years of age. She was abducted on 
her way from school. It was in November while she was writing end-of-year tests. She was 
in Standard 5 (Grade 7). Her father forced her into a marriage that he had arranged. One 
day her father instructed her to go to her future husband’s home, but she did not want to, 
and so her father and two boys dragged her there. Her prospective husband had never 
seen her before, nor had she seen him. It was his elders who had chosen her for him.  
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During the abduction process, Asanda wept. She was afraid of her father, and felt 
helpless to change her circumstances. If she fled the marriage, what would she go back to? 
At the time they did not have children’s rights. If she went home her father would chase 
her away. And so she remained with a husband that she did not know.  
Her husband was born in 1948. He was too old because she was the same age as his 
younger sibling who was the third one from his birth. With force from both sets of parents, 
she remained in her husband’s homestead. She was 15 years of age and did not know 
anything about sex. She was a virgin and did not want to sleep with her husband. One 
night he forced himself on her when she was refusing to sleep with him. There was blood 
as she was a virgin. She went home and told her family that she could not sleep with her 
husband but they refused to welcome her back and told her to persevere. The marriage 
was physically and sexually abusive. He continued to rape her because in the rural areas 
her husband knew that she would not go anywhere to report him. He would force her to 
have sex even if she protested. Over the course of the marriage she had seven children.  
Early in the marriage, her husband moved to Gauteng to work in the mines, but he 
did not send money back home to provide for Asanda and the children. She had to rely 
on his parents, who came to be a great source of physical and emotional support for 
Asanda. His parents loved her.  She would report to them when her husband hit her. She 
never told her own parents how her husband mistreated her. After her husband’s parents 
died Asanda had no choice but to relocate to Gauteng to demand that the husband 
support her and their two children. By then he had been in Gauteng for about four years. 
In Gauteng, Asanda’s husband still refused to maintain her and the children, and 
continued to abuse her. He was a drunk and a gambler. Asanda struggled to find 
employment as a domestic worker because she could not speak English. She would 
struggle to hear instructions from her employer. Eventually she made money by selling 
apples on the street in the Johannesburg suburb of Alberton where they lived. Asanda 
made use of the authorities in Johannesburg to improve her circumstances. She went to 
the child support authorities so that her husband would be compelled to pay the child 
support grant. She also began to report him to the police for abuse.  
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Asanda’s husband stopped beating her out of fear of being arrested in Johannesburg, 
where it was easy for Asanda to go to the police. He only beat her when they were in the 
rural areas. In Johannesburg the police were always present.  
It was because of the children that Asanda persevered in the marriage. She did want 
to divorce her husband earlier in the marriage but her children asked her not to leave. 
She decided that it was best that she stay with her children. She had five girls and two 
boys, but one of her daughters passed away the year before. Only one of her children, a 
daughter, is now married. The others are too scared to as they are traumatised by what 
they saw their mother go through. They say they do not want to be abused in their 
marriages.  
Asanda is still with her husband. She has long forgiven him because she is a religious 
woman and committed to her church. She prays a lot. Her husband is much better now 
– the result of becoming a churchgoer. He does not like talking about the past, about the 
way he used to abuse Asanda. He says these things stress him a lot. When she tries to 
mention the past abuse to him, he does not allow her to finish. He does feel remorse for 
what he did but he keeps quiet when she speaks of his actions.  
She is trying to let it pass, the things of the past, but it is difficult for the pain to end. 
Her blood pressure is continuously high. Her father passed away and she still blames him 
for what he did. Her life turned into this because of him. He didn’t want her to get an 
education. Ukuthwala was the norm during her youth. It does still happen but now girls are 
reporting it to the police. Recently a man abducted a girl but the police intervened and 
now others in the community are afraid to get involved with ukuthwala. During her 
girlhood, although there were police around they would not intervene in cases of 
abduction or domestic abuse. This is why reporting to police was not an option for her 
and other girls. Sometimes they would even think of hanging themselves because not even 
their own parents were willing to help them out.  
 
 212 
8.3 ANELE’S STORY 
Anele was thwele at age 14. Her mother was also married through ukuthwala. Her 
husband, Anele’s father, was a drunkard who would drink all the time and only bring 
home R10 for the family. He beat her mother badly. Eventually Anele’s mother left the 
marriage with her two children. While looking for a job, Anele’s mother left her and her 
sibling with other women. Once she had found a stable home, job and had also gotten 
married, she brought the children back. That was when Anele was thwelwe. 
In the new marriage, Anele’s mother met Anele’s future sister-in-law, whose family 
lived nearby. Together they arranged for Anele to be married. Anele believes that her 
mother thought it better for her to go and start her own family since she was not the child 
of the mother’s new husband. If she remained, she would not belong, even with her 
maternal family. Since Anele’s own mother was married through ukuthwala she likely 
thought it right to continue the tradition.  
Anele was in standard four when the abduction took place. It was late in the evening 
and she was cleaning her feet to sleep and go to school in the morning. While she was 
bathing in the waskom (silver wash tub) the men arrived. One man grabbed her and raised 
her legs high in the air for the other men to grab them. Anele was never involved in the 
marriage negotiations nor informed about the impending abduction. She was defenceless 
as the men travelled with her to their destination. It was dark and they walked through 
the bushes. She was covered with a blanket so that others would not recognise her from 
her screams.  
Anele tried to come up with tricks to escape. She asked for them to release her so 
that she could go and urinate. She began to run but then she fell. They caught her and 
beat her. During the abduction the men did not tell Anele who they were nor where they 
were taking her. At the destination she was put into the room of her husband, and this is 
how she discovered who her husband was. He had been there during the abduction but 
did not sympathise while she was crying and being beaten along the journey.  
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As a newly abducted makoti, she was not allowed to leave that room for a week. On 
the first night, people stood listening outside the room while her husband raped her. 
Following the act, her husband took a bloodstained cloth to prove her virginity to the 
elders. Those waiting outside had heard her screams. She was crying since she was a 
virgin. Yet, she could not fight him for being exhausted from the running and beatings 
during the journey. Her husband raised her legs high to his chest to ensure that she was 
defenceless when she tried to fight the pain of his penetrating her. He did not let go of her 
legs until he penetrated her.  
The husband had to make sure that he took Anele’s virginity and that she bled. 
These acts of violence ensured that Anele remained with him. They also assured that she 
physically could not run away as it was difficult for her to walk for about a week. She could 
have attempted an escape after that week, while fetching water at the river, but the thought 
of being mocked and isolated back home discouraged her from leaving. She was no longer 
a girl yet also not a mother. If she went back home she would not even be allowed to 
attend ceremonies, nor could she attend school. 
After her arrival, her in-laws set a timeframe for her to become pregnant. She was 
subjected to immense pressure. Her first child died during birth. Being so young, the pain 
was too great and she could not push during the birthing. Her body was immature. This 
led to the death of the child. Luckily, Anele and her mother-in-law had a good 
relationship. Anele would take her to see her daughter when she was sick. One time, after 
Anele had dropped her mother-in-law off at the daughter’s home, Anele decided to go 
and see her uncle. Upon returning she discovered that her mother-in-law had died. Her 
husband’s family accused her of killing the mother. The accusations and bad-mouthing 
added to Anele’s pain of being abducted. She decided to leave.  
While away from her husband’s homestead, his family found another woman to 
marry him and take her place. The new wife also left him, at which point the in-laws called 
Anele back. She returned since she had a child with him by then. Her husband began to 
have affairs in Johannesburg and fathered children outside of the marriage. On the third 
encounter, Anele left him and did not come back for eight years. During that time her 
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husband married another woman with whom he had two children. Anele only returned 
because she was afraid of what would happen to her own children whom she had left 
behind. She had learned that the wife was abusing her children, and that her son had 
started taking drugs. Anele’s husband negotiated with her mother for Anele to return. On 
her arrival at the husband’s homestead she declared that she was there for the children 
only. The children eventually began to feel more secure since Anele was there and the 
other wife left.  
Anele stayed in her marriage. She has five children. She says she and her husband 
survived the marriage through perseverance. He is remorseful for how he abused her. 
What has helped her is the continuous talking about what happened to her with the help 
of Masimanyane. She has travelled to different places to talk about her experiences, 
including before government bodies. Talking has helped her healing and she can now 
speak openly about what happened in the past. If she had not encountered Masimanyane 
she does not know how she would have handled the emotions that she was keeping to 
herself.  The trainings she attended helped her to not hold onto the past, but to deal with 
it so that she could proceed with her life. 
Anele has grown stronger and has been pivotal in dealing with family matters. 
Though she has little money, she is the financial provider for the family as her husband 
does not work. In addition to her government grant she developed projects to bring in 
income and to uplift women in her community. Anele organised for women in the area to 
help each other plough, and also create a money rotation system so that everyone is more 
financially secure. Ukuthwala continues to happen in other areas, especially Mthatha. She 
is concerned about ukuthwala in modern times, the struggles of young girls, and the 
ukuthwala wounds that [older] women are still carrying.  
8.4 REFLECTIONS 
As we all spoke and supported the survivors during the group interview, the 
Masimanyane staff shared their insights with me. They spoke about violence in marriage 
and the influence of culture, and how women who were thwelwe are living with the pain of 
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unhealed wounds. Critical of the lack of intervention by society at large, one counsellor 
rhetorically asked: “And the society, what actually the correction that they are doing to 
the women who are still in those wounds?” (Interviewee 11). Asanda cried during her 
telling of her story, and we took breaks to let her breathe and to console her. One of the 
counsellors rubbed her back. “It’s a lot of pain! It’s a lot of pain!” the counsellors declared 
(Interviewees 11, 12). It is pain that the survivors feel when they speak of their past, it 
comes to the surface, “it doesn’t end.” For Black rural women, marriage is, as one of the 
counsellors said, “a very difficult journey” (Interviewee 12).  
The Masimanyane community workers informed me that when they started 
working with Anele, she was just like Asanda was that day. “Can you see,” the counsellor 
said, referring to Anele’s composure, “when she’s telling the story, she’s stronger because...  
it’s not the first time, she’s always telling lots of interviews” (Interviewee 11). She 
continued: “On first and second interview she was crying! She was crying! Crying!... now 
she is stronger because she’s always having these interviews, always talking about this, and 
it’s healing in a way.” This is not to say that the absence of tears necessarily means that 
someone is stronger. The Masimanyane staff do not encourage the survivors to hide their 
feelings or to put on a mask of resilience. But, they have seen Anele grow from feeling 
helpless and disempowered in her marriage, home and community, to making peace with 
the past, becoming financially independent and taking up a position of leadership in her 
community.  
Paralleling the social barrier motif of Chapter 6, the counsellors emphasised the fact 
that [Black] women, “they learn. They learn to stay in their marriages” (Interviewee 12). 
Even if the marriage is very broken, they learn to stay. This is what they have been taught. 
What makes spaces such as the ones provided by Masimanyane so vital is that they give 
women the safety to simply be, to cry, to bare their wounds and vulnerabilities. So often, 
Black womanhood is ascribed the characteristics of strength, endurance and 
perseverance.625 The language of the Mvamvu judgment regurgitates the stereotype that 
                                               
625 Philile Ntuli, “Defending Shabangu: On the Strengh/Ening and Weakness/Ing of Black 
Women,” The Centre for Law and Society Blogspot, 26 June 2017, 
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Black women are not feeling beings; they can withstand unspeakable abuse and yet feel 
minimal pain or none at all. 
The ukuthwala script suppresses the voices of older Black women, as though violent 
ukuthwala and the accompanying suffering is a recent phenomenon. By masking the 
ravages of marital rape over generations, the ukuthwala discourse perpetuates the cliché of 
stoic and formidable bomama,626 bearing up their families and communities on their 
indefatigable shoulders.  
In an opinion piece, feminist commentator Ntuli critiqued the tenacity of harmful 
conceptions of Black womanhood in South African discourse. Speaking of Black mothers 
and grandmothers, she wrote: “We must confront the reality that we live in a society where 
extra-ordinary women do not speak… We measure their stature by how much they do 
not complain or share anguish with others. We nobilise their silent suffering and in turn 
recreate tropes for the present and the future about the hidden beauty of Black women.”627 
For the sake of their children, and because of alienation by their families, Anele 
and Asanda stayed in their marriages. It is only as a result of the trainings provided by 
Masimanyane that they have been able to open and unburden themselves. Although 
Asanda and Anele are aware that in some areas girls are now fighting for their rights, there 
still remains the concern about the hold of patriarchy over parts of the Eastern Cape. Not 
every girl can escape her marriage, and not all rural women have access to safe spaces to 
speak about abuse. In this way the façade of Black female fortitude is maintained. 
In terms of the brutal forms of ukuthwala that are characterised by abduction, 
beating and rape, Anele and Asanda’s experiences attest to the very entrenched and 
intimate connection between marriage and violence. Within the areas that the survivors 
                                               
https://clsblogspot.wordpress.com/2017/06/26/defending-shabangu-on-the-strengthening-and-
weaknessing-of-black-women/. 
626 Mothers.  
627 Ntuli “Defending Shabangu.”  
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grew up in, the forms of ukuthwala that they endured were the norm, an accepted part of 
forming a marital union. This is why their parents did not rescue them. Anele’s testimony 
of her rape is striking. It demonstrates that rape in the context of marriage, and rape 
generally, has nothing to do with lust. It is an act of power, utility and symbolism. 
Complicit in the violence, an audience waited with anticipation outside the room where 
Anele’s husband raped her. By raping her he proved her virginity and the potency of his 
manhood, flaunting the evidence of the bloodstained cloth. The rape also wounded Anele 
to prevent her from escaping, and most critically irretrievably transformed her social status 
so that she could not return home. The acts that her husband and both families committed 
upon her body reinforced the idea of women and girls as objects designed for the inscribing 
of male superiority and the supremacy of family. 
Asanda and Anele seemed hopeful that with police intervention and increasing 
intolerance for ukuthwala, the prevalence of forced marriage will decrease. They are 
nonetheless aware that awareness levels and police intervention are uneven within the 
Eastern Cape. Anele pointed out Mthatha as an ukuthwala hotspot. Nonetheless, as the 
survivors could not rely upon police assistance in their youth, they welcome the availability 
of criminal justice system in contemporary times. Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted the 
contradictory nature of criminal justice responses. In some areas the police and courts 
plainly decline to get involved in cultural matters, while in others, and as the survivors’ 
testimony affirms, the police are protecting women and girls from abuse in the home.  
The narratives also document the centrality of non-legal forms of support for 
women. The survivors’ value Masimanyane’s training and counselling; resources that 
emphasise emotional healing and the acquiring of knowledge about rights. The 
interventions of Masimanyane in their rural communities sparked a trajectory of 
introspection and healing. Anele said that her sense of peace and independence are the 
outcome of the empowerment engendered by Masimanyane. Asanda is in the early stages 
of her journey, but for now is at least given the space to weep and to speak openly in a 
supportive and pro-woman environment. She will travel along her path of healing at her 
own pace.   
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The Masimanyane staff are excited about their work and advocacy work in 
general. Awareness raising and campaigns are helping women to know that the practices 
of violence and discrimination are not good. With education and more knowledge women 
are equipped to make better decisions for themselves and to pass these lessons onto their 
children. The counsellors also made the point that in this democratic society, “things now 
are being on the table.” There are ukuthwala cases in the media, there is training, and more 
transparency. “We are all aware that rural women are still oppressed,” one of the 
counsellors commented (Interviewee 11). Gay women are being forced to marry, and 
women who do not bear children are brutalised. Women “only get recognised or listened 
to when they are in the shadows of their husbands,” she remarked and continued, “(w)e 
can’t continue begging for men’s mercy.” For now, they will continue to do work 
according to the saying, “one mother is a help to other mothers.” Yet, this also means that 
women are both victimised and must also do the work of liberating themselves. Men 
largely remain unaccountable and unscathed, and Black women have no choice but to lift 
each other up.  
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9 Chapter 9: The Journey’s End 
9.1 MY OWN BEGINNING  
When I began the journey of conducting empirical research on marital rape, I 
erroneously believed that I had a good sense of what I may find. I did not know the precise 
substance and form of what my research would unearth, but based on my own feminist 
orientation and prior research on women, I held preconceptions about marital rape and 
how victims respond. It was only once I immersed myself in the field that I became aware 
of what my preconceptions actually were, and that I, in fact, was naïve in certain respects 
about the extent of the erasure of marital rape in localities of contemporary South Africa. 
The job of a researcher, I learned as I went along, is to shed what one thinks one knows. 
If you hold too tightly onto certainty, it precludes deep learning. You miss enriching and 
important phenomena; and miss the opportunity to see your research subject and 
environment anew.  
As I commenced my interviews with counsellors, some were slightly confounded as 
to why I was focusing on marital rape and attempted to redirect the conversation to 
intimate partner violence broadly, and to other forms of abuse – the forms for which their 
clients most frequently sought assistance. Violence in intimate partner relationships and 
marriage have the same characteristics, one counsellor informed me, as she tried to 
encourage me to relinquish my concentration on marital rape. I began to doubt whether 
I would find anything consequential, and whether I was making a mistake by researching 
marital rape as a discrete issue.  
Because Mosaic and Masimanyane are women’s rights organisations, safe havens 
for victims of violence, I created a picture in my head of how victims would present and 
relieve themselves in these institutions. I imagined women raising the issue of marital rape 
right away, for I thought – again too simplistically – that because rape is such a deep 
violation of a persons’ dignity, this would be the first and most pressing issue for survivors. 
“What could be more violative and violent, than rape?” I pondered.  
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As I persisted amidst my confusion, an epiphany emerged. A talk with my supervisor 
and time self-reflecting enlightened me to the fact that I had been looking at my subject 
in the wrong way. I had neglected to appreciate the meaning of some counsellors’ 
befuddlement and their inclination to talk about things other than marital rape. The fact 
that some counsellors did not frequently encounter marital rape cases, or lumped these 
cases under the category of intimate partner violence or domestic violence, had meaning. 
Informants’ detracting from the subject of marital rape, compounded by the hidden state 
of marital rape even within feminist sanctuaries, was a reflection of reality. Marital rape, 
as a counsellor at Mosaic declared to me, has been hiding. That reality of stubborn 
invisibility, I determined, was my subject.  
I grew more open to the seeming absence of marital rape as I conducted my 
interviews, and I learned to make meaning of the silences, as well as to ask questions 
differently to elicit information about the issue. As I grew more perceptive and travelled 
to different locations, the subject became more prominent in my interviews, and 
informants had a considerable amount to tell. The focus of my questions became why and 
how the subject of marital rape is hiding, and what community factors make it hard for 
women to find help. Given these constraints, I also sought to ascertain how marital rape 
does come to the surface, and how women find relief.  
9.2 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
I conceived of this dissertation as being exploratory and fluid, and this is why I chose 
the seemingly abstract theme of (in)visibility as the foundation of my questions. Weaving 
the concept of (in)visibility throughout my dissertation allowed for me to create a story of 
texture and dimension. It is a narrative of concrete and symbolic terms. The story 
embodies how the subject of marital rape comes to the fore in formal and informal spaces. 
Concomitantly the accounts depict the forces that preclude a revelation of the scale of 
sexual violence and stifle survivors’ ability to find recourse. The dissertation is a tapestry 
of sorts. The thread of (in)visibility allows for contradictions and irresolution to become 
apparent – for us to simultaneously perceive regress and progress in the law and women’s 
recourse-seeking journeys.  
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Though the framework for the research rests on institutional responses, 
fundamentally it is about women’s lives. The underlying motivation of feminist research 
is to consistently agitate against accepted or missing discourses on women’s lives, to upset 
existing paradigms that concern women, and to be subversive even as it makes itself known 
in a broader intellectual community. As I knew that formal iterations of the law and 
cultural norms had bolstered the position of men over their wives until very recent times, 
I proceeded from the position that this history still influenced the present. Steered by Black 
and African feminist thought, I have incessantly posed probing questions, to dig beneath 
the ostensibly smooth surface of the law’s progression, and to extract a more elaborate 
story of marital rape and of Black women’s lives. And through an interpretivist research 
ideology, I allowed meaning to develop from perspectives of the women with whom I 
spoke. Throughout, I paid attention to silences relating to marital rape; silences in 
literature and discourse, and the silences of survivors.  
In answering both the central and sub-research questions, I have refrained from 
portraying institutions and survivors in reductive or simplistic terms. The ecological 
paradigm I employed has given rise to a tapestry of themes that are full of contradictions 
and intricacies. The ecological framework is a tool for stepping away from linear and 
superficial depictions of women’s circumstances. There is much to be learned at each level, 
but a more elaborate portrait is drawn by searching across and between the different 
systems and environments that make up the human experience. I have looked at the 
microsystem which is the family and social sphere; the macrosystem which denotes the 
cultural context of the individual, family and community; and the exosystem which refers 
to larger social and economic forces. The mesosystem has brought to light how the 
individual interacts with formal institutions such as community organisations, churches, 
police and courts.   
The sub-questions that I raised touched upon each component of the ecological 
framework presenting both a macro and micro-view of the phenomenon of marital rape 
and institutions, and illustrating how the cumulative force of the systems shape survivors’ 
lives. My answers to the questions highlight the modalities of institutions’ complicity in 
fostering environments that allow for marital rape to flourish. In parallel, the research 
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sheds light on the forms of relief that these same institutions provide to survivors and the 
kinds of succour that survivors find meaningful and effective. Furthermore, and most 
importantly, my analysis discloses how women in present-day South Africa live, and have 
lived with extreme levels of violence in their marriages. It describes the wounds that they 
are carrying on and within their bodies; wounds not always immediately perceptible to 
the eye. Alongside the unveiling of violence, I also document survivors’ agency and the 
steps they take to improve their existences. 
9.2.1 The Legal Roots 
The past bears on the contemporary framing of wives’ identities and agency, or 
lack thereof. To provide historical context for the invisibility of marital rape, I have 
recounted how women’s entry into the institution of marriage transformed them into the 
property of their husbands. That is what the law dictated, with English law referring to an 
irrevocable contract and Roman-Dutch law casting wives as naturally inferior beings. The 
traditions of some Black South African populations too nullified wives’ ability to claim 
redress for rape by their husbands. Just as slavery positioned Black women as “both will-
less and always willing,”628 in the case of marriage in regions under an English and/or 
Roman-Dutch common law influence, the law shifted focus away from the violent excesses 
of husbands, instead ascribing women the identity of subservient and sexed beings.  
Bearing in mind the importance of historical legacies, I have shown how the law 
held ambivalence towards marital rape into modern times, even with the passage of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act (PFVA) in 1993. This provided the answer to my first 
research sub-question which asks: Prior to and post-1993, how have ostensibly progressive 
legal and policy developments contributed to a disavowal of marital rape? My 
interrogation of the processes around the criminalisation of marital rape expose a 
disinclination on the part of lawmakers to accord wives protection from sexual violence.  
Though celebrated as an achievement for its undoing of the marital rape 
exemption, the PFVA was the poorly constructed tactic of a political party desperate to 
                                               
628 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 81. 
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draw the votes of women as apartheid faded. From the 1980s onwards, South Africa 
lawmakers missed opportunity after opportunity to discursively confront the myths that 
formed the basis of the marital rape exemption, and to make clear that marital rape is a 
serious matter that deserves criminal justice redress just as other forms of rape do. 
My critical analysis of the PFVA and its foundation uncovered that it was less 
about protection for women, and more about preserving the family unit. Moreover, the 
Act almost retained the marital rape exemption, as only the final version of the relevant 
provision completely criminalised marital rape. Even as the PFVA was replaced by the 
Domestic Violence Act (DVA), the South African Law Commission declined to 
meaningfully consider the issue of marital rape until wholesale rape law reform took place. 
Consequently, the foundation of legislative treatment of marital rape is thin and 
unresolved, and this ambivalence emboldened, as opposed to deconstructed, the 
longstanding notion that rape in marriage does not exist.  
9.2.2 The Erasure of Marital Rape in Recent Judgements    
Following the historical contextualising, I analysed the small universe of marital 
rape cases available at the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal levels in order to 
answer the question: How does contemporary South African legal discourse reinforce the 
myth that marital rape is a lesser form of rape? Placing rape myths at the centre of my 
evaluation, I exposed how contemporary legal discourse mirrors the pro-marital rape 
exemptions sentiments of Parliamentarians and judges in the pre-PFVA era. Eschewing 
an uncritical portrayal of the application of rape stereotypes, I problematised rape myth 
theories, and utilised neutralisation theory to explain how patriarchal caricatures of rape 
make their way from the social sphere and into the legal sphere. The central argument I 
made here is that the culturally sanctioned rape myths create a common bond between 
rapist and judge, and they draw upon the same language and techniques to justify marital 
rape. 
Parsing the language of sentencing determinations in three marital rape 
judgements (Mvamvu, Modise and Moipolai), I drew out the neutralisation techniques 
exploited by the judges to minimise the culpability of the husbands who had been 
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convicted of marital rape. Through the techniques of denial of injury and denial of the 
victim, the judges negated the human-ness and suffering of the victims. I argued that  
Mvamvu is a singularly confounding case because of how essentialist notions of Blackness 
and rural culture are leveraged to make light of marital rape and the resultant trauma 
caused to women. In this case, the Court employed discriminatory ideas of rural traditions, 
Blackness and gender roles to present the wife as a second-class citizen who is in effect 
unrapeable. Despite the affirmation of the convictions handed down by the trial courts, 
the tone of the three appeal judgments is replete with myths that trivialise marital rape, 
contributing to the invisibility of this form of violence.   
I also discussed how feminists took note of the pernicious reasoning that came to 
light in rape decisions following the enactment of the Minimum Sentences Act of 1997, 
and that their critiques of Mvamvu and other decisions served as the basis for the limiting 
of  judicial discretion in sentencing under the 2007 Amendment to the Act. Though it is 
early to tell, there are signs the courts are transforming.  
9.2.3 Ukuthwala and Culturalism 
Although the great outpouring of institutional concern and action since 2009 
around the ‘emergence’ of violent and distorted forms of ukuthwala has its positive aspects, 
I have sought to insert a more critical perspective into the ukuthwala discourse. As a feminist 
researcher I could not rest easy, applauding the intensified media attention, jurisprudence, 
scholarship and community advocacy, when in fact the ukuthwala push is premised upon 
numerous problematic assumptions about violence against women. In light of my 
uneasiness, I methodically critiqued what I have termed the ‘ukuthwala crusade,’ specifying 
its flaws and negative implications for collective understandings of marital rape. To this 
aim, I asked the question: how does institutional culturalism obscure the link between 
sexual violence and marriage? 
To answer this question, I portrayed how the unifying message of the ukuthwala 
crusade bears the marks of culturalism – a one-dimensional way of looking at culture. The 
effect of the culturalist script is that it straightjackets rural Black subjects into pre-
determined modes of behaviour and thought. By delineating that “authentic” ukuthwala is 
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uniformly practiced and benign, the crusade (in)visibilises women who were thwelwe and 
raped in the process decades ago. Decrying rape in ukuthwala as an aberrant act, the script 
cancels out forms of living customary law and practice. Taking comfort in the certainty of 
legal positivism and the imagined homogeneity and benevolence of culture, ukuthwala is 
reduced to  forced child marriage, and the men who abduct and rape them are cast as 
lustful paedophiles, acting in flagrant violation of customary norms. The Jezile judgment 
concretises that position. The premise of the crusade is that rape in marriage is rare. Yet, 
I argue that ukuthwala symbolises the linkages between marriage and rape, with the former 
sanctioning the latter. Ukuthwala is not only a statutory rape issue, it is at its essence, a 
marital rape issue.  
To further highlight how institutions ignore the link between sexual violence and 
marriage, I elucidated how the ukuthwala script ignores the embodiments of patriarchy in 
local spaces that placed women in inferior positions over generations. The nature and 
intensity of this patriarchy changed through the interventions and manipulations of 
colonialism and apartheid. My description of how cultural norms prevented women from 
having autonomy over their bodies in marriage is not included to make the claim that 
“Black culture” is entirely patriarchal. It is not, and women have always found ways to 
exercise their agency. But, there are embedded norms around sexual violence and 
marriage that stem from the past, and hold strong in the present.   
9.2.4  Individual and Institutional Barriers 
In the latter part of my dissertation I move into the empirical realm to present the 
findings from my interviews with women’s rights community workers and survivors of 
coercive ukuthwala. For my findings, I commenced by asking the question: In what ways 
do individual and local contexts hinder women’s ability to seek recourse for marital rape? 
As I referred to at the start of the conclusion of this dissertation, the invisibility of marital 
rape resonated most strongly with me as I began to interview the organisation staff. The 
hidden state of marital rape stems from a combination of individual conditioning, 
institutional positioning and structural inequality. With police, family, churches and 
traditional authorities reinforcing patriarchal norms of sexual violence in marriage, 
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women internalise the belief that their husband is superior, that he is owed sex, and that 
they possess little or no freedom to act autonomously.  
The data illuminates that violence is an all-encompassing feature of women’s lives. 
They live in circumstances in which they must determine how to survive against an 
onslaught of physical, verbal, psychological and economic abuse, and in that climate of 
abuse, sexual violence is not at the forefront of their minds. The correlation between other 
forms of abuse and sexual abuse is very high. For fear of being left economically destitute 
or being beaten in retaliation, some women make the decision to not fight the rapes. For 
these reasons, survivors tend not to volunteer information about sexual violence when they 
do go to non-profit organisations (NPOs) like Mosaic and Masimanyane; or they speak 
about sexual violence in passing. 
Survivors are hard pressed to find relief from formal and informal institutions. 
Especially where lobola has been paid, and the husband supports the wife’s family, families 
are reluctant to intervene to stop the abuse. For ukuthwala, rape is the norm amongst some 
communities. Where families and traditional authorities have benefited from the 
abduction, survivors can rarely rely upon them for rescue. The churches also encourage 
women to stay in their marriages, no matter the level of abuse. The resounding message 
that women receive from these institutions is that they must learn to persevere; they must 
learn to stay in their marriages.  
Alternatively, women may try to seek help from the courts and police, but the 
advocacy work of Masimanyane and Mosaic signals the alarming levels of apathy, poor 
training and discrimination on the part of these institutions. There are police who 
genuinely want to do their job well, but they are ignorant of protection order procedures. 
More worrying is the fact that court and police personnel mock marital rape survivors – 
asking them how it is possible for them to be raped by their husbands. They encourage 
women to file protection orders as opposed to criminal charges. And, detectives are 
disinclined to investigate marital rape cases because of the administrative work they entail, 
as well as the prospect that the couple might reconcile. Overall, the (in)visibilising factors 
outlined in this part of this dissertation leaves an unpromising impression of the chances 
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that survivors of marital have to find protection. It is no wonder then, that the counsellors 
repeatedly spoke of how violence in the home can result in the death of the survivor. That 
is what is at stake for wives who are raped by their husbands.  
9.2.5 Finding Relief 
A contrast is necessary to that of highlighting survivors’ agency and the forms of 
recourse that they find accessible and meaningful. After detailing the forces that invisibilise 
marital rape, I subsequently sought to provide answers to the question: In the face of 
silence surrounding sexual violence in marriage, what forms of recourse do women draw 
upon that positively impact their lives? My interviews with Mosaic and Masimanyane 
staff, and clients of Masimanyane reveals that empowerment of survivors through 
education and counselling is a pivotal part of their healing, but this is a process that takes 
time and sensitivity to survivors’ mindsets and trauma. The empowerment leads to a 
naming of the violence, an appreciation of one’s rights to dignity and equality in marriage, 
and conscious decision-making.  
There are no typical endings for survivors, and no forms of thought or action are 
imposed on them by the NPOs. The philosophy of Mosaic and Masimanyane is that their 
clients must determine for themselves what direction they want their futures to take, for 
then they are more likely to follow that direction through. The organisations are merely 
facilitators and guides. My research also contributes a localised picture of what justice and 
relief mean for women. Yes, the law can play its part, and sometimes it must play its part 
in situations where a woman’s life is immediately at risk. Nonetheless, the women’s 
journeys delineate that well-being can be found through emotional and psychological 
healing. It doesn’t necessarily entail a dramatic exit from the marriage, or having one’s 
day in court.   
To end the dissertation, I presented the life histories of two women who had 
survived violent forms of ukuthwala. For Anele, healing took the form of finding peace with 
the past and in her marriage, and growing to be an influential member of her community; 
a woman who empowers other women. Asanda’s story attests to the longevity of the pain 
of coercive ukuthwala and marital rape, a burden that most women carry in silence. The 
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perspectives of women like Anele and Asanda are largely absent from the ukuthwala 
discourse, and we have to ask ourselves, why? In this regard, one of the educators under 
Masimanyane’s ukuthwala project said that the erasure of survivors’ voices represents “the 
normalisation of violence against women, period.” And I agree.    
9.3 WHERE ARE WE GOING? 
At present, Mosaic and Masimanyane and other community-based groups are 
performing critical interventions in the lives of women who are survivors of abuse. They 
represent a beacon of hope, and the police and courts do too in the instances where they 
do what they are mandated to do. Still, one cannot help but draw the conclusion that the 
NPOs often do the work that the state should be doing, and that the authorities would not 
perform as well were it not for the constant vigilance of the NPOs.  
The informants relayed that the police and courts immediately refer clients to them 
because of their expertise and resources. But this places an undue burden on the 
organisations, and detracts from the structural deficiencies of the courts and the police. As 
a symbiosis, the relationships between NPOs and authorities undoubtedly have their 
benefits. The government personnel who staff the front desks can refer clients to the NPOs 
so that clients are better informed about how to interact with the system and receive case 
assistance preparation. Working with and within government structures enables the NPOs 
to have influence in those spaces – to monitor the work of the courts and authorities, to 
advocate with the powers that be when needed, and reach a larger population of women 
who are in need of help.  
But, what would happen if community groups Masimanyane, Mosaic, Rape Crisis, 
Ilitha Labantu, and People Opposing Women Abuse did not exist?  And what happens to 
survivors who do not have access to help from NPOs, or do not know that they can receive 
help? How much grimmer are their prospects for finding recourse? As we take stock of the 
hidden nature of marital rape and the complications in bringing it to light, further research 
on this issue is imperative. Research with women who have not had interactions with 
NPOs would provide an important contrast, documenting how women address marital 
 229 
rape with fewer or different resources. The present research is also region specific – 
covering Eastern Cape and Western Cape, as such there is significant room and need for 
empirical work to be undertaken in other parts of South Africa. 
A few years from now it will also be interesting to see how the jurisprudence on 
marital rape develops. Will judges continue to follow Mvamvu or will the courts articulate 
a woman-centric view of marital rape in their reasoning? For the specific subject of 
ukuthwala, auspiciously, there is a growth of empirical studies in communities that follow 
the practice, and this will perhaps shift the tone of the ukuthwala discourse.  
9.4 THE UNHEALED WOUNDS   
After absorbing the findings of my desktop and empirical research, I was left to 
wonder about the condition of South Africa and its women and girls. The nation is steeped 
in violence; it is everywhere and in everything. From the numerous studies, we know much 
about the levels of rape that ravage South Africa, rape of women and men, of boys and 
girls, of babies. We know that the prevalence studies only capture the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of violence, and official rape statistics can only communicate so much.  
From my research, I came to understand, in terms much clearer than before, how 
women are vessels of pain. Through their bodies, they have the ability to withstand and 
hide pain for a lifetime, even as their spirits wither. They do not have outlets because they 
are taught to be self-sacrificing – to put their families first, their husbands, and children. 
They must place countless responsibilities on their shoulders and still stand.  
It is not surprising that there reaches a point when they must break. In the past, 
through acts of “insanity” and “rebellion” women in Xhosa-speaking communities could 
escape their marriages.629 Thus it was only by violating the established and firm hlonipha 
                                               
629 The culturally prescribed methods of protest in Xhosa-speaking communities involved acts 
through which the makoti presented herself as mad and defiant – these mainly entailed direct violations of 
the hlonipha custom (see below). 
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rules – negating their makoti status – that women could literally break free from oppressive 
marriages without the aid of their families.630 In the present, Black women do experience 
breakdowns, having reached the limit of suppressing suffering. We just do not see Black 
women break – as the Mvamvu case displayed. Black women are apparently unbreakable 
and unhurtable. They exhibit only slight and temporary symptoms after horrifying 
violence, even after being raped eight times.  
There are two stories that come to mind, told to me during one of my interviews 
with a court counsellor at Masimanyane. The counsellor, who has worked for 
Masimanyane since the 1990s, was wanting to impart how most survivors of sexual 
violence keep things to themselves, and very few talk to anyone about being raped and 
abused (Interviewee 8). One client had been married through ukuthwala and she eventually 
left the marriage when her sons were grown up because the husband had abused her 
during the marriage. The sons had behavioural problems and during one session the client 
was complaining to the counsellor about them taking drugs and other things. She was an 
old client of the counsellor’s and so they knew each other well. The counsellor responded 
that she hoped the children would start to behave since they were no longer teenagers, 
but she could see that the client was very unsettled. “I think,” the client began, “they’re 
doing this, because they are products of rape, they are product of rape.” Puzzled, the 
counsellor asked what the client meant.  “I never say yes to my husband when he sleep to 
me, all these years, he was just getting to bed and then open my legs and do this, and I’m 
getting pregnant, give birth, and then getting pregnant, and giving… they are products of 
rape!” she screamed in hysterics. She had kept these things to herself for so long, and they 
had been haunting her. The casual conversation with the counsellor triggered her, 
unleashing a lifetime’s worth of trauma from marital rape.  
                                               
630 The hlonipha custom represents an elaborate systems of rules and constraints that persons within 
a family are required to adhere to, and are determined by gender/age and position within the family. The 
rules are most stringent for newly married women as they begin life within their husband’s household. For 
example, the makoti is prohibited from using certain names relating to their husband’s family in their 
vocabulary, and cannot take certain routes/enter within particular parts of the homestead.   
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The counsellor had also told me about another woman she had encountered. The 
client had been suffering from chronic back and headaches. Her husband was also 
concerned about her because she was not interested in sex and was frequently angry and 
short tempered. He encouraged her to see someone. She said to the counsellor, “I’m not 
sick, I’m not sick but I’ve got this thing inside me for years. Ever since I was 11.” She then 
told the counsellor that from the time she was 11 years old different men had sexually 
abused her, and that her mother had orchestrated the abuse. When she had gone to live 
with her mother (who was a domestic worker) and her stepfather, one day the mother said 
to the stepfather, “when I’m not around you must try to satisfy yourself to this child and 
everything.” The client started crying, confused about what her mother was saying. The 
mother then got some Vaseline, took her panty off, and helped the stepfather to rape her. 
From that day on, the rapes continued. The mother also took the client to the home of 
the white family that she was working for, and forced her to play with the employer’s 
penis. The employer paid the mother for these “services.” Eventually the mother 
abandoned the daughter, left her with the white employers, and went to work in 
Johannesburg. 
While with the white family, the client said she became the “wife” of the old man, 
meaning he continued to sexually abuse her. Then the son of the employer also began to 
sexually abuse her. She ran away when she was 16. “So Sisi… I never told anybody,” she 
divulged to the counsellor. She was in her 30s by this time. She began to roll on the floor 
screaming, “this thing is eating me!!” The counsellor immediately referred her to a 
psychologist, and at the time of our interview the woman was still receiving psychological 
help. Profoundly impacted by what she had witnessed, the counsellor said that it is 
staggering how women can bottle things up for so many years.  
If there is one thing that can be taken from the research, it is to truly appreciate the 
human element of the sexual violence that is documented in prevalence studies and that 
enters the courts in form of rape charges. Behind the “percentage,” the “complainant” 
label or the “victim” label, it is paramount that we understand the ubiquitous nature of 
violence in women’s lives, and how that violence shapes them and moulds them. The law 
has its limitations in humanising its subjects, and this is why empirical work is so critical. 
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The present research makes known some of the forms of marital rape, and other abuse, 
to which women are subjected, and how they navigate extremely hostile spaces. Some are 
fortunate enough to find relief and to speak of their suffering. But, the majority of women 
who endure marital rape will keep their silence, and tuck the violence under a shroud of 
feigned strength; strength that is so often taken for granted in Black women.   
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Supervisor: Dee Smythe 
Guide for Interviews with Organisation Staff 
 
§ What is your full name? 
§ What is your professional title at _______? 
§ What responsibilities do you have as part of this job? 
§ How long have you worked at ________? 
§ Did you hold previous positions at _________? 
§ What were your duties when you held those positions? 
§ For how long have you been working with survivors of sexual violence? 
§ What made you interested in doing this kind of work?  
§ What kinds of sexual violence cases do you tend to assist with most frequently?? (rape by 
strangers, intimate partner violence, child abuse etc.?) 
§ How do your clients generally come to learn about the work that _______ does? 
§ What kinds of services do they seek from you?   
§ How often do you learn of cases of marital rape?  
§ Based on your work in this community, how do people view marital rape? Do they talk 
about it? Do they see it as rape?  
§ Under what circumstances do marital rape survivors seek assistance from your organisation? 
§ What kinds of services are marital rape survivors looking for when they come to you? 
§ What kinds of help did they seek before coming to you (family, police, traditional leaders, 
clinic etc.)?  
§ What kinds of help are you able to provide to them or refer them to? 
§ What are some of the challenges that these women face in obtaining help for the abuse? 
§ Are the challenges that wives face different to those of other rape survivors? If yes, how?  
§ Based on your experience, what do you see as being the most effective sources of recourse 
for women who are experiencing rape by their husbands?  
§ What sources of recourse are not so helpful?  
§ What are some of the outcomes of cases of marital rape that you or Masimanyane has 
assisted with?    
§ Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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